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Psycholinguist ics  is the s tudy o f  the menta l  processes and  skills underlying 
the p ro d u c t io n  and  com prehens ion  o f  language,  and  o f  the acquisi t ion o f  
these skills. This chap te r  will deal with the fo rm er  aspect only; for  the ac­
quisi t ion o f  language see the suggested “ F u r th e r  read in g” at the end o f  this 
chapter .
A l th o ug h  the te rm “ psycholinguis t ics” was b ro ugh t  into vogue during the 
1950s, the psychological  s tudy o f  language use is as old as psychology itself. 
As early as 1879, for instance,  Francis  G a l to n  publ ished the first s tudy o f  
word  associat ions (Gal ton ,  1879). A n d  the year 1900 saw the appearance  
o f  Wilhelm W u n d t ’s m o n u m e n ta l  tw o-vo lum e w ork  Die Sprache. It endeav­
oured  to explain the phylogeny o f  language in the h u m a n  m ind  as an increas­
ingly complex and  conscious means  o f  expression in a society, and  to describe 
how language is created t ime and  again in the individual  act o f  speaking.  
A l th o ug h  W u n d t  deemed it impossible to s tudy language use experimental ly ,  
his con tem pora r ie s  in t roduced  the exper imenta l  s tudy o f  reading (Huey),  o f
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verbal m em o ry  and  w ord  associa t ion  (E bb inghaus ,  M arb e ,  W at t ) ,  and  o f  
sentence p ro d u c t io n  (Biihler, Seitz). They  began  m easur ing  vocabu la ry  size 
(Binet), and  s tar ted  collecting and  analysing speech errors  (M eringer  and  
M ayer) .  The  s tudy  o f  neurologically  induced  language im pa irm en ts  acquired  
par t icu la r  m o m e n tu m  af te r  Pau l  Broca  and  Carl  W ern icke  discovered the 
m ain  speech and  language supp o r t in g  areas in the  b r a in ’s left hem isphere .  In 
the absence o f  live b ra in  to m o g ra p h y ,  aphasio logis ts  began developing 
neurolinguist ic  tests for the  pu rpose  o f  localizing b ra in  dysfunc t ions .
All o f  these themes persist in m o d e rn  psycholinguistics.  But deve lopm ents  
since the 1950s have prov ided  it with two o f  its m ost  character is t ic  features ,  
which concern  linguistic processing and  representation. W ith  respect to 
processing,  psycholinguistics has followed m a in s t ream  psychology in tha t  it 
considers  the language user as a complex information processing system. 
W ith  respect to rep resen ta t ion ,  psycholinguists  stress the gigantic a m o u n t  o f  
linguistic knowledge the  language user brings to  bear  in p ro d uc in g  and  u n d e r ­
s tand ing  language.  A l th o u g h  the s t ruc tu re  o f  this know ledge  is the subject  
m a t te r  o f  linguistics, it is no less a psychological  enti ty  th a n  is language 
processing itself (C hom sky ,  1968). Psycholinguist ics  studies how  linguistic 
know ledge  is exploited in language use, how represen ta t ions  for  the  fo rm  and  
m ean ing  o f  w ords ,  sentences,  and  texts are cons t ruc ted  or m an ip u la ted  by the 
language  user, and  how  the child acquires  such linguistic rep resen ta t ions .
I shall first in t roduce  the canonica l  setting for  language use: conversa t ion .  
Next I shall cons ider  the m enta l  lexicon, the  hear t  o f  o u r  linguistic 
knowledge.  I shall then  m ove to the processes o f  speak ing  an d  speech u n d e r ­
s tand ing  respectively. Finally I shall tu rn  to o the r  m odes  o f  language  use, in 
par t icu la r  writ ten  language and  sign language.
CONVERSATION
O u r  linguistic skills are pr im ari ly  tuned  to  the  p ro p e r  co n d u c t  o f  co nv e rsa ­
t ion .  T he  innate  ability to  converse has p rov ided  o u r  species with a capaci ty  
to  share  m oods ,  a t t i tudes ,  and  in fo rm a t io n  o f  a lm ost  any k ind ,  to assemble 
know ledge  and  skills, to p lan  c o o rd in a ted  ac t ion ,  to educa te  its offspring ,  in 
shor t ,  to create  an d  t ransm it  cu l ture .  A n d  all this at a scale th a t  is absolu te ly  
u n m a tc h e d  in the  an im al  k ingdom . In add i t io n ,  we converse  with ourselves,  
a k ind o f  au to s t im u la t io n  tha t  m akes  us m o re  aw are  o f  o u r  inc l inat ions ,  o f  
w ha t  we th ink  or  in tend  (D ennet t ,  1991). Fry ( 1977) correctly  charac ter ized  
o u r  species as homo loquens.
In conversa t ion  the in te r locu to rs  are involved in negot ia t ing  m ean ing .  
W h en  we ta lk ,  we usually have som e kind o f  co m m u n ica t iv e  in ten t ion ,  and  
the  conversa t ion  is felicitous w hen  tha t  in ten t ion  is recognized by ou r  
par tner(s )  in conversa t ion  (Grice, 1968; Sperber  & W ilson ,  1986). This  m ay 
take  several tu rns  o f  m u tu a l  clarif ication. H ere  is an  exam ple  f rom  C la rk  and
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Wilkes-Gibbs (1986), where subjects had  to refer to complex tang ram  figures:
A: Uh, person putting a shoe on.
B: Putting a shoe on?
A: Uh huh. Facing left. Looks like he’s sitting down.
B: Okay.
Here  the com m unica t ive  in tent ion was to establish reference,  and tha t  is 
of ten  a const i tu t ing co m p o n en t  o f  a larger communica t ive  goal.  Such goals 
can be to com m it  the in ter locutor  or  oneself  to some course o f  action,  as in 
requesting and  promising,  or  to in form the in ter locutor  on  some state o f  
affairs,  as in asserting, for example.  The  app rop r ia te  linguistic acts for 
achieving such goals are called speech acts (Austin,  1962).
A l though  what  is said is the means  o f  making  the comm unica t ive  intent ion 
recognizable,  the relat ion between the two can be highly indirect.  C onversa ­
tions involve intricate mechanisms o f  politeness control  (Brown & Levinson, 
1987). W h a t  is conveyed  is often quite different f rom  what  is said. In most  
c ircumstances,  for instance,  we d o n ’t request  by co m m an d in g ,  like in “ Open 
the w in d o w ” . Rather  we do it indirectly by checking whether  the in ter locutor  
is able or  willing to open the window, like in “ C an  you open the window for 
m e ? ” It would ,  then,  be inappropr ia te  for the in ter locutor  to answer “ Yes” 
without  fu r ther  act ion.  In tha t  case, the response is only to the quest ion 
(whether  he or  she is able to open the window),  but  not  to the request.
H o w  does the listener know  tha t  there is a request  in addi t ion  to the ques­
t ion? There  is, o f  course,  an en o rm o us  a m o u n t  o f  shared si tuational  
knowledge that  will do the work .  Grice (1975) has a rgued  that  conversat ions 
are governed by principles o f  rat ionali ty;  Sperber  and  Wilson (1986) call it 
the principle o f  relevance. The  in ter locutor ,  for instance,  is so obviously able 
to open the window tha t  the sp eak e r ’s in tent ion canno t  have been to check 
that  ability. But C lark  (1979) found  tha t  linguistic factors play a role as well. 
If  the quest ion is phrased  idiomatically,  involving can and  please , subjects 
in terpret  it as a request.  But the less idiomatic  it is (like in “ Are  you able 
t o . .  . ” ), the m ore  subjects  react to the quest ion  instead o f  to the request.
A n o th e r  im p o r tan t  aspect o f  conversa t ion  is turn-taking. There  are rules 
for the a l locat ion o f  turns  in conversa t ion  tha t  ensure everybody’s right to 
talk,  that  prevent the s imultaneous  talk o f  different part ies,  and  tha t  regulate 
the p roper  engaging in and  disengaging f rom  conversa t ion  (Sacks, Schegloff, 
& Jefferson,  1974). These rules are mostly followed, and  sometimes in ten­
t ionally violated (as in in te rrupt ing  the speaker) .  T u rn - tak ing  is subtly c o n ­
trolled by linguistic (especially prosodic)  and  non-verbal  (gaze and  body 
m ovem ent)  cues (Beattie,  1983).
THE MENTAL LEXICON
P roduc ing  or  unders tand ing  spoken  language always involves the use o f
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words.  The  mental  lexicon is our  reposi tory  o f  words ,  their  meanings ,  their 
syntax,  and  their  sound  forms.  A  language’s vocabu la ry  is, in principle,  
unlimited in size. Take ,  for  instance,  the numerals  in English. They  alone 
fo rm  an infinite set o f  words.  But it is unlikely tha t  a word  such as twenty- 
three-thousand-two-hundred-and-seventy-nine is an entry in ou r  mental  
lexicon. Rather ,  such a word  is construc ted  by rule when needed.  W e have 










Figure 1 Fragment of a lexical network. Each word is represented at the conceptual,
the syntactic and the sound form level 
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H o w  m a n y  words  are s tored? Miller (1991) estimates tha t  the average high 
school g radua te  knows a b o u t  60,000 words  (under  one definition o f  “ w o r d ” ).
One  way o f  representing this en o rm o u s  body  o f  knowledge is by way o f  
ne tw ork  models.  Figure 1 shows a f ragm ent  o f  such a ne twork .  Each  word  
is represented by three nodes,  one  at  the conceptua l  level, one at  the syntactic 
(grammatical)  or  lem m a level, and  one at the sound  fo rm  (phonological)  or  
lexeme level. The  lem m a is the syntactic representa t ion  and  the  lexeme is the 
phonologica l  representa t ion .  A  w o r d ’s semantic  propert ies  are given by its 
connect ions  to o ther  nodes at the conceptua l  level (for instance,  tha t  a sheep 
is an animal ,  gives milk,  etc.). A  w o r d ’s syntactic propert ies  are represented 
by its lem m a n o d e ’s relations to o ther  syntactic nodes (for instance,  “ sheep” 
is a noun ;  French  “ m o u t o n ” has male gender,  etc.).  The  sound  fo rm  p ro p e r ­
ties, finally, such as a w o r d ’s phonologica l  segments,  are represented in the 
way a w o r d ’s lexeme node  relates to  o ther  sound  fo rm  nodes (“ sheep” for  
instance conta ins  three  o rdered  phonologica l  segments,  /ƒ/, / i/, and  /p / ,  as 
show n in Figure 1).
Different  au thors  have p roposed  different ne twork  models  (e.g.,  Collins & 
Lof tus ,  1975; Dell, 1986; Roelofs ,  1992), and  for different purposes .  It is 
unlikely tha t  such ne tworks  can adequate ly  represent  all complexit ies o f  our  
semantic ,  syntactic,  and  phonological  knowledge a b o u t  words .  But they can 
be useful in predict ing speed o f  word  access in com prehens ion  and  p ro d u c ­
t ion,  as well as in explaining various  kinds o f  errors  tha t  we m ake  in speech 
p ro d uc t io n  and  various  disorders  o f  accessing words  in aphasic  speech.
Especially im p o r ta n t  fo r  theories o f  language use are the ways tha t  verbs 
are represented in the menta l  lexicon. As a semantic  entity,  a verb assigns 
semantic  roles to its a rgum ents .  The  verb walk , for  instance,  requires an  a n ­
imate  a rgum en t  tha t  specifies the role o f  agent,  as in John walked. The  verb 
greet governs two a rgum ents ,  one for  the agent  and  one  for  the recipient o f  
the act ion,  as in Peter greeted the driver. As a syntactic entity,  a verb assigns 
syntactic funct ions  to the sentence const i tuents  it governs.  In the above sen­
tence, Peter is the subject  and  the driver the object .  A  v e rb ’s a rgum ent-  
func t ion  m app ing  is no t  r a n d o m .  M ost  verbs,  for  instance,  m a p  a recipient 
a rg u m en t  on  to a syntactic object  func t ion ,  bu t  no t  all. T he  verb receive 
d o e s n ’t. In Mary received the book , Mary  is b o th  recipient and  sentence su b ­
ject.  Also,  verbs o f ten  allow for  mult iple  m appings .  In the driver was greeted 
by Peter , the recipient,  no t  the agent  appears  in subject  posi t ion.
F o r  each verb,  the menta l  lexicon conta ins  its possible m app ing  frames.  
These  play an  im p o r ta n t  role in the sp eak e r ’s syntactic p lanning  and  in the 
l is tener’s syntactic and  semantic  parsing.
SPEAKING
Speaking is o u r  mos t  complex  cogni t ive-motor  skill. It involves the concep­
t ion o f  an  in ten t ion ,  the selection o f  in fo rm a t io n  whose expression will m ake
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tha t  in tent ion recognizable,  the selection o f  app rop r ia te  words,  the cons t ruc ­
t ion o f  a syntactic f ram ew ork ,  the retrieval o f  the w o rd s ’ sound  forms,  and  
the co m p u ta t io n  o f  an ar t icu la tory  plan for  each w ord  and  for  the u t te rance  
as a whole.  It also involves the execution o f  this p lan  by m ore  than  100 
muscles control l ing the flow o f  air th ro u g h  the vocal tract .  Finally,  it involves 
a process o f  self -monitor ing by which speech t roub le  can be prevented or  
repaired.  The  following is a bird eye’s view over these processes.
Conceptual preparation
The  quest ion  where com m unica t ive  intent ions  com e f rom  is a psychodynam ic  
quest ion  ra ther  th a n  a psycholinguistic one. Speaking is a fo rm  o f  social 
act ion,  and  it is in the context  o f  act ion tha t  in tent ions,  goals, and  subgoals  
develop. It is not  impossible,  though ,  tha t  the in tent ion  what to  say occas ion­
ally arises f rom  spon taneous  activity in the speech fo rm ula t ing  system itself. 
It can create ra ther  incoherent  “ internal  speech” , which we can self-perceive. 
This,  in tu rn ,  m ay  provide  us with ta t ters  o f  no t ions  tha t  we then  consider  
for  expression (cf. Dennet t ,  1991).
Conveying an in tent ion m ay  involve several steps or  “ speech ac ts” . The  
speaker  will have to decide what  to  express first, what  next,  and  so on.  This 
is called the sp eak e r ’s linearization p rob lem  (Levelt,  1989). It is especially 
ap p a ren t  in the expression o f  mul t id imensiona l  in fo rm a t ion ,  as in describing 
o n e ’s ap a r tm e n t  (Linde & Labov ,  1975). The  conceptua l  p rep a ra t io n  o f  
speech, and  in par t icu lar  l inearizat ion,  require  the sp e a k e r ’s con t inu ing  
a t ten t ion .  The  principles o f  l inearizat ion are such tha t  a t ten t iona l  load is 
minimized.
Each  speech act,  be it a request  to do X , an  assert ion tha t  Y, etc. ,  involves 
the expression o f  some conceptua l  s t ruc ture ,  technically called a “ m essage” 
(Garre t t ,  1975). T h a t  message is to be given linguistic shape;  it has to  become 
“ f o r m u la te d ” .
Grammatical encoding
A first step in fo rm ula t ing  is to  retrieve the a p p ro p r ia te  words  f rom  the 
menta l  lexicon and  to em bed  them  in the developing syntactic s t ruc ture .  In 
n o rm a l  conversa t ion  we p roduce  some two words  per  second.  A t  this rate  we 
m an age  to access the ap p ro p r ia te  words  in o u r  huge menta l  lexicon. O cca ­
sional  errors  o f  lexical selection (such as “ D o n ’t b u rn  you r  to e s ” where 
fingers was in tended)  show tha t  the lexicon has a semantic  o rgan iza t ion .
The  s tan d a rd  exp lana t ion  for such errors  is tha t  ac t ivat ion  spreads  th ro u g h  
a semantical ly  organized  ne tw ork ,  as in Figure  1. In such a ne tw ork ,  each 
node  has an  ac t ivat ion  level between 0 and  1. W h e n  the lexical concept  node  
S H E E P  is active, then  act ivat ion spreads  to  semantical ly  related concept  
nodes,  such as G O A T .  Both  nodes  spread  ac t iva t ion  “ d o w n ” to  their  l em m a
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nodes.  W hich  one o f  the lemmas will then  be selected for  fu r ther  processing? 
N orm al ly  it will be the m ost  activated one,  in this case the lem m a for 
“ sheep” . But the occurrence o f  an  occasional  e rror  shows tha t  there is a small 
probabi l i ty  tha t  a less act ivated lem m a gets selected. Accord ing  to one theory  
(Roelofs ,  1992) the probabi l i ty  tha t  a par t icu lar  lem m a becomes selected 
within a t ime interval t is the ra t io  o f  its act ivat ion to the sum o f  the act iva­
t ion o f  all o ther  lem m a nodes.  F o r  instance, if “ sheep” and  “ g o a t ” are the 
only two active lemmas dur ing  interval t af ter  p resen ta t ion  o f  the picture,  and 
they have act ivat ion levels o f  0.7 and  0.1 respectively, the probabi l i ty  tha t  the 
target  word  “ sheep” will be selected dur ing  tha t  interval is 7/8, whereas the 
e r roneous  w ord  “ g o a t ” will be selected with the probabi l i ty  1/8. Hence,  if 
there is m ore  than  one lem m a active in the system, there is always a small 
p robabi l i ty  tha t  a non- in tended  word  becomes selected (and it is likely to be 
semantical ly  related to the target).
Spreading  act ivat ion theories o f  lexical selection are typically tested in 
p ic tu re -naming  experiments ,  where nam ing  latencies are measured .  F o r  a 
review o f  issues in lexical selection, see Levelt (1992a).
As soon  as a lem m a is retrieved, its syntactic propert ies  becom e available.  
A m o n g  them  are the l e m m a ’s g ram m at ica l  class (preposi t ion,  noun ,  verb, 
etc.).  Each  lem m a requires its own specific syntactic env i ronm ent  or 
“ f r a m e ” . Syntactic p lanning  is like solving a set o f  s imul taneous  equat ions .  
Each  l e m m a ’s f ram e has to fit its n e ig h b o u r ’s frames,  and  since G arre t t  
(1975) there are theories  a b o u t  how this is realized (see Levelt,  1989, for  a 
review). Actual ly ,  the equat ions  are not  quite “ s im u l tan eou s” ; the lemmas 
for  an u t te rance  are typically no t  concurren t ly  retrieved. L em m as  for salient 
concepts ,  such as an im ate  objects ,  tend to be retrieved faster th a n  for n o n ­
salient concepts  (Bock & W arren ,  1985), and  tha t  affects their  posi t ion  in the 
developing syntactic s t ructure .  F o r  a review o f  g ram m at ica l  encoding,  see 
Bock and  Levelt (1994).
Phonological encoding
A  selected lem m a (but  only a selected one: see Levelt et al. ,  1991) spreads its 
ac t ivat ion to its lexeme node  (cf. Figure 1). A t  this level two kinds o f  p h o n o ­
logical in fo rm a t io n  becom e available.  The  first one is the w o r d ’s segments,  
which are “ spelled o u t ” one  a f te r  ano the r .  The  second one  is the w o r d ’s 
metrical  s t ruc ture .  F o r  “ sheep” it is the in fo rm a t io n  tha t  it is a one-syllable 
word .  F o r  “ f a th e r” it is the in fo rm a t io n  tha t  it is a two-syllabic t rochaic  
w ord .  T he  metrical  f rames o f  successive words  are o f ten  com bined ,  creat ing 
so-called phonolog ica l  w ord  frames.  In Peter gave him it , the  last three 
words  fo rm  one phonolog ica l  w ord  gavimit. In a process o f  segment-to- 
fram e association spel led-out  segments are inserted one by one  into  the co r re ­
spond ing  phonolog ica l  w ord  frames.  It is dur ing  this o rdered  insert ion tha t  
phono log ica l  syllables are created ,  one  af te r  a n o th e r  (such as ga-vi-mit; see
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Levelt, 1992b). H o w  this string o f  phonological  syllables determines  the 
precise ar t icu la tory  gestures to be m ade  by the speech organs  is still a m at te r  
o f  m uch  debate  (see especially B row m an  & Goldstein ,  1991).
The  not ion  that  segments and  frames are independent ly  retrieved arose in 
the analysis o f  phonological  speech errors  (Dell, 1986; Sha t tuck -H ufnage l ,  
1979). Spooner isms such as with this wing I thee red , or  fo o l  the pill (instead 
o f  fill the p o o l ) show tha t  segments can become associated to the right place 
in the wrong  frame.
Phonolog ica l  encoding also involves the p lanning  o f  larger units than  
phonologica l  words.  There  is, in par t icular ,  the p lanning  o f  in tona t iona l  
phrases.  These are units tha t  carry  a par t icu lar  in tona t iona l  con tou r .  Such 
con tours  can be rising, falling or  com bina t ions  thereof .  They  of ten  express 
a sp ea k e r ’s a t t i tude  towards  what  is said: d o ub t ,  certainty,  or  tow ards  the 
inter locutor:  reassuringness,  inviting react ion.  See Levelt (1989) for a review 
o f  phonologica l  encoding.
The  o u tp u t  o f  phonological  encoding is an a r t icu la tory  p ro g ram m e.  
Phenomenologica l ly ,  it appears  to the speaker  as internal  speech. This 
internal  speech need not  be ar t iculated.  It can be kept in an ar t icu la tory  
buffer,  ready to be retrieved for a r t icu la tory  execution (Sternberg,  W right ,  
Knoll ,  & Monsell ,  1980).
Articulation
The ar t icu la tory  a p p a ra tu s  consists o f  three  m a jo r  s tructures .  T he  resp ira tory  
system contro ls  the s teady outf low o f  air f rom  the lungs. The  brea th ing  cycle 
dur ing  speech is quite  different f ro m  norm al  b rea th ing ,  with very rapid  in h a ­
lat ion and  very slow exhala t ion .  The  laryngeal system has the vocal cords  as 
its central  par t .  It is the main  source o f  acoustic  energy. The  vocal t ract ,  
finally, conta ins  the cavities o f  pharynx ,  m o u th ,  and  nose. They  are the reso­
na to rs  tha t  filter the acoustic  energy in f requency bands  or  formants. Vowels 
are character ized by their fo rm a n t  s t ruc ture .  T he  vocal t ract  can be c o n ­
stricted at different places, and  these constr ic t ions  can be m ad e  or released 
in different m anners .  In this way a wide range o f  co n so n an ta l  and  o ther  
speech sounds  can be made .
The  contro l  o f  this utterly complex  m o to r  system has been the subject  o f  
m uch  research.  Present  theories  converge on  the no t ion  o f  model-referenced 
control (Arbib ,  1981; see also Figure 2). The  m o to r  system is given an 
“ a r t icu la to ry  t a s k ” (as par t  o f  the a r t icu la to ry  p ro g ram m e) ,  such as “ close 
the l ips” . There  are usually m an y  degrees o f  f reedom  in executing such a 
task.  F o r  instance,  lip closing can be realized by moving  the lips, by moving  
the jaw ,  or  by doing  bo th  to var ious  degrees. T he  in ternal  model  com putes  
the least energy-consuming  way o f  reaching the goal,  given the  actual  s tate 
o f  the ar t icu la tors  (there is co n t in u o us  p ropr iocep t ive  feedback  to the 
internal  model) .  T h e  o u tp u t  is a set o f  efferent  contro l  signals to  the relevant
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Figure 2 Model-referenced control in articulation
Source : Levelt ,  1989
muscles.  Sa l tzm an  and  Kelso (1987) gave a precise m athem at ica l  rendering 
o f  this theory .  See Levelt (1989) for  a review o f  theories o f  ar t icula t ion .  The  
o u tp u t  o f  ar t icu la t ion  is overt  speech.
Self-monitoring
W e can listen to o u r  own overt  speech and  detect t rouble ,  jus t  as we can listen 
to the speech o f  o thers  and  detect  errors  or  infelicitous delivery. This  involves 
o u r  no rm a l  speech unders tand ing  system. We can also detect t roub le  in our  
internal  speech. W h en  the t roub le  is disruptive enough  for  the ongoing  c o n ­
versa t ion ,  a speaker  m ay  decide to  in te r rup t  the flow o f  speech and  to m ake  
a self-repair.
N o t  all se l f -produced t roub le  (such as errors  o f  selection) is detected by the 
speaker .  Se lf -moni tor ing  requires a t ten t ion ;  we mostly  a t tend  to what we say, 
far less to how  we do it. Detect ion o f  t roub le  is bet ter  tow ards  the end o f  
clauses,  where  less a t ten t ion  for  con ten t  is required (Levelt,  1989). There  are 
two main  classes o f  t roub le  tha t  induce repair ing.  The  first one is an all-out 
e r ro r  (as in and above that a h o r i z o n n o  a vertical line)] the e r ro r  can be 
lexical, syntactic,  or  phonolog ica l .  The  second one is tha t  som eth ing  is not  
really a p p ro p r ia te  (as in to the right is blue -  is a blue point).  The  speaker  
then  repairs  in o rde r  to m a k e  the  u t te rance  m ore  precise,  less am biguous .  
U p o n  detecting ei ther kind o f  t roub le ,  the speaker  can  self- in terrupt .  A n d  
this ignores linguistic s t ructure ;  a speaker  can  s top  in the midst  o f  a phrase ,  
a w ord ,  or  a syllable. But then,  the speaker  o f ten  m arks  the  k ind o f  t roub le
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by some editing expression: “ n o ” , “ so r ry ” , “ I m e a n ” , for  errors;  “ r a th e r ” , 
“ tha t  is” , for someth ing  inappropr ia te .
Restart ing,  tha t  is, making  the repair  p roper ,  is linguistically quite p r in ­
cipled. The  speaker  grafts  the repair  on to the syntax o f  the in te r rup ted  u t te r ­
ance,  which has been kept in abeyance.  As a consequence,  repair ing is like 
linguistic coord ina t ion .  One  seldom finds a repair  such as is she driving -  she 
walking downtown?  A n d  indeed,  the correspond ing  coo rd ina t ion  is she 
driving or she walking downtown?  is i l l -formed. But is he — she walking 
downtown?  is a very c o m m o n  repair  type, and  it co r responds  to a well- 
fo rm ed  coord ina t ion :  is he or she walking downtown?  (Levelt,  1989).
SPEECH UNDERSTANDING
The  canonical  objective in speech unders tand ing  is to recognize the sp ea k e r ’s 
com m unica t ive  in tent ion.  H o w  does the listener induce tha t  in ten t ion  f rom  
the  sp e a k e r ’s overt  speech, a con t inuous  flow o f  acoustic  events?
Several c o m p o n e n t  processes are involved here. First ,  there  is the h e a re r ’s 
acoust ic-phonet ic  analysis o f  the speech signal,  tha t  is, represent ing it as a 
phonetic  not  just  an acoustic event.  Second,  there  is phonologica l  decoding,  
in par t icu la r  finding the words  tha t  co r respond  to the phonet ic  events,  and  
analysing the overall prosodic  s t ruc ture  o f  the  u t terance .  T h i rd ,  there  is 
g ram m at ica l  decoding,  pars ing the u t te rance  as a m eaningfu l  syntactic s t ruc­
ture .  Finally, there  is discourse processing,  in terpret ing  the u t te rance  in the 
context  o f  the ongoing  discourse,  and  in par t icu la r  inferr ing the sp e a k e r ’s 
in tent ions.  Let us review these processes in tu rn .
Acoustic-phonetic analysis
It is very ha rd ,  if not  impossible,  to listen to speech as if it were jus t  a string 
o f  chirps,  buzzes,  hum s,  and  claps.  We jus t  c an n o t  help perceiving it as 
speech. In this so-called “ speech m o d e ” (L ibe rm an  & Matt ingly ,  1985) we 
in terpre t  the  acoust ic  event as result ing f ro m  a s p e a k e r ’s a r t icu la to ry  gestures 
as a phonet ic  event.  There  is no unan im i ty  in the  l i terature,  th o u g h ,  a b o u t  
w ha t  kind o f  represen ta t ion  the listener derives.  A ccord ing  to L ib e rm a n  and  
Matt ingly ,  the listener derives the s p e a k e r ’s in tended  a r t icu la to ry  gestures 
(even if they were sloppy).  O thers  a rgue  tha t  listeners have special detectors  
for  distinctive events in the speech signal, such as for  onsets ,  for  spectral  
peaks ,  fo r  the frequencies and  m o t ions  o f  fo rm an ts .  T he  detect ion  o f  such 
acoust ic  events m ay  suffice to  derive the presence or  absence  o f  phone t ic  fea ­
tures ,  such as voicing, nasali ty,  vowel height ,  s tr idency,  an d  so on  (Stevens 
& Blumstein ,  1981).
Speech segments ,  clusters,  and  syllables have character is t ic  d is t r ibu t ions  o f  
phone t ic  features .  Hence ,  if such fea ture  detectors  are reliable, they m ay  p r o ­
vide sufficient in fo rm a t io n  for  effective phono log ica l  decoding .  O pin ions
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differ, however ,  a b o u t  their reliability. The  speech signal is highly variable,  
dependen t  as it is on  speech rate,  sex o f  the speaker ,  sloppiness o f  speech 
delivery, reverbera t ion  or noise in the ro o m ,  for  example.  Even if the listener 
can part ia l  ou t  such effects o f  the speech context ,  acoust ic-phonet ic  analysis 
will o f ten  be indeterminate .  Still, it m ay  well be sufficient for  the purpose .  
N o t  every word  has to be recognized in o rder  to  derive the sp eak e r ’s in ten­
tions.  A n d  where a really critical w ord  is missed, the in te r locu tor  will say 
“ w h a t ? ” or  signal difficulty o f  unders tand ing  in o the r  ways.
F o r  an  excellent review o f  acoust ic-phonet ic  processing,  see Pisoni  and  
Luce (1987).
Phonological decoding
W hateve r  the precise charac te r  o f  the phonet ic  representa t ions ,  they are the 
l is tener’s access codes to  the menta l  lexicon. H o w  does a listener recognize 
words  in connected  speech? A m a jo r  p rob lem  here is to segment the speech, 
to find ou t  where words  begin an d  end in the con t inuous  flow o f  speech. 
There  are,  basically, two routes  here.
T he  first one is the b o t to m -u p  a p p ro a c h ,  tha t  is, to  build  on  cues in the 
phonet ic  represen ta t ion .  Cut le r  (1990) has a rgued  tha t  English listeners will, 
by defaul t ,  segment  speech such tha t  there  are word  boundar ie s  right before  
stressed syllables. It is a statistical fact o f  English th a t  85 per cent o f  the 
m ean ingfu l  words  tha t  one encounters  while listening begin with a stressed 
syllable. T he  segm enta t ion  s trategy will, therefore ,  be quite successful.  
C u t l e r ’s theory  has meanwhile  fo u n d  substan t ia l  experimenta l  suppor t .  Also,  
there  are  speech sounds  tha t  tend to occur  at  the ends o f  words ,  such as [-ng] 
an d  [-nd] for  English. Speakers  m ay  use such phono tac t ic  proper t ies  o f  their 
language  to predict  w ord  boundar ies .
The  second rou te  is to p -d o w n .  W e of ten  recognize a w ord  before  it ends. 
But  th a t  m eans  tha t  we can  predict  the w o r d ’s end ,  and  hence the upcom ing  
w ord  b o u n d a ry .  T h a t  gives us a hand le  on  where  to s tar t  recognizing the  s u b ­
sequent  word .
Given th a t  we know  a w o r d ’s beginning,  how do we recognize it? 
A ccord ing  to the cohort theory (M ars len-W ilson ,  1989), a small  word-init ial  
fea ture  pa t te rn  (cor respond ing  to a b o u t  two segments  o f  the inpu t  word)  ac ­
tivates all words  in the menta l  lexicon th a t  m a tch  it phonologica l ly .  A ssum e 
the inpu t  w ord  is trespass, and  the cluster [tr] has becom e available.  This  will 
act ivate  all words  beginning with [tr], such as tremble , trespass, trestle, trom­
bone , etc. This  is called the  “ word-ini t ia l  c o h o r t ” . As m o re  phone t ic  i n f o r m ­
a t ion  becomes available,  the c o h o r t  is successively reduced.  W h e n  the vowel 
[e] is perceived, all i tems no t  shar ing  tha t  vowel,  such as trom bone , are  deac ­
t ivated.  This  process con t inues  unti l  a single cand ida te  remains .  F o r  trespass 
this happens  when  [p] is reached .  T he  segment  [p] is, there fore ,  called the 
uniqueness point  o f  trespass. A  w o r d ’s uniqueness  po in t  depends
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on its word-initial lexical alternatives. For most words the uniqueness point 
precedes the word’s end.
For an optimally efficient system, the word’s uniqueness point would also 
be its recognition point. There is good experimental evidence in support of 
this hypothesis (e.g., Frauenfelder, Segui, & Dijkstra, 1990), though the 
recognition point may slightly anticipate the uniqueness point in case syn­
tactic or semantic information disambiguates the item from its remaining 
alternatives (Zwitserlood, 1989). Hence, it will often be possible for a listener 
to anticipate the upcoming word boundary.
Phonological decoding serves not only the recognition of words, but also 
their groupings into prosodic constituents, such as phonological and intona- 
tional phrases. These constituents carry important information about the 
syntax of the utterance, and about the communicative intentions of the 
speaker (cf. Levelt, 1989).
Grammatical decoding
As words are successively recognized and prosodically grouped, the listener 
will as much as possible interpret these materials “on-line” (Marslen-Wilson
& Tyler, 1980). Each recognized word makes available its syntactic and 
semantic properties. There is, then, concurrent syntactic parsing and 
semantic interpretation, each following its own principles, but interacting 
where necessary.
In this connection, one should distinguish between local and global syn­
tactic parsing. Local parsing involves the creation of local phrase structure, 
combining words into noun phrases, verb phrases, etc. There is increasing 
evidence that local parsing can run on word category information alone 
(Frazier, 1989; Tyler & Warren, 1987). We have little trouble parsing “jab- 
berwocky” or semantically anomalous prose such as the beer slept the slow  
guitar. Here we construct phrase structure exclusively by recognizing the 
words’ syntactic categories (Art, Adj, N, V). However, successful local 
parsing is highly dependent on the intactness of phonological phrases, as 
Tyler and Warren (1987) could show. For instance, in the above anomalous 
prose, one should not create a prosodic break between the and slow , or 
between slow  and guitar.
Global syntactic parsing, however, interacts with semantic interpretation. 
In global parsing, semantic roles are assigned to syntactic constituents, and 
this is to a large extent governed by the verb’s argument/function mapping. 
When the meaning of words or phrases contradicts the semantic roles they 
should carry, global parsing is hampered (Tyler & Warren, 1987).
One important aspect of global parsing is the resolution of anaphora. In 
the sentence the boxer told the skier that the doctor fo r  the team would blame 
him fo r  the recent injury, the anaphor him can refer back to the boxer and 
to the skier, but global syntax prohibits its referring to the doctor. Indeed,
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experimental evidence shows reactivation of both boxer and skier, but not 
of doctor when the pronoun him is perceived. Such reactivation can also be 
measured for so-called null-anaphors as in the policeman saw the boy that 
the crowd at the party accused t o f  the crime. Here there is measurable react­
ivation of boy at position t (the syntactic “trace” of the boy ; see Nicol & 
Swinney, 1989). But also in this respect global parsing is semantically facil­
itated, for instance if the anaphor’s referent is a concrete noun (Cloitre & 
Bever, 1988).
Grammatical decoding doesn’t remove all ambiguity (for instance, the 
pronoun him above is not fully resolved). Here, further discourse processing 
is needed.
Discourse processing
Partners in conversation construct mental models of the state of affairs they 
are talking about (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Seuren, 1985). Indefinite expressions 
(such as in there is a dog in the room) make them introduce a new entity (a 
dog) in the model. Definite expressions (such as the room in the same sen­
tence) make them look up an already existing entity. The new information 
in the utterance is then attached to whichever entity it concerns.
Identifying referents is a major accomplishment of human language 
processing, still unmatched by any computer program. The problem is that 
referring expressions can be highly indirect. How can a waitress in a res­
taurant interpret the referent when her colleague says the hamburger wants 
the bilP. Nunberg (1979) argued that there are “referring functions” that map 
a demonstratum (like the hamburger) on to the intended referent (the person 
who ordered it). But the range of possible referring functions is almost 
unlimited. Clark, Schreuder, and Buttrick (1983) and Morrow (1986) have 
argued (and experimentally shown) that such demonstratum-to-referent map­
ping depends on the mutual knowledge of the interlocutors and on the 
saliency of entities in their discourse models.
Indirectness is the hallmark of discourse interpretation. As mentioned 
above, what is said often relates quite indirectly to what the speaker intends 
to convey. It is not only politeness that governs such indirectness. All figures 
of speech, whether polite or not, require the listener to build a bridge from 
the literal to the intended. This holds equally for metaphor (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1986), irony (Clark & Gerrig, 1984), and hyperbole (Grice, 1975).
Finally, whereas acoustic-phonetic, phonological, and grammatical 
decoding are largely automatic processes, discourse processing requires the 
listener’s full attention. In that respect, it is on a par with the speaker’s con­
ceptual preparation. As interlocutors we are concerned with content. The 
processing of form largely takes care of itself.
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READING
The invention of writing systems, whether logographic, syllabic, or alpha­
betic, is probably the most revolutionary step in human cultural evolution. 
It added a powerful means of storing and transmitting information. With the 
invention of printing, it became a major mechanism for large-scale dissem­
ination of knowledge in a culture.
But equally surprising as this ability to map spoken language on to a visual 
code is our capacity to efficiently process such a code. When skilled, we 
silently read five or six printed words per second; this is about twice the rate 
of conversational speech. This ability has not given us any selective advan­
tage in biological evolution; the invention of writing systems is as recent as 
about 5,000 years ago. Rather, the ability to read must be due to a happy 
coincidence of other pre-existing faculties of mind.
One of these is, of course, language. As readers we largely use our parsing 
potential for spoken language. Visual word recognition feeds into the lemma 
level of Figure 1. As lemmas are successively activated by the printed words, 
further syntactic, semantic, and discourse processing operates roughly as for 
spoken language. There are, admittedly, differences too. There is, for 
instance, no prosody to help syntactic parsing; instead there is punctuation. 
Also, there is no external enforcement of rate as there is in speech perception.
Another pre-existing faculty on which reading is parasitic is our enormous 
ability to scan for small meaningful visual patterns. In a hunter’s society 
these were probably animal silhouettes, footprints, and so on. Words (if not 
too long or too infrequent) are recognized as wholes; a skilled reader 
processes a word’s letters in parallel. Much ink has been spilled on the ques­
tion whether the letters individually or the word as a whole activate a phono­
logical code in silent reading, that is, the word’s lexeme (see Figure 1). Such 
phonological recoding indeed exists. But it is only for low-frequent words 
that this “phonological route” is of any help in lemma access (Jared & 
Seidenberg, 1991). However, this silent “ internal speech” probably does play 
a role in further syntactic and semantic parsing; it is a way of buffering 
successive words for further processing.
The ability to scan is optimally used in reading. The basic cycle is this: the 
reader fixates a word for, on average, one-fifth of a second. The fixation is 
roughly between the beginning and the middle of the word. During this 
period lexical access is achieved. In addition, there is some perception of the 
next word in the periphery of vision. Sometimes this suffices to recognize that 
next word as well on the same fixation (but the fixation will then last some­
what longer). Usually, however, the information from the periphery of vision 
is used only to plan a saccadic eye movement (a jump of the eye) to that next 
word. The size of the saccade depends on the length of the next word; the 
average saccade is about eight characters in size. The new word is fixated, and 
the cycle starts all over again.
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When a word is quite infrequent, or when the reader has trouble 
integrating it in the developing syntax or semantics, the fixation duration can 
be substantially longer. Also, the reader may backtrack and refixate an 
earlier word when there is serious trouble in comprehension.
For a major review of the reading process and its disorders, see Rayner and 
Pollatsek (1989).
SIGN LANGUAGE
Contrary to written language, the sign languages of deaf people are not para­
sitic on spoken language. They are autonomous languages in the visual mode. 
Their mere existence shows that our faculty of language is not crucially
SUMMER UGLY DRY
Illustration, copyright Ursula Bellugi, Salk Institute for Biological Studies, La Jolla,
CA, 92037
•  •  •
Figure 3 Minimal contrasts between signs in American Sign Language: (a) hand
configuration, (b) place of articulation, (c) movement
Source: From Klima and Bellugi, 1979
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dependent on our ability to speak. Deaf children who grow up in a signing 
deaf community acquire their language at the same age and in roughly the 
same stages as hearing children do.
Just as words, signs have form and meaning. The articulators of sign 
language are the hands, the face, and the body. Where words contrast pho- 
nemically (for instance in voicing: bath vs path), signs contrast in hand con­
figuration, in place of articulation and in hand movement (see Figure 3). 
Also, facial features may distinguish between signs.
Although the first coining of a sign is often iconic, its meaning is eventually 
independent of its form, as it is for words in spoken languages. As a conse­
quence, sign languages are mutually unintelligible, just as spoken languages 
are (contrary to what Wundt suggested in Die Sprache -  see above).
Sign languages are rich in morphology (for inflection and for derivation of 
new signs) and have full-fledged recursive syntax. Many syntactic devices are 
spatial in character. Anaphora, that is, referring back to an earlier 
introduced entity, is done by pointing to the locus in the signing space (in 
front of the body) where the original referent was first “established” . In 
American Sign Language the sign for transitive verbs either moves from sub­
ject to object locus, or from object to subject locus. Each verb has its own 
“mapping function” (like in spoken language, see above). For the structure 
and use of British Sign Language, see Kyle and Woll (1985).
There is increasing evidence that a sign language is subserved by the same 
areas of the brain that sustain spoken language. Poizner, Klima, and Bellugi, 
(1987) showed that damage to anterior areas of the left hemisphere in native 
signers resulted in a style of signing highly comparable to the agrammatism 
of so-called Broca’s patients. Similarly, a form of fluent aphasia resulted 
when the damage was in a more posterior area of the left hemisphere, com­
parable to the fluent aphasia of so-called Wernicke’s patients. Damage in the 
right hemisphere left the signing intact, but patients lost the ability to sign 
coherently about spatial relations, such as the layout of their apartment. 
Their spatial representations were damaged, but not their spatial language.
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The nature of human thought and the capacity for rational reasoning have 
been issues of great interest to philosophers and psychologists since the time 
of Aristotle. Humans have excelled among species in their ability to solve 
problems and to adapt their environment for their own purposes. We are 
unique in our possession of a highly sophisticated system of language 
allowing both representation of complex and abstract concepts and the com­
munication of very precise meaning with one another. We have also de­
veloped a new form of evolution -  much faster than natural selection -  
whereby the accumulated knowledge and wisdom of our culture is recorded 
and passed on through education so that each new generation starts with an 
advantage on the one before. Despite this impressive record, we also are sub­
ject to many systematic errors and biases in our thinking, some of which are 
discussed in this chapter.
The study of thinking and reasoning in humans can accurately be described 
as the study of the nature of intelligence. The work described here falls, 
however, into a quite different tradition from the psychometric study of indi­
vidual differences in intelligent performance that is usually referred to as the 
psychology of intelligence. Psychometrics is concerned with the measurement 
of intelligent performance, whereas the study of thinking and reasoning is
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focused on understanding the nature of intelligent processes. Strangely 
enough, these turn out to be two quite different kinds of undertaking.
THE NATURE OF THINKING: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historically, we can trace three different conceptions of the nature of 
thinking. The first of these corresponds to what the non-psychologist might 
respond if asked to define thought. I shall describe this notion as the contents 
o f  consciousness. Common sense (or fo lk  psychology) supposes that we are 
consciously in control of our actions: we think, therefore we do. When we 
make a decision or solve a problem it is on the basis of a train of thought 
of which we are conscious and which we can, if required, describe to another. 
Such reports of thought are known as introspections. The validity of 
introspection is clearly assumed in our everyday folk psychology, as we all 
feel able to ask and answer questions about how and why we have taken par­
ticular actions. Indeed, a major industry -  opinion polling -  is based upon 
introspectionism. Politicians and political commentators alike are absorbed 
by the results of polls that ask people not only how they intend to vote, but 
also to identify the issues which will influence their decisions.
Aristotle and other early philosophers were in no doubt that the mind 
could and should study itself through introspection. This led to a theory of 
thinking known as associationism in which thinking was supposed to consist 
of a sequence of images linked by one of several principles (see Mandler & 
Mandler, 1964). Associationism and the equation of thought with conscious­
ness remained more or less unchallenged until the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries when several separate developments conspired to 
challenge this idea.
First, there were the systematic experimental studies of introspection car­
ried out at the Wurzburg School around the beginning of the twentieth cen­
tury (see Humphrey, 1951). In these experiments, subjects were asked to 
perform simple cognitive acts such as giving word associations or judging the 
comparative weight of two objects and then asked to report on what went 
through their minds at the time. Much to the initial surprise of the 
researchers, many of these acts did not appear to be mediated by conscious 
thoughts. Subjects often reported either no conscious experience at all, or 
else one of indescribable or “imageless” thought.
A second influential development was that of the Freudian school of 
psychoanalysis which introduced the notion of unconscious thought and 
motivation. An introspective report of the reason for an action would cer­
tainly be suspect to a Freudian since it might well constitute a rationalization 
of behaviour determined by deep-seated and repressed emotions in the 
unconscious mind.
The other major influence was the introduction of the school of beha­
viourism by J. B. Watson (e.g., 1920) whose influence was very strong in
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psychology up until the 1950s and which lingers on even in the present day. 
Watson attacked all study of conscious thought as mentalistic and unscien­
tific. Science, he maintained, could concern itself only with the study of 
phenomena that were subject to objective observation and independent 
verification -  criteria that introspective reports clearly could not meet. 
Watson and other behaviourists effectively redefined thought as simply com­
plex forms of behaviour which were the result of stimulus-response learning. 
Study of stimulus-response pairings and reinforcement history were suffi­
cient to explain all phenomena attributed -  by the mentalistically inclined -  
to thinking.
From the viewpoint of a modern cognitive psychologist both introspec- 
tionists and behaviourists might be seen as half right. The behaviourists were 
probably right in their contention that thought cannot be studied effectively 
via introspection. The mentalists, on the other hand, were correct in asserting 
that complex behaviour could not be explained without reference to internal 
mental processes. Their mistake -  with the benefit of hindsight -  was to 
assume that such processes were necessarily conscious and reportable. This 
leads us to the third conception of human thought — that of information 
processing.
Psychologists’ own thinking — like that of their subjects -  is constrained 
by the availability of models and analogies. Watson used the analogy of a 
telephone exchange to explain his notion of learning by stimulus-response 
connections. Although its origin can be traced to earlier, highly creative 
thinkers (especially Craik, 1943) the emergence of cognitive psychology in the 
1950s and 1960s was largely due to the development of cybernetic systems 
and then the digital computer. Computers are general-purpose information 
processing systems. They compute by manipulating symbols which can 
represent almost anything -  numbers and arithmetical operators, permitting 
arithmetic; letters and words as in word and text processing; collections of 
facts stored in a database; and so on.
When people perform mental arithmetic, we would describe this as an act 
of thought. So is a computer also thinking when it performs computations 
to solve problems? It appears that it is, although some philosophers (e.g., 
Searle, 1980) maintain that computer intelligence is intrinsically different 
from that of the human mind. The point of the analogy, however, is that we 
can see that computers can perform complex acts of information processing
-  depending upon their programming -  but without any need to assume that 
they are conscious. Once you equate thinking with information processing, 
then the task of the modern cognitive psychologist is clear: understanding 
thought is the problem of discovering the software of the human brain. Many 
psychological theories in fact are formulated as working computer programs 
which attempt to simulate the behaviour of a human being who is solving a 
problem or engaged in some other cognitive activity.
In spite of this advance, arguments persist among cognitive and social
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psychologists as to the value of introspective reports. Some cognitive 
psychologists disregard them entirely on the basis of much evidence that such 
reports can be both incomplete and misleading (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). One 
interesting line of argument is that verbal reports are useful indicators of 
thought processes but not as used in the tradition of introspective reporting 
(Ericsson & Simon, 1980). According to this view, verbalizations are the 
products of cognitive processes and can be fruitfully interpreted by the psy­
chologist when subjects are asked to “think aloud” while performing a task 
or solving a problem. Introspective reports fail because first, they are 
retrospective rather than concurrent, and second, they invite subjects to 
describe their thinking or to theorize about the causes of their behaviour.
The psychology of thinking can be broadly defined to cover a wide range 
of topics. For example, Gilhooly (1982) distinguishes between directed 
thinking -  as found in problem solving and reasoning -  undirected thinking
-  as in day-dreaming -  and creative thinking. In this chapter we shall focus 
on directed thinking: thought aimed at achieving specific goals. This is an 
area in which reasonable theoretical progress has been made, and for which 
there are clear practical applications in everyday life.
Studies of directed thinking fall broadly into three main areas which are 
described as problem solving, reasoning, and decision-making. We shall 
consider each in turn.
PROBLEM SOLVING
A person has a problem whenever he or she wishes to achieve a goal and is 
unable to proceed immediately to do so. Problem solving consists of finding 
a method of getting from where you are to where you want to be, using such 
resources and knowledge as you have available. This definition obviously 
covers a vast range of human activity; problem solving is clearly involved in 
solving crossword puzzles and choosing chess moves, but it is equally 
involved in finding your way to a new destination, obtaining a ticket for a 
sold-out sporting contest, or working out how to persuade your boss to give 
you a pay rise.
One distinction which has helped psychologists think about the vast range 
of behaviours involved in problem solving is that between well-defined and 
ill-defined problems. In a well-defined problem, all the information needed 
and the means of solution are available at the outset. This is typical of things 
that are set as “problems” in newspapers, and so on, and also typical of much 
research in the psychological laboratory. An anagram is an example of a well- 
defined problem. You know the letters that constitute the solution word and 
also the means of solving the problem — rearrangement of the order of letters
-  at the outset. Well-defined problem solving thus consists of applying 
known rules to known information in order to transform the situation and 
achieve the goal.
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Some of the most famous studies of well-defined problem solving were 
conducted by Newell and Simon (1972). An example of one of their problems 




Subjects are also told that D = 5 and that each letter represents a single digit 
number between 0 and 9. Given this information and the assumption that the 
normal rules of arithmetic apply, it is possible -  though complicated -  to 
work out what all the letter-number pairings must be. If the reader wishes 
to attempt this problem, then it is suggested that a good record (on paper) 
of the sequence of attempts — including errors and correction -  be kept.
Newell and Simon (1972) made an important theoretical contribution with 
the idea of problem solving as a search through a problem space. A problem 
space consists of a number of linked states including an initial or starting 
state and one or more goal states. All problems include permissible operators 
which allows one state to be transformed to another. Thus, solving problem 
consists in applying operators repeatedly to transform the initial state into a 
goal state.
As an example consider the game of chess (also studied by Newell & 
Simon, 1972). The states of the game can be described as the position of the 
pieces on the board plus some additional information (whose turn is it to 
move, do players have the right to castle, may a pawn be captured en 
passant, and so on). The initial state is thus the board with the pieces in 
starting position with White having the right to move. A goal state is any 
position in which the player has won the game either by checkmating the 
opponent or making such a mate inevitable. The permissible operators are 
the laws of chess, which determine the moves that can legally be made in a 
given situation.
Note that these definitions tell us nothing about the strategy of chess. The 
problem space consists of all states that can be reached by legal moves -  a 
vast number of possibilities in the case of chess. The strategy of the game 
obviously consists in choosing between alternative legal moves in such a way 
as to move towards the goal state of a winning position. In chess, as in many 
other problems, the problem space is too large for an exhaustive search to 
be feasible. You cannot consider all moves and all possible replies to more 
than a very few moves ahead without the number of possible positions 
becoming enormous. Thus Newell and Simon (1972) emphasize the import­
ance of heuristic strategies. An heuristic is a short-cut, rule of thumb method 
which may lead to a quick solution, but which may also fail. What heuristics 
do is to drastically reduce the size of the problem space to be searched in the 
hope that the goal state is not excluded in the process.
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Consider the following anagram: GBANRIEK. Since it has eight letters the 
total problem space includes the 8! = 40,320 possible rearrangements of the 
letters. A guaranteed, algorithmic (i.e., exhaustive search) method of solving 
this involves constructing all 40,320 letter strings and checking whether each 
is a word. A typical heuristic method, on the other hand, might involve 
looking for familiar letter patterns to decompose the problem. For example, 
we note that the anagram includes the letters I, N, and G and speculate that
the word might be of the f o r m ____ING. Thus we have now reduced the
problem to solving the five-letter anagram BAREK which has only 5! (120) 
possible solutions and is thus much easier. We may now spot the solution 
word BREAKING. Like all heuristics, however, this was not guaranteed to 
work. Many words contain the letters ING in other configurations, e.g., 
GELATIN.
Problem space analysis is extremely useful as it provides a common frame­
work in which to describe a very wide range of different problems. Newell 
and Simon (1972) studied subjects using think-aloud protocols while solving 
problems such as the cryptarithmetic example given above. They concluded 
that people have sets of general-purpose problem solving strategies that are 
used in similar ways to search problem spaces, no matter what particular 
domain is involved. They implemented their theory in a working computer 
program called General Problem Solver that was claimed to solve the same 
problems as the human subjects and in a similar way.
Important though this work has been, the conclusions are somewhat ques­
tionable. The first difficulty is that most real-life problems are ill defined. 
Some aspect of the problem -  the information assumed, the means of solu­
tion, sometimes even the goal -  is incomplete or missing at the outset. Take 
the case of engineering design which was subjected to detailed psychological 
study by Ball, Evans and Dennis (in press). An engineer is given a general 
specification for a device which includes its functionality — what it must 
do -  and a number of constraints, including costs. The engineer must then 
come up with a technical specification for a device which can be constructed 
and can be demonstrated to work.
As Ball discovered, such problems are not at all well defined. Nearly all the 
information required to solve the problem is implicit and must be retrieved 
either from the existing knowledge and experience of the engineer or by 
researching technical manuals, and so on. In the process of design, con­
straints emerge that were not apparent at the outset. The goal initially set may 
also be modified and rethought as the work progresses. Now such activity can 
still be usefully described within the problem space framework -  a space that 
is being continually augmented and redefined by the knowledge and experi­
ence of the engineer. However, the point is that simply applying the problem 
space description provides no explanation for some of the most important 
aspects of the process, particularly the means by which prior knowledge and 
experience are retrieved and applied.
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A number of more recent studies of human problem solving have focused 
on ill-defined problems and the use of prior knowledge. Of particular interest 
has been the role of analogy in solving problems (see Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 
1983; Keane, 1988). Most real-life problem solving -  including “expert” 
problem solving -  occurs within contexts where the solver has previous 
experience. Clearly, people do not solve all such problems as if seen for the 
first time; they must extrapolate from past experience. The theoretical and 
practical interest lies in how they actually bring their prior knowledge to bear.
A problem that has featured in many of these studies is the tumour 
problem  first introduced by the Gestalt psychologist Duncker (1945). The 
problem is that of a patient who has a malignant but inoperable tumour that 
can be destroyed only by radiation. However, the radiation destroys healthy 
tissue at the same rate as diseased tissue. The solution that subjects must find 
is to use a lens to converge the rays at the point of the tumour. Hence, the 
rays accumulate only to sufficient intensity to destroy the tumour and not the 
healthy tissue they pass through on the way (see Figure 1).
The problem is incompletely defined in that while the goal and constraints 
are generally indicated, subjects must search their knowledge and imagin­
ation for possible means of solution. General knowledge of medical proce­
dures is unhelpful; surgery is out by definition; drug treatments are of no 
relevance. The problem can, however, be facilitated by provision of a struc­
tural analogue such as the General story. The General is trying to attack a 
fortress which is well defended and which may be reached by a number of 
different roads. Each road is mined and may be safely crossed only by a small 
band of men. The General splits his force into small groups which approach
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simultaneously from different directions, and converge at the fortress with 
sufficient force to win the battle.
Gick and Holyoak (1980) showed that presentation of the General story 
could facilitate convergence solutions to the tumour problem provided that 
subjects were given a cue as to its relevance. There is a theoretical argument 
as to whether analogies can work by direct mapping of the elements of the 
analogy on to the problem, or whether the solution is mediated by an abstract 
schema. Gick and Holyoak suggest that subjects may construct and apply a 
convergence schema which is defined in terms of variables. For example, in 
the schema the goal is to destroy an obstacle, the means is a sufficient force, 
the constraint is that direct application is blocked, and so on. The General 
story could lead to development of a schema which is applied to the tumour 
problem.
The notion of schema is a useful one, in that it helps us to understand how 
knowledge may be abstracted, generalized, and applied in new situations. 
The notion will recur in the discussion of reasoning to which we now turn.
REASONING
Reasoning is the process of drawing conclusions or inferences from given 
information. An important distinction is that between deductive and induc­
tive inference. Deductive reasoning involves drawing conclusions that are 
logically valid, that is, they necessarily follow from the premises on which 
they are based. Thus such inferences do not increase the amount of inform­
ation contained in the premises; they merely render explicit what was pre­
viously latent information. The following are examples of valid deductive 
inferences:
The television will work only if it is plugged into the mains;
The television is not plugged into the mains,
Therefore, the television will not work.
John is taller than Jim;
Paul is shorter than Jim,
Therefore, John is taller than Paul.
The validity of the first example does not depend in any way on our 
knowledge of television sets, but only on our understanding of the connective 
“only if” . Any argument of the form p  only if  q; not-q, therefore not-p 
would be logically valid no matter what propositions we substitute for p  and 
q. Hence, validity depends on the form of the argument, not its actual con­
tent. In logic, the statement p  only if  q cannot be true in a world where p  
is the case and q is not the case. Hence, once we know that q is false we can 
infer that p  must be false as well.
The second example requires us to know that the relation taller—shorter is 
transitive. A transitive relation is one where the objects are ordered in a single
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line so that whenever A is higher than B on the scale, and B is above C  then 
A is also above C. Examples of other transitive relations are better-worse, 
warmer-colder, and darker-lighter. Many relations, of course, are not tran­
sitive. If A is next to B and B is next to C it does not follow that A is next 
to C.
Deductive inferences are very important in intelligent thinking as they 
allow knowledge to be stored in generalities and then applied to particular 
situations. Thus if we want to watch television and discover one that is 
unplugged, we immediately plug it in. This is a simple example of reasoning 
in order to solve a problem. The limitation of deductive reasoning, however, 
is that it adds no new knowledge; thus we cannot learn by deduction. Induc­
tion is involved whenever our conclusion has more information than the 
premises. A typical example is an inductive generalization such as
The Australian soap operas I have seen were boring, hence all Australian soap
operas are boring.
Such an inference is clearly not logically valid, though it could well influence 
what you watch when you get the TV plugged in.
The British psychologist, Peter Wason, invented two famous problems 
that have been used extensively to study both inductive and deductive 
reasoning. The inductive problem was first published by Wason (1960) and 
is known as the “2 4 6” task. The subjects are told that the experimenter has 
a rule in mind which applies to “ triples” of three whole numbers. An example 
which conforms to the rule is “2 4 6” . The subjects are then asked to discover 
the rule by generating triples of their own. In each case the experimenter says 
whether the triple conforms or not. Subjects are told to announce the rule 
only when they are very sure that they know it.
The actual rule is “any ascending sequence” but the subject is induced by 
the example to form a more specific hypothesis, such as “ascending with 
equal intervals” . Most subjects have great difficulty in solving the problem 
initially because all the examples they test appear to conform to the rule. The 
reason is that subjects test positive examples of their hypothesis which invari­
ably turn out to be positive examples of the experimenter’s rule as well. Their 
hypothesis can be refuted only by testing a negative example of the 
hypothesis such as “ 1 2 4” which is revealed as a positive instance of the 
actual rule. The set relationships involved are shown in Figure 2.
The protocols discussed by Wason (1960) were very interesting, suggesting 
that some subjects became so convinced of the correctness of their 
hypotheses that they were led to reformulate the proposed rule in different 
terms when told it was wrong. A striking example of this is shown in Table 1.
Wason’s interpretation of his findings was that subjects have a confirma­
tion bias, meaning that they systematically seek out evidence that confirms 
rather than refutes their current hypothesis. He suggested that such a 
confirmation bias is a very general tendency in human thought which may
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U Universal set of all triples 
E Experimenter’s rule -  all 
triples in ascending sequence
S Subjects’ hypothesis, e.g., 
ascending with equal intervals
Figure 2 Set relationships in W ason’s 2 4 6 task
Table 1 Example protocol from Wason (1960)
8 10 12: two added each time; 14 16 18: even numbers in order or magnitude;
20 22 24: same reason; 1 3 5: two added to preceding number.
The rule is that by starting with any number two is added each time to form  the 
next number.
2 6 10: middle number is arithmetic mean of other two; 1 50 99: same reason 
The rule is that the middle number is the arithmetic mean o f  the outer two.
3 10 17: same number, seven, added each time; 0 3 6: three added each time.
The rule is that the difference between two numbers next to each other is the 
same.
12 8 4: the same number subtracted each time to form the next number.
The rule is adding a number, always the same one, to form  the next number.
1 4 9: any three numbers in order o f  magnitude.
The rule is any three numbers in order o f  magnitude.
(17 minutes)
347
C O G N I T I O N
account for the maintenance of prejudice and false belief. While a number 
of authors have accepted this interpretation, it has also been subject to 
serious challenge (see Evans, 1989; Klayman & Ha, 1987).
The problem is that the subjects in the “2 4 6” experiment have no way 
of knowing that a positive test cannot lead to refutation of their hypothesis, 
and in many real-world situations it would do so. For example, in science it 
is customary to formulate general hypotheses and test if they apply to specific 
cases. Hence, given the hypothesis “All metals expand when heated” you 
would test any untried metal to see if the prediction holds -  and if it did not 
you would indeed refute the hypothesis. You would not be likely to try 
heating non-metal things, and even if you did and they expanded, it would 
mean only that your rule was insufficiently general.
Arguments such as these have led some authors to suggest that subjects’ 
behaviour on the “2 4 6” is more rational than it at first appears and that if 
there is a bias, it is towards positive testing rather than to confirmation as 
such. A particularly interesting experiment reported by Tweney, Doherty, 
and Mynatt (1980) provides evidence for this. In one study, instead of 
defining instances in positive and negative terms (right/wrong, belonging/ 
not-belonging) they told subjects that all triples were either MEDs or DAXes 
and that “2 4 6” was an example of a MED. What happened was that subjects 
continued to test their hypotheses positively but alternated between testing 
MED and DAX hypotheses. For example, if the hypothesis was that “ triples 
ascending in equal intervals are MEDs and others are DAXes” , then they 
might test “ 1 2 5” predicting it to be a DAX. This meant that they effectively 
tested negative examples of the usual hypothesis and hence solved the 
problem much more easily. The psychological difference is that the negative 
test of MED was construed as a positive test of DAX.
A close parallel to these findings occurs with the second and most famous 
of W ason’s problems -  the four-card selection task (see Evans, Newstead 
and Byrne 1993 for detailed review and discussion). This problem requires 
subjects to test hypotheses via deductive reasoning. In the classic “abstract” 
version of the task, subjects are told that a set of cards always has a capital 
letter on one side and a single-figure number on the the other side. They are 
then shown four such cards lying on a table with the exposed values as shown 
in Figure 3. The subjects are told that the following rule may be true or false:
I f  there is an A on one side o f  the card then there is a 3 on the other side o f  the card.
The subjects’ task is to turn over those cards -  and only those cards -  that 
are needed to decide whether the rule is true or false. The task is deceptively 
simple, since most subjects fail to solve it. The common answers given are 
A alone, or A and 3. The correct answer is the A and the 7. The reason is 
that the rule can be shown to be false only if there is an A on one side of 
a card and number other than a 3 on the other. Only by turning the A and 
the 7 (not a 3) is it possible to discover such a card. There is also no point
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Figure 3 The four cards displayed in a version of W ason’s selection task
in turning the 3 since the rule makes no claim that an A must be on the back 
of a 3.
Wason’s original claim was again that card selections reflected a confirma­
tion bias: subjects were trying to prove the rule true rather than false, that 
is, looking for the combination A and 3, rather than A and not-3. This view 
was, however, refuted to the satisfaction of Wason as well as other authors 
by the finding of “matching bias” reported by Evans and Lynch (1973). They 
pointed out that the preferred selections, A and 3, were not only the verifying 
choices, but also the positive choices matching the items named in the actual 
rule. Verification and matching could, however, be separated by introducing 
negative components into the rule. Consider for example, the rule
I f  there is an A on one side o f  the card then there is N O T a 3 on the other side
o f  the card
If subjects have a confirmation bias, then they should now choose the A and 
the 7 which confirm the two parts of the rule. If, however, they have a 
matching bias then they should continue to choose A and 3 which are the cor­
rect and falsifying combination on this rule. Subjects do, in fact, continue 
to choose predominantly matching values on this and other variants of the 
rule, thus confirming the predictions of Evans and Lynch. Evans (1989) 
regards matching as an example of a generalized positivity bias, that is, bias 
to think about positively defined items, which also accounts for subjects’ 
behaviour on the “2 4 6” task.
Dozens of experiments have been published -  and continue to be published
— in which subjects are asked to solve versions of the Wason selection task. 
Most of these have been concerned with the so-called thematic materials 
facilitation effect. This has its origin in two early studies discussed in Wason 
and Johnson-Laird’s (1972) famous textbook on reasoning. In one of these 
(Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Legrenzi, 1972) subjects were shown envelopes 
in place of cards, together with the following Postal Rule:
I f  the letter is sealed then it has a 50 lire stamp on it.
Subjects were then shown four envelopes which were either front side up and 
showing a 50 or 40 lire stamp, or rear side up showing that they were sealed 
or unsealed (see Figure 4). The subjects had to decide which envelopes to turn
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Figure 4 The four envelopes shown to subjects in the Postal Rule version of the
selection task
over in order to decide if the rule was true or false. The usual matching 
response on the abstract task would lead to choice of the sealed envelope and 
the 50 lire stamp. However, almost all subjects made the logically correct 
choice of the sealed envelope and the one showing a 40 lire stamp.
The original interpretation offered of this and other similar experiments 
was that use of thematic materials facilitated logical reasoning on the task. 
This view has been considerably refined by subsequent research, however. 
The problem with the Postal Rule is that a very similar rule (involving pence 
rather than lire) was in force in the UK at the time of the study. Thus it was 
argued that subjects knew from experience that envelopes with a lower value 
stamp must not be sealed and that hence no “ reasoning” as such was required 
to solve the problem. This argument was supported by the findings of several 
later studies which showed that first, the Postal Rule produces no facilitation 
of performance in American subjects unfamiliar with such a rule, and 
second, British subjects too young to remember the rule (it was dropped in 
the 1970s) show no facilitation on the problem whereas older subjects per­
form much better.
It is not the case, however, that subjects must have direct experience of the 
context in order for a problem content to facilitate on the selection task. A 
very effective version, for example, is the Sears Problem in which subjects
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are asked to play the role of a store manager checking that a company rule 
has been followed. The rule is
I f  a purchase exceeds $30, then the receipt must be approved by the departmental
manager.
Subjects are shown four receipts, two of which are front side up showing 
totals of above and below $30 and two of which are front side down and 
either have or do not have the signature of the departmental manager on 
them. Few subjects have any difficulty in correctly deciding to turn over the 
receipt for more than $30, and the one that has not been signed by the 
manager. This is despite the fact that subjects have not worked as managers 
in department stores.
While arguments exist about the precise reason for facilitation of perform­
ance by these kinds of thematic content, the general idea is that where sub­
jects have either direct or analogous experience that can be linked to the 
problem, then they can solve it. Another line of argument is that it is the 
introduction of deontic terms such as may and must which carry with them 
notions of permission and obligation that causes the facilitation. The idea is 
that we have generalized reasoning schemas that enable us to understand the 
logic of any situation in which, for example, a precondition is set for an 
action. Thus, once we have identified the action (e.g., sealing an envelope, 
spending over $30) and the precondition (sufficient value stamp, permission 
of departmental manager) we know what to do: we are applying a generalized 
permission schema to the problem at hand.
The two problems of Peter Wason discussed in this section have stimulated 
much interesting psychological work on the nature of human reasoning. The 
specific findings discussed here invite two general conclusions: first, that 
reasoning with “abstract” problem material is heavily biased by a tendency 
to think about positively rather than negatively defined information, and 
second, that the introduction of thematic problem content, and hence 
associated prior knowledge, can have a dramatic effect on the reasoning 
observed, and sometimes produces much better logical performance. The 
“sometimes” in the latter conclusion is needed. Other research, which there 
is no space to discuss here, has also indicated that prior knowledge can be 
a source of bias and error in reasoning. This is especially the case when sub­
jects are asked to evaluate the logic of an argument but have strong prior 
beliefs about the truth of a conclusion (see Evans, 1989, chap. 4).
DECISION MAKING AND STATISTICAL JUDGEMENT
In a problem solving task, it is normally possible to work out and demon­
strate a solution to the problem set. Once you have the solution, you know 
it and can prove it. In a decision-making task, however, subjects are required 
to exercise judgement about a choice that will only later prove to work out
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well or badly. Decision-making means committing yourself to choices 
between actions by anticipation of what the outcomes will -  or may -  be. 
Thus when we make any decision -  to accept one job rather than another, 
to marry someone or not, go to a football match rather than stay at home
-  we do so in the hope that the future we chose was to be preferred to the 
one we avoided.
Decision-making is obviously of great importance in the real world, but it 
is a subject of considerable psychological interest too. Most real-world 
decision-making is done under conditions of uncertainty: we do not know for 
sure what will happen as a result of each choice and at best can try to estimate 
the probabilities of different outcomes. If we are to choose rationally then 
we need to evaluate the desirability of these outcomes as well. In the parlance 
of decision theory, we should try to maximize expected utility where utility 
is the subjective value of the outcome and where the term “expectation” 
means that we weight the various possible outcomes by their likelihood of 
occurring. Hence, a small chance of a highly desirable outcome might be 
equally attractive to a much better prospect of a less desirable outcome.
There has been much debate in the psychological literature about whether 
people choose rationally or not. The notion of rational choice has several 
components. First, it implies that people will consciously consider the various 
actions available to them and try to project ahead the possible outcomes and 
further choices to which they lead in what is termed a decision tree. Second, 
it is assumed that they assign probabilities and utilities to each of these out­
comes as accurately as possible in the light of their current beliefs. Finally, 
rational decision-makers are assumed to apply systematic principles, such as 
the maximization of expected utility, in order to decide their final choices.
There are many demonstrations of human choice behaviour that appear to 
depart from this idealized notion. Within the space restriction here I shall 
discuss just one aspect -  the ability of people to judge probabilities or to 
reason statistically. A famous set of papers by the psychologists Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman dating from the early 1970s have apparently 
demonstrated the frailty of human probability judgement. This research is 
often cited as evidence of irrationality, although Tversky and Kahneman 
themselves follow the tradition of work on “bounded rationality” espoused 
by Newell and Simon (1972). The idea is that people cannot base their prob­
ability judgements on probability theory due its computational complexity 
and instead employ short-cut rules of thumb known as heuristics. While 
often useful, such heuristics can also lead to systematic errors and biases.
Of the heuristics discussed by Kahneman and Tversky, the two most 
famous are those of representativeness and availability (see Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982 for a collection of relevant papers, including the 
seminal ones). Probability or frequency of an event is estimated by the avail­
ability heuristic when people base their judgement on the ease with which 
examples can be brought to mind. Such a heuristic would often be effective.
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For example, an experienced doctor might base a provisional diagnosis on 
her recollection of the numbers of previous cases or patients with similar 
symptoms who turned out to suffer from a particular condition. Assuming 
that memory was accurate and that experience was representative then this 
is a good, if rough basis for a judgement.
As Tversky and Kahneman have demonstrated, however, relying on avail­
ability of recalled examples can lead to biases. For example, some types of 
information are easier to retrieve than others, due to the way in which 
memory is organized. For example, most people will say, if asked, that there 
are more words in English that start with the letter k than those that have 
k as the third letter, although the reverse is true. The problem is that it is hard 
to generate examples of the latter category: they cannot easily be “brought 
to mind” .
Availability is also implicated in biases which preserve false beliefs and 
theories. An interesting example is the phenomenon of illusory correlation. 
It has been demonstrated in a number of studies that human judges -  
including experts — hold theories that are not supported by the evidence they 
encounter. For example, some clinicians maintain that projective personality 
tests such as the Rorschach ink blot test is useful in diagnosing mental illness 
despite a lack of any supporting evidence. Research has shown that such 
judges perceive a correlation between test results and diagnoses in a set of 
data in which they are in fact randomly related. A plausible explanation of 
illusory correlation is that the judges selectively remember the cases that 
confirm their expectations or pet theories. Thus confirming cases are more 
available in later recall and bias the judgement of the correlation.
The representativeness heuristic is involved in judgements of conditional 
probability. The likelihood of a sample given a population, or of an event 
given a hypothesis is dependent upon the perceived similarity of the two. Sim­
ilarity judgements may, however, cause the subject to overlook the relevance 
of a critical statistical feature such as the size of the sample, or the base rate 
occurrence of the event. A simple example is provided by the conjunction 
fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Subjects are given a description of Bill 
as follows:
Bill i s . . .
They are then asked to rank the likelihood of several statements including the 
following:
a Bill is an accountant 
b Bill plays jazz for a hobby
c Bill is an accountant who plays jazz for a hobby.
What happens is that most subjects rate the order of likelihood of these state­
ments as a >  c >  b. However, there is a statistical impossibility here in that 
statement c cannot be more likely than statement b. Given two events A  and
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B the probability of them both occurring -  P{A  HZ?) -  must be less than or 
equal to the probability of either P ( A)  or P(B).  Whenever c is true then b 
is true as well, because Bill plays jazz for a hobby. If all jazz players were 
accountants then the two statements would be equally likely, otherwise b has 
to be more probable.
The explanation offered for the fallacy is that the description of Bill con­
forms to our stereotype for accountants but not for jazz players. Thus the 
statement c is more representative of the description than is statement b and 
hence judged more probable.
One of the most famous of Kahneman and Tversky’s problems is the Cabs 
Problem. You are given the following information: in a certain city there are 
two cab companies: the Blue cab company, which has 85 per cent of the city’s 
cabs, and the Green cab company, which has 15 per cent of the city’s cabs. 
A cab is involved in a hit-and-run accident and a witness later identified the 
cab as a Green one. Under tests the witness was shown to be able to identify 
the colour of a cab correctly about 80 per cent of the time under comparable 
viewing conditions. The subjects are asked if the cab involved in the accident 
is more likely to have been Green or Blue. Most say Green, although the cor­
rect answer is Blue.
The problem is that subjects disregard the base rate or prior probability of 
the cab colour -  85 : 15 in favour of Blue. In fact, when asked to give a 
numerical estimate, most subjects say 80 per cent Green -  the chance of the 
witness correctly identifying a cab. If there were no witnesses, it would be 
obvious that the chance of the cab being Blue was 85 per cent -  the base rate. 
As Figure 5 shows, however, the chance of a Blue cab being identified as 
Green is 17 per cent which is still higher than the chance (12 per cent) of a 
Green cab being identified as Green.
Blue Cabs (85%) Green Cabs (15%)
A Probability o f  Blue identified as Blue = 80% x 85% = 68%
B Probability of Blue identified as Green = 20% x 85% = 17%
C Probability o f  Green identified as Green = 80% x 15% = 12%
D Probability of Green identified as Blue = 20% x  15% = 3%
Figure 5 Probabilities in the Cabs Problem
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Originally, the base rate fallacy was interpreted as the base rate lacking 
representativeness, although the explanation is probably more fundamental. 
We find it very difficult to apply abstract statistics to individual cases. Hence, 
many cigarette smokers are aware of the statistical risks for smokers as a 
whole, but do not feel that this affects them as individuals. However, we can 
apply statistics when we see a causal connection. If the cabs problem is 
slightly reworded, most subjects give the right answer. In this version the 
number of Green and Blue cabs in the city is the same, but 85 per cent of 
the cabs involved in accidents are Blue. The image of reckless Blue cab 
drivers conjured up induces subjects to take account of the base rate, 
although from a statistical point of view the problem is unchanged.
CONCLUSIONS
Psychological research on thinking and reasoning has produced some useful
-  and sometimes surprising — conclusions. The common-sense view, that 
intelligent actions are based on conscious and rational acts of thinking, does 
not fit the evidence at all well. If thought is to be defined as the information 
processing that underlies problem solving, reasoning, and decision-making, 
then surprisingly little of this appears to be accessible through introspection.
If human thinking is rational -  and the success of the species suggests that 
it should be -  then that rationality is highly constrained by our capacity to 
process information. In particular, we seem to solve problems and make de­
cisions largely on the basis of heuristic processes which serve us well in some 
circumstances, but lead us into error and bias in others. We seem to have 
particular difficulty in understanding probability and uncertainty despite the 
crucial role that this plays in rational decision-making.
Studies of reasoning also show that we are prone to biases, for example 
in a strong preference for thinking about positively defined information. 
Perhaps the most important finding in this area, however, is the discovery 
that we do not -  as was once thought -  appear to reason by the use of an 
abstract mental logic, but instead seem to be highly influenced by the content 
and context of the problems with which we are faced. The processes of 
human thought appear to be quite specific to the areas of knowledge which 
we are involved in applying.
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Artificial intelligence, cognitive 
psychology, and the future 
Further reading 
References
Artificial intelligence, almost always known as AI, attempts to understand 
intelligent behaviour, in the broadest sense of that term, by getting computers 
to reproduce it. “ Intelligent behaviour” is taken to include thinking, 
reasoning, and learning, and their prerequisites (perception, the mental 
representation of information, and the ability to use language). Indeed, much 
current work in AI is concerned with modelling aspects of behaviour that 
would not normally be thought of as requiring any special intelligence. As 
part of computer science, AI is separate from cognitive psychology, although 
there is a large overlap in subject area. The two come together (with, most 
importantly, linguistics and philosophy) in the multidisciplinary approach of 
cognitive science.
Although AI aims to understand human intelligence, it also aims to 
produce machines that behave intelligently, no matter what their underlying 
mechanism. However, although these machines may not model human 
behaviour, their construction may reflect principles that are useful in 
studying it.
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HISTORY
Since AI depends on computers, it is a relatively new discipline: the name was 
first used in the mid-1950s, though a few years earlier, pioneers such as Alan 
Turing in Britain and Claude Shannon in the United States had worked out 
how to write chess-playing computer programs. The dream of mechanized 
thought has, of course, a much longer history. The philosophers Blaise 
Pascal (1623-1662) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646—1716) built small cal­
culating machines, and conceived grander schemes for formalizing thought 
processes. Charles Babbage (1792-1871) came nearer to building a universal 
computing machine, but was foiled by the limitations of having to use mech­
anical parts. Real computers had to wait for electronic components -  first 
vacuum tubes, then semiconductors.
A conference at Dartford College, New Hampshire, in 1956 effectively 
launched AI research, even though its organizers felt disappointed at the 
time. In retrospect, the most important line of research discussed at the con­
ference was that of Allen Newell and Herbert Simon (see e.g., Newell, Shaw, 
& Simon, 1957) on human problem solving. They proposed the idea of a heu­
ristic (“rule-of-thumb”) procedure for solving problems, and they shunned 
a line of research based on modelling the properties of networks of brain 
cells, which only assumed major importance again 25 years later, in the guise 
of connectionism. Newell and Simon’s information processing approach was 
the dominant one in the early days of AI, and it remained influential 
throughout the 1960s -  the so-called semantic information processing era. 
There was, however, a subtle shift of emphasis from a formal analysis of 
tasks to one based on the meaning of the information being processed. Fur­
thermore, in attempting to tackle broader problems, such as natural language 
understanding, AI researchers quickly discovered that everyday tasks depend 
on huge amounts of background knowledge. To keep programs manageable, 
they were made to work in limited domains, in particular BLOCKSWORLD
-  a tabletop with prismatic blocks on it. It was hoped that programs that 
worked in these limited domains would scale up to real situations. In practice 
they did not, and in retrospect it is often obvious why they could not.
The 1970s was a somewhat disappointing period in “traditional” areas of 
AI research. Indeed, in the UK the Lighthill report (Lighthill, 1972) con­
cluded that AI should not be a priority area for research. The late 1970s saw 
four important developments. The first was a shift in interest from specific 
computer programs to general principles. To some extent this development 
was linked to the second, the emergence of cognitive science, in which AI 
techniques are used with the primary goal of developing general theories of 
cognition, rather than with the more applied (“engineering”) goal of building 
intelligent machines. The third development was a shift in the research topics 
seen as central to AI. In particular, fifteen years of research on the first 
expert systems was beginning to have spectacular payoffs (in the domains of
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mathematics, medical diagnosis, and determining the structure of complex 
organic molecules) and suddenly everyone wanted to write an expert system. 
In the short term, this enthusiasm generated additional funding and research, 
but it soon became apparent that an expert system in one domain could not 
necessarily be used as a model for one in another domain. If expert systems 
showed that real applications had to come to grips with formalizing real 
knowledge (as opposed to knowledge about toy domains), they also showed 
that this task was a formidable one. The fourth development was the re- 
emergence of neural network modelling, of the kind that had been largely set 
aside by those who espoused the Newell and Simon information processing 
approach. Theoretical developments together with the availability of larger, 
faster computers suddenly saw this approach producing important and 
enticing results.
The 1980s saw the working out of these developments. Although all remain 
important, all have faced disappointments. It is very hard to make an expert 
system that replaces an expert, though much easier to write a program that 
helps one. And it is hard to generalize the lessons learned in one domain of 
expertise. Cognitive science has not integrated its subdisciplines as closely as 
was hoped, and neural network modelling has still to show that it can make 
significant contributions to modelling abilities that call for complex inform­
ation processing, in particular high-level processes in language understanding 
and thinking and reasoning.
KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION
Intelligent behaviour requires information to be stored, either in a short-term 
store or a long-term store or, more usually, both. One of the primary tasks 
of AI is therefore to produce an account of how information is represented 
in an intelligent system.
We know that the human nervous system has many parts, and that those 
parts probably operate in different ways. Nevertheless, there are many attrac­
tions in proposing that all information is stored in the same format. It may 
not be the form of information storage that differentiates information 
processing systems, but the nature of the information and the purpose for 
which it is used. Partly for this reason, many AI researchers have been 
attracted to the idea that information should be stored using the logical lan­
guage known as first order predicate calculus (FOPC), and extensions of it 
that incorporate reasoning about time and modality. An additional attraction 
of this proposal is that, at least in principle, FOPC is computationally tract­
able: given a FOPC database, other facts implied by that database can be 
generated automatically. Other systems of representation are either not 
known to have or known not to have this property.
Unfortunately, although FOPC appears to have desirable properties, in 
practice it is extremely cumbersome to use. Partly because of the uniformity
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of the representation, facts in a large FOPC database can be difficult to find. 
Similarly, although there is a well-established procedure for drawing infer­
ences from facts in a FOPC database (the resolution method, Robinson, 
1965), it very quickly gets bogged down in making all but the simplest infer­
ences. Furthermore, inferences made from a FOPC database cannot be over­
ridden by new information. Everyday inferences can -  they are said to be 
non-monotonic. For example, if I know that John is 25 years old and lives 
in Los Angeles, I infer that he can drive. If I subsequently learn that he 
suffers from epilepsy, I would probably withdraw my previous conclusion. 
Since the late 1970s there have been several attempts to construct non­
monotonic logics, similar to FOPC but with additional rules of inference that 
violate monotonicity. There have also been attempts to formalize non­
monotonic reasoning in other ways. The idea of a truth maintenance system 
(TMS) (Doyle, 1979) has been important in many of these. A TMS stores 
information about the justification for beliefs held, and allows dependency- 
dependent backtracking, so that when a belief turns out to be false, the 
reasons why it was held can be accessed directly and reassessed. None of these 
attempts to handle non-monotonic reasoning has been entirely successful.
Partly as a result of problems with uniform representation systems, such 
as FOPC, many AI researchers have proposed non-uniform representations, 
which allow special procedures for manipulating certain types of inform­
ation. One of the earliest, and best-known, non-uniform representations is 
semantic networks (Quillian, 1968). Semantic networks give a special place 
to the information represented in their links and, in particular, they allow 
efficient processing of taxonomic information. Quillian’s original, and rather 
simple, networks have been extended and elaborated in various ways, and 
representation of information in network form has proved a recurrent theme 
in AI. More complex non-uniform representation schemes that are related to 
semantic networks include frames and scripts. Scripts represent stereotyped 
sequences of events, frames have several uses. In one, frames represent par­
ticular objects and types of object, and a more recent development is that of 
object-oriented programming languages. The first widely used object- 
oriented language was the AI language SMALLTALK. More recently object- 
oriented versions of the most important AI language, LISP, have appeared, 
and languages such as C now have object-oriented versions (C++). Indeed, 
one of the major applications of object-oriented programming is not in AI, 
but in the development of windows-based interfaces for personal computers 
and workstations, where windows are treated as objects.
In the framework of semantic networks, the spread of activation through 
a network is the principal method of extracting information from it. This 
process has usually been simulated on a serial computer, but it ought to be 
achieved more efficiently on parallel hardware. Indeed, one of the most 
important parallel processing computers, the Connection Machine (not to be 
confused with connectionist neural nets), was inspired by Scott Fahlman’s
361
C O G N I T I O N
(1979) suggestion for implementing semantic networks on special hardware. 
The idea of distributed processing is also found in neural network models of 
cognitive processing. Neural networks also allow, though they do not 
demand, distributed representations of the knowledge embodied in them. In 
particular, those neural networks that learn to perform tasks, rather than 
having information encoded into them by the programmer, are likely to 
develop distributed representations. Such networks show rule-governed 
behaviour as an emergent property, and the only way to determine exactly 
what rules such a network is following is to examine the relation between its 
inputs and its outputs.
There are many things we cannot be sure of, so a further issue in 
knowledge representation is the encoding and use of uncertain information. 
Inferences from uncertain information are modelled mathematically using 
probability theory and, in particular, Bayes’ theorem, which is familiar to 
psychologists from statistical courses. Complex sets of probabilistic interrela­
tions can be modelled in so-called Bayesian networks. Unfortunately 
Bayesian inference is neither computationally simple nor always the correct 
model of real world uncertain inference. The early expert system MYCIN (see 
below) introduced the simplifying idea of certainty factors associated with 
each of its diagnostic rules of inference. In recent years attention has focused 
on a more sophisticated mathematical approach known as Dempster-Shafer 
theory and there has also been renewed interest in fuzzy set theory, which 
enjoyed brief popularity in cognitive psychology in the mid-1970s.
VISION
Traditional AI research on vision was concerned, broadly speaking, with 
recognition of the objects -  the prismatic solids -  in the BLOCKSWORLD. 
For computer vision programs, the objects were matt white, uniformly lit (no 
shadows), and placed against a black background. In fact, the general 
problem of object recognition in the BLOCKSWORLD was set aside in 
favour of two of its component problems: finding lines in an image of a 
BLOCKSWORLD scene, and segmenting the image into sets of regions -  
each region corresponding to a surface -  that belong to the same object. 
Indeed, this research came to be dominated by attempts to solve the seg­
mentation problem: many programs required line drawings (rather than 
images) as their inputs.
The most important method of attempting to solve the segmentation 
problem, originally suggested by Alfonso Guzman (1968), was to use inform­
ation about the types of vertex in the scene. Guzman’s taxonomy was intu­
itive, but it was systematized independently by Max Clowes (1971) and David 
Huffman (1971), who stressed the importance of maintaining different 
descriptions of the image (in terms of lines, line junctions, and regions) and 
the scene (in terms of edges, vertices, and surfaces), and of making systematic
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inferences about the scene on the basis of the image. The Clowes-Huffman 
scheme is limited to scenes with no shadows and in which no more than three 
lines meet at any point. It has three types of line (corresponding to bound­
aries, inside edges, and outside edges) and four basic types of line junction 
(Ts, Ys, Ls, and arrows). From these line types and junction types, 16 
derived junction types can be constructed, which correspond to possible
Figure 1 The 16 derived junction types in the Clowes-Huffman scheme -  4 Ts, 3 Ys, 
6 Ls, and 3 arrows. An arrow on a line signifies that it represents an occluding edge 
(boundary between objects), a plus (+) sign signifies a convex (or outside) edge of a 
single object, and a minus (—) sign a concave (or inside) edge. The direction o f  the 
arrow indicates the side o f  the line on which the occluding object lies (to the right
when facing in the direction o f  the arrow)
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configurations in a BLOCKSWORLD scene (see Figure 1). Identification of 
the basic junction types in the image, plus the application of the constraint 
that any line should be of the same type along its whole length, allows most 
images of permissible scenes to be interpreted.
David Waltz (1975) extended the Clowes-Huffman scheme to scenes with 
shadows and to images in which more than three lines meet at a point. These 
apparently simple changes increased the number of permissible derived junc­
tion types from 16 to about 2,500. Nevertheless, Waltz’s program was more 
successful than those devised by Clowes and Huffman, since he exploited the 
need for consistent labelling of neighbouring junctions. An iterative tech­
nique known as Waltz filtering or, more generally, as relaxation eliminates 
possible labellings of junctions, using this consistency constraint. In most 
cases it rapidly converges on a solution to the segmentation problem for the 
image it is processing.
Steve Draper (1981) and others have identified a number of problems with 
the junction-labelling technique and with an alternative to it known as the 
gradient-space method. Draper invented a technique called sidedness 
reasoning. Sidedness reasoning is about whether two points or surfaces are 
on the same side of a third surface. Draper showed that this technique was 
able to segment all BLOCKSWORLD images but in doing so he virtually put 
a stop to work on object recognition in the BLOCKSWORLD. The reason 
was that his technique wore on its sleeve the fact that it was specific to 
BLOCKSWORLD: it works only when all surfaces are flat. Thus, the idea 
of solving the problem of object recognition in a miniature domain and 
scaling up the solution to the real world would not work.
A quite different approach to the problems of vision is found in the work 
of David Marr (1982) and his associates. M arr’s work integrates ideas from 
AI, psychology, and neurophysiology in what is usually taken to be the 
paradigmatically successful piece of research in cognitive science. The work is 
guided by an underlying philosophy about the study of natural information- 
processing systems. Marr identified three levels at which such systems should 
be studied. First, a task analysis answers the questions of what the system 
does and why it does it. This analysis leads to a computational theory of the 
system -  an account of the function (in the mathematical sense) it computes. 
The second level of analysis is that of representation and algorithm. The third 
level is that of implementation. In the case of natural information processing 
systems, this level of analysis requires the study of the neural mechanisms 
that support the system. Marr is critical of previous AI work on vision, 
largely because of its focus on the second level of analysis at the expense of 
the first, to which Marr attached great importance. He is also critical of 
neurophysiological work, such as that of  Hubei and Wiesel (1962), in which 
the purpose of certain types of cell is inferred from their properties. 
According to Marr, the purpose of a system (and of its parts) can be deter­
mined only by constructing a computational theory.
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In his own work, Marr recognized three main stages of visual processing. 
In the first of these stages, the array of light falling on the retina is trans­
formed into a representation called the primal sketch. The primal sketch is 
a symbolic representation, but it is a representation of the image, not of the 
scene. It contains information about lines, boundaries, and regions in the 
image. The construction of the primal sketch takes place very early in the 
visual system and proceeds on the basis of local interactions between 
processing units (cells) that represent adjacent parts of the image. Although 
these interactions reflect what is known about the early visual system, Marr 
eschewed theories what were motivated solely by neurophysiological evid­
ence. Hence, his demand for independent support -  from task analysis and 
psychological evidence -  for the algorithm and representation he proposed.
In the second stage of visual processing, the 2iD sketch is derived from 
the primal sketch. This sketch is a very short-term memory store into which 
a set of processes writes information about the surfaces (in the scene) 
represented in the image, their orientation, and their approximate distance 
from the viewer: the third dimension is not properly represented, hence 
2iD sketch. The most important of these processes are stereopsis, structure 
from motion, and shape from shading.
Since objects have not yet been recognized, surfaces cannot be identified 
by reference to information about the objects of which they are part. This 
aspect of the construction of the 2iD sketch reflects M arr’s preference for 
bottom-up  (data-driven) theories of visual processing. The only world 
knowledge that such theories can claim the visual system uses is a set of 
general principles, such as what very few points in an image correspond to 
abrupt changes in the surface represented. Specific information about the 
scene being viewed is not yet available.
In the final stage of visual processing, a 3D model description is con­
structed from the 2iD sketch. This representation contains information 
about the identity and three-dimensional structure of the objects in the scene. 
M arr’s account of this final stage is highly speculative, and less closely linked 
with the psychological and neurophysiological evidence. M arr’s basic idea is 
that objects can be represented, in a catalogue stored in long-term memory, 
as jointed generalized cylinders (cylinders whose cross-section changes along 
their length). The principal axes of these cylinders make up stick figures of 
the objects represented. He showed that, subject to certain constraints, 
generalized cylinder representations could be derived from the 2iD sketch, 
and then compared with entries in the catalogue, with any necessary rotation 
and bending at the joints. In practice this matching is difficult, and Marr sug­
gested a process of gradual refinement in the match between the image and 
the stored representations in the catalogue. This kind of process can be (rela­
tively) time-consuming, and was rejected by Marr in his analyses of the lower 
levels of visual processing.
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M arr’s work incorporates, in addition to traditional Al-style program­
ming, much straightforward mathematics. Subsequent work on vision, both 
theoretical and applied, has become increasingly mathematical and, hence, 
increasingly inaccessible to psychologists. On the theoretical side, many of 
the problems of visual analysis have been identified as special cases of what 
are known as ill-posed problems. They are ill posed because, as they stand, 
they do not have a unique solution. They can be analysed by a technique 
known as regularization, which requires the addition to the problem of the 
kind of general constraints identified by Marr. On the applied side, special­
ized hardware in the form of very large-scale integration (VLSI) chips has 
allowed, for example, stereo algorithms to be used in real-world applications.
THINKING, REASONING, PROBLEM SOLVING
Historically, problem solving was one of the earliest topics of AI research. 
Furthermore, it has often been argued that it is the central topic, since AI 
techniques in other domains can be seen as special cases of searching through 
a “space” of possibilities for a solution to a problem. For example, parsing 
a sentence can be seen as a search through the (infinite) set of possible 
syntactic structures defined by the grammar of a language.
Occasionally it is possible to examine all possible solutions to a problem 
to find the right one. However, for most interesting problems there are too 
many possibilities to make this approach viable. Usually there are several 
steps in the solution to a problem, so the number of possible moves multiplies 
up at each step, producing what is called a combinatorial explosion in the 
number of potential solutions. A control strategy for searching through 
the space of possible solutions is, therefore, required.
Traditionally, there are two ways of representing problems so that a search 
can be made for their solution. In a state-space representation, problems are 
represented in terms of states of the relevant part of the world, and actions 
(usually referred to as operators) that transform one state into another. 
In this representation, a single path through the tree of possibilities 
( = a sequence of operators) represents the solution to the problem. In a 
problem-reduction representation a large problem is broken up into a 
number of sub-problems, all of which must be solved if the main problem 
is to be solved. State-space representations are easier to construct. Sensible 
reductions of problems can be hard to find, but they are very useful when 
they have been found. In serious AI work on problem solving the two types 
of representation are combined into AND/OR trees. AND branchings rep­
resent problem reductions, where all the sub-goals have to be fulfilled. OR 
branchings represent alternative possibilities in a state space, only one of 
which has to be fulfilled.
Various general control strategies for searching problem spaces have been 
proposed. The most fundamental distinction is between breadth-first and
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depth-first search of trees. In breadth-first search all possible one-operator 
solutions are checked, then all possible two-operator solutions, and so on. 
In depth-first search one possible solution is followed up until it succeeds or 
fails, or until a pre-set depth limit is reached, since a branch in an AND/OR 
tree may never terminate. Simple depth-first and breadth-first search are used 
only in desperation. Usually some method is introduced for following up the 
most promising possibilities. Methods for deciding which possibility is the 
most promising are inevitably heuristic. The most sophisticated method of 
making the choice is the AO* algorithm. However, the algorithm itself does 
not provide the means of measuring which next move is the best. Further­
more, there is no general method for assigning values to moves. A new one 
must be devised for each domain in which the algorithm is used.
Such methods can, nevertheless, be applied to solving puzzle-book 
problems and in game-playing computers (e.g., for chess). In chess-playing 
programs the problem that the computer is trying to solve is not how to win 
the game, but what move to make next. Successful programs run on very fast 
super-computers, so that they can examine vast numbers of possible moves. 
However, they limit the distance ahead (in terms of moves) that they look. 
Since they typically cannot see ahead to a winning position, they have to 
evaluate the positions that they can reach in other ways, and then aim to 
reach the best position that a rational opponent will let them. The play of 
such programs differs in several ways from that of human chess players. The 
standard of the best of them, however, is usually reckoned to be in the 
grandmaster category.
Even if all AI researchers had access to the kind of super-computers that 
chess programmers use, they would not necessarily want to use the same kind 
of brute force problem solving methods, particularly if they were interested 
in modelling human problem solving abilities. Newell, Shaw, and Simon 
(1957) first introduced the idea of heuristic (rule-of-thumb) problem solving 
techniques in their Logic Theory Machine, that proved theorems of logic. An 
alternative way of speeding up problem solving is to use domain-specific tech­
niques, that may be heuristic, but which need not be. An early example of 
an AI program that used a domain-specific technique was Gelernter’s (1963) 
Geometry Machine, which constructed the equivalent of geometrical dia­
grams. It is thought that most human mathematicians, except when they are 
working in completely new areas of mathematics, use domain-specific tech­
niques. More generally, domain-specific techniques are thought to be widely 
used in all types of problem solving.
LANGUAGE
There is a long history of computational research on all aspects of language 
processing. Research on speech, both automatic speech recognition and 
speech synthesis, has been strongly influenced by work on signal processing
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carried out by electronic engineers. More recently, with the advent of larger 
and more powerful computers, the field of speech and language technology 
has emerged, which is primarily directed to producing tools for processing 
large corpora of linguistic data held on computers. Some of the techniques 
developed may be of interest to AI researchers; others are used to derive 
statistical information that is of primary interest to, say, lexicographers.
Work on language processing is divided into three parts, concerned respect­
ively with recognizing or selecting words, computing or generating sentence 
structure, and processing meaning at the level of discourse. Until the 1970s 
AI research on language processing often produced working systems that 
understood a substantial portion of a language such as English. Winograd’s 
(1972) SHRDLU, a program that talks about moving blocks around the 
BLOCKSWORLD, represents the apotheosis of this work. However, it has 
since become obvious that the component parts of language processing are each 
so complex that they must be studied separately, if real progress is to be made.
Recent work on word identification has been largely dominated by neural 
network modelling, in particular the TRACE model of auditory word iden­
tification (McClelland & Elman, 1986) and Seidenberg and McClelland’s 
(1989) model of visual word identification. The TRACE model is “hand- 
coded” . It does not use distributed representations, and hence its mode of 
operation is easy to discern. It has interacting banks of detectors at three 
levels: for the auditory features of sounds, for phonemes (sounds that cor­
respond roughly to letters), and for words. The Seidenberg and McClelland 
model, on the other hand, is a model that learns. One of its most interesting 
features is its eschewal of lexical representations: all its knowledge is encoded 
in links between orthographic and phonological features.
Investigations of the computation of sentence structure (parsing) have 
taken two rather different directions. On the one hand, computational lin­
guists worry about problems such as the linguistic niceties of describing sen­
tence structure and the computational properties of the procedures that 
derive the structure for a particular sentence, given a description of how sen­
tences in its language can be structured (a grammar). One of the most impor­
tant developments in computational models of parsing is the introduction of 
unification-based approaches (e.g., Kay, 1985). Unification is a technique 
that is widely used in other branches of AI, in particular theorem proving. 
Unification-based parsers, like some other parsers, such as chart parsers, 
have the additional advantage of clearly separating information about how 
sentences can be structured (the grammar) from information about how sen­
tence structure is computed (the parsing algorithm). In contrast with 
researchers whose primary interest is in the computational properties of 
parsing systems, those who attempt to model the way that people derive sen­
tence structure have to take account of well-established empirical findings on, 
in particular, what happens when people encounter a syntactic ambiguity. It 
is not yet clear how these two approaches to parsing can be integrated.
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Understanding and generating discourse still remain formidable tasks. AI 
research has often been hampered by a restricted or ad-hoc approach to word 
meanings. One hope is that linguistically more sophisticated approaches to 
word meaning, such as Jackendoff’s (1990) conceptual semantics, will be 
taken up by AI researchers. At the level of sentence meaning, AI researchers, 
at last, agree about the importance of compositional semantics of a broadly 
Montagovian kind (Dowty, Wall, & Peters, 1981). However, the major 
problems in describing discourse level processing, which have been known 
for many years, still resist satisfactory analysis. Some of the most important 
are figurative and indirect uses of language, coherence, ellipsis, and the role 
of the other participants’ beliefs.
LEARNING
For historical reasons, learning has been a comparatively neglected topic in 
AI. The information processing approach to understanding intelligent behav­
iour was seen as a radical alternative to the behaviourism that had dominated 
psychology, and which placed a strong emphasis on learning. Furthermore, 
traditional AI aimed to study intelligence at an abstract level, independent 
of both its genesis (learned or programmed) and its underlying mechanism 
(carbon or silicon). The study of learning has come back into its own with 
the increasing importance of connectionist modelling. Nevertheless, a 
number of important studies of learning have been carried out in the sym­
bolic framework, and the diversity of the learning mechanisms that they 
investigate contrasts sharply with the behaviourist approach.
Learning by being told often involves little more than adding a fact to a 
database. However, more abstract pieces of information, such as advice on 
the best strategy for winning a game, may need to be operationalized.
A more complex kind of learning is learning from mistakes. Gerald Suss- 
m an’s (1975) program HACKER writes its own mini-programs for solving 
problems of stacking and unstacking blocks in BLOCKSWORLD. However, 
it can learn only when it can almost solve a problem, and its performance 
is crucially dependent on its having a “teacher” who presents it with a suit­
ably graded set of problems. Patrick Winston’s (1975) program that learns 
concepts for configurations of blocks (such as arches) in BLOCKSWORLD, 
similarly learns from almost correct information. When told that something 
is not quite an arch, it can use that information to deduce what distinguishes 
arches from non-arches.
As well as recognizing the importance of being almost correct, Winston 
also emphasized that an important aspect of learning is what is sometimes 
called induction -  going beyond the information embodied in the examples 
presented to the program to form general concepts (in his case) or rules. 
Positive instances suggest generalizations of the concept or rule, negative 
instances suggest specializations (or restrictions). Research subsequent to
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Winston’s, particularly that of Ryszard Michalski (e.g., 1983) has systema­
tized the study of induction, and shown that it can be regarded as a special 
case of search, with the search space being the set of possible generalizations 
statable in a particular language. Michalski’s approach is more powerful than 
Winston’s, but less closely related to human learning. It can also be used for 
the related task of discrimination learning. Its disadvantage is that it works 
straightforwardly only if the generalizations are formulated using exactly the 
same predicates that are used to describe the instances.
Winston’s program can learn more complex concepts (such as arch) only 
because it knows simpler concepts (pillar, lintel). This aspect of the program 
relates, very crudely, to the question of how much of what we know about 
language is learned, and how much is innate. In the case of concepts, it has 
been argued (e.g., by Fodor, 1981) that all concepts must be innate. More 
generally, it is widely, though not universally, believed that many general 
principles governing the form of possible languages are innate, and that the 
availability of these principles to the language learning mechanism explains 
how it is able to achieve what appears, on mathematical analysis, to be a 
difficult or impossible task.
Another famous example of learning by generalization is Arthur Samuel’s 
(1963) checkers (draughts) program. This program develops a general 
method for evaluating board positions by comparing computed evaluations 
with the way the game actually turns out, and revising, if necessary, the 
method of evaluation.
A more ambitious, and more controversial, attempt to study a different 
kind of learning -  learning by exploration -  is found in Doug Lenat’s (1982) 
AM (Automated Mathematician) and EURISKO programs. AM starts with 
a collection of set-theoretic concepts and ways of combining them, and 
creates further mathematical concepts from them (e.g., positive whole 
number, prime number, the fundamental theorem of arithmetic -  that every 
number can be expressed as a product of prime factors).
None of the programs described so far provides a convincing model of 
human learning. People can learn things very quickly, though they often 
make mistakes in doing so. This very quick learning depends on particular 
ways of using background knowledge. Two lines of research that attempt to 
model this kind of learning investigate analogy-based learning and 
explanation-based learning. The importance of analogy in learning and 
problem-solving has long been recognized in cognitive psychology. None the 
less the underlying processes are difficult to model computationally, not least 
because the domain from which an analogy is drawn need not be specified 
in advance. In explanation-based learning (see e.g., de Jong, 1988) a single 
event or episode is explained on the basis of a theory about the relevant 
aspects of the world. That explanation is then generalized so that it will be 
useful in other situations.
Traditional AI work on learning has embodied a variety of ideas. An
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alternative tradition, running from the British Empiricist philosophers of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the behaviourists and neo­
behaviourists of the twentieth century, has seen all learning as the formation 
and strengthening of associations between ideas. In a modified form, this 
notion also underlies recent connectionist accounts of learning. Connec- 











Figure 2 A simple connectionist network showing the three types o f  unit -  input,
hidden, and output -  and the connections between them
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activation that can be passed from one unit to another. A typical machine 
has three layers of units: input units, hidden units and output units (see 
Figure 2). Such machines can learn in several ways, but the most popular is 
known as a back propagation. It is a supervised learning method in which 
a stimulus is encoded at the input units and produces an output at the output 
units. The supervisor tells the machine what the output should have been, 
and the difference between the actual and expected outputs is propagated 
back through the network of units, and used, in a precisely specified way, to 
adjust the (associative) strengths of the connections between them. Adjust­
ments are small, because the machine must not produce the correct response 
to the last input at the expense of responding grossly incorrectly to other 
inputs. Learning is slow, sometimes very slow, but a stable set of associative 
strengths is usually reached.
Another biological metaphor that has inspired AI work on learning is 
evolution. Genetic algorithms (e.g. Goldberg, 1989) use complex rules to per­
form tasks. The parts of these rules can be recombined by processes that are 
analogous to the genetic operations that take place in the germ cells during 
sexual reproduction. The resulting rules are then allowed to perform their 
task for some time, and their performance is assessed. Those that do best 
re-enter the “ reproductive” process.
APPLICATIONS
Intelligent machines should be of more than academic interest. However, 
most of the machines that we interact with in everyday life, for example auto­
matic bank tellers, are not intelligent. More intelligent machines -  often 
referred to as expert systems -  do have applications. However, despite the 
hopes of the early 1980s, it now appears that expert systems will typically be 
used to assist experts, rather than to replace them. Perhaps the most im­
portant area of application for intelligent programs is in medical diagnosis, 
though there are obviously ethical problems in this domain. One area in 
which computers play a crucial role is in modern scanning techniques (CAT, 
PET, NMR, etc.). The basic use of computers in scanning is to generate 
appropriate images. Intelligent programs might also help to produce diag­
noses from images.
One of the earliest, and best known, medical diagnosis systems is MYCIN 
(Shortliffe, 1976), which diagnoses serious bacterial infections so that life- 
saving antibiotic drugs can be administered before a culture has been de­
veloped. The development of such a system requires the gleaning of inform­
ation about the diseases in question and their symptoms. Some of this 
information is elicited from experts, sometimes with difficulty, as the experts 
cannot necessarily verbalize their knowledge. TEIRESIAS (Davis, 1982) is a 
program that attempts to automate this knowledge transfer, and also to use 
the knowledge already in MYCIN to generate user-friendly explanations of
372
A R T I F I C I A L  I N T E L L I G E N C E
its diagnoses. Other diagnostic information comes from statistical records. In 
an expert system all the information is usually represented in a uniform way, 
so that new information can readily be added. The rules for making infer­
ences are stored separately, and an attempt is made to keep the inferential 
processes simple. One of the major aspects of inference in expert systems is 
combining uncertain bits of information to produce a best guess, for example 
at a diagnosis. This combination is sometimes achieved using standard 
statistical (Bayesian) techniques and sometimes using domain specific rules, 
as in MYCIN (see above).
MYCIN also formed the basis of the first expert system shell, E-MYCIN, 
which is MYCIN stripped of its domain-specific knowledge. Expert system 
shells were the first of several attempts to make the creation of new expert 
systems easy. Success has been partial. E-MYCIN, for example, is most suc­
cessful in other medical diagnosis systems, such as PUFF, which diagnoses 
pulmonary diseases.
Another well-known expert system is DENDRAL (Lindsay, Buchanan, 
Feigenbaum, & Lederberg, 1980), which works out the molecular structure 
of large organic molecules from their mass spectrograms. DENDRAL has 
been in regular use by research chemists for some time. An additional pro­
gram, meta-DENDRAL, attempts to formulate new rules using the induction 
techniques described above.
A second area in which AI has sought to find application is in computer- 
assisted learning (CAL). With the expansion of higher education in the UK, 
CAL is likely to become increasingly important, though it is as yet unclear 
what the contribution of AI techniques will be. The current focus of attention 
is on multimedia, and in particular hypermedia learning tools, which provide 
facilities for exploring large databases in various ways, but which rely on 
much of the intelligence resting in the instructions and with the student.
The intelligent tutoring systems of AI, on the other hand, try to be intelli­
gent themselves. Such systems have three main components: a knowledge 
base which could, in principle, incorporate multimedia options, a model of 
the student, and a set of teaching strategies. The knowledge base is used to 
impart information directly to students, but it is also used to generate ex­
planations of why students’ answers to questions are wrong. This process, in 
turn, makes use of the model of the student to decide what kinds of miscon­
ceptions students will have. Such indirect methods of teaching meet with 
some success, but they prove comparatively difficult to implement in a 
tutoring system.
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
AI research, more than that in other sciences, has been surrounded by 
philosophical controversy. Two related issues have provided the major focus
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of debate. The first is whether machines can think, and the second is what 
role they should be allowed to play in our lives.
The question of whether machines can think, although one that excites the 
popular imagination, is not necessarily a clear one. One crucial aspect of it, 
however, is whether there is a difference between computer programs that 
model phenomena such as the weather, which simulate processes in the 
world, but do not reproduce them, and AI programs. In other words: is a 
computer running such a program really intelligent, or is it just simulating 
intelligent behaviour? On one view, most programs lack real intelligence 
because they do not interact with the world. The symbols that they manipu­
late have meaning only because of the way they are interpreted by their 
programmers. On this view a robot that based its interactions with the world 
on its internal computations could be intelligent. An opposing view is that 
real intelligence can be manifest only in biological systems (Searle, 1980). To 
support this thesis Searle put forward his famous Chinese room  argument. 
If he sat in a room manipulating symbols according to the rules embodied 
in a computer program, he might, from the outside, be described as reading 
and answering questions in Chinese. He would not, however, understand 
Chinese. So, understanding Chinese is not just running a program. However, 
Searle’s view of what else it is, basically being a biological intelligence, 
appears to have no foundation, and has been dubbed protoplasm chauvinism 
(Torrance, 1986).
If machines, or at least robots, can be intelligent, we might at some time 
in the future have moral responsibilities towards them, or we might be in 
danger of being dominated by them. To some extent the moral issues raised 
by such considerations are just those that arise in the application of any 
science. The difference is that we might be faced not simply with a substance 
or technique that might be misused, but with something that is itself an 
“alien” intelligence. However, it is difficult to pinpoint, as Weizenbaum 
(1976) has tried to do, the sense in which intelligent computers pose a special 
threat.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, AND  
THE FUTURE
Since the mid-1970s there has been an enormous growth in AI research. It 
is no longer possible, as it once was, for an AI researcher, let alone a psycho­
logist, to keep up with developments in all o f  its subfields. Furthermore, 
much of  AI has become very technical: much more so than cognitive psy­
chology. Nevertheless, the best science often is technical; if cognitive psychol­
ogists are not to risk being usurped, they should keep at least one eye on 
developments in AI.
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In everyday language, “ learning” refers to the acquisition of knowledge, but 
psychologists use the word in a subtly different sense. For psychologists, the 
acquisition of knowledge belongs to the field of memory, and the word 
learning  is usually reserved for changes in behaviour resulting from experi­
ence. The word sk ill, on the other hand, has roughly the same meaning in 
psychology as in everyday usage, but something needs to be said about the 
distinction between cognitive, motor, and social skills, all of which are 
covered in this section. Social skills are simply those that are specifically 
required for effective social interaction. The distinction between cognitive 
and motor skills is not entirely clear but, roughly speaking, cognitive skills 
are defined negatively as skills that do not require bodily or perceptual-motor 
coordination to any significant degree, and motor skills are those that do.
Nicholas J. Mackintosh opens this section by outlining the fundamental 
principles of classical and operant conditioning in chapter 5.1. Classical 
conditioning is sometimes called Pavlovian conditioning, after the Nobel 
Prize-winning Russian physiologist who first investigated it. Operant condi­
tioning is sometimes called instrumental conditioning, because in this type of 
learning the occurrence of certain elements of behaviour, called responses, 
are instrumental in eliciting reward or reinforcement. Among the technical 
terms that Mackintosh introduces in connection with classical conditioning 
are unconditional stim ulus  (a stimulus that elicits a response unconditionally) 
and conditional stim ulus  (one that elicits a response only after a process of 
learning has taken place): there is a potential source of confusion about these 
concepts that needs to be cleared up. As a result of a mistranslation of 
Pavlov’s writings into English, these are commonly called unconditioned  and 
conditioned  stimuli, and that is also why the learning process that causes a 
stimulus to elicit a response has come to be called conditioning (a back- 
formation from “conditioned”).
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Psycholinguistics is the study of the mental processes and skills underlying 
the production and comprehension of language, and of the acquisition of 
these skills. This chapter will deal with the former aspect only; for the ac­
quisition of language see the suggested “Further reading” at the end of this 
chapter.
Although the term “psycholinguistics” was brought into vogue during the 
1950s, the psychological study of language use is as old as psychology itself. 
As early as 1879, for instance, Francis Galton published the first study of 
word associations (Galton, 1879). And the year 1900 saw the appearance 
of Wilhelm W undt’s monumental two-volume work Die Sprache. It endeav­
oured to explain the phylogeny of language in the human mind as an increas­
ingly complex and conscious means of expression in a society, and to describe 
how language is created time and again in the individual act of speaking. 
Although Wundt deemed it impossible to study language use experimentally, 
his contemporaries introduced the experimental study of reading (Huey), of
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verbal memory and word association (Ebbinghaus, Marbe, Watt), and of 
sentence production (Biihler, Seitz). They began measuring vocabulary size 
(Binet), and started collecting and analysing speech errors (Meringer and 
Mayer). The study of neurologically induced language impairments acquired 
particular momentum after Paul Broca and Carl Wernicke discovered the 
main speech and language supporting areas in the brain’s left hemisphere. In 
the absence of live brain tomography, aphasiologists began developing 
neurolinguistic tests for the purpose of localizing brain dysfunctions.
All of these themes persist in modern psycholinguistics. But developments 
since the 1950s have provided it with two of its most characteristic features, 
which concern linguistic processing  and representation. With respect to 
processing, psycholinguistics has followed mainstream psychology in that it 
considers the language user as a com plex in form ation  processing  system. 
With respect to representation, psycholinguists stress the gigantic amount of 
linguistic know ledge  the language user brings to bear in producing and under­
standing language. Although the structure of this knowledge is the subject 
matter of linguistics, it is no less a psychological entity than is language 
processing itself (Chomsky, 1968). Psycholinguistics studies how linguistic 
knowledge is exploited in language use, how representations for the form and 
meaning of words, sentences, and texts are constructed or manipulated by the 
language user, and how the child acquires such linguistic representations.
I shall first introduce the canonical setting for language use: conversation. 
Next I shall consider the mental lexicon, the heart of our linguistic 
knowledge. I shall then move to the processes of speaking and speech under­
standing respectively. Finally I shall turn to other modes of language use, in 
particular written language and sign language.
CONVERSATION
Our linguistic skills are primarily tuned to the proper conduct of conversa­
tion. The innate ability to converse has provided our species with a capacity 
to share moods, attitudes, and information of almost any kind, to assemble 
knowledge and skills, to plan coordinated action, to educate its offspring, in 
short, to create and transmit culture. And all this at a scale that is absolutely 
unmatched in the animal kingdom. In addition, we converse with ourselves, 
a kind of autostimulation that makes us more aware of our inclinations, of 
what we think or intend (Dennett, 1991). Fry (1977) correctly characterized 
our species as hom o loquens.
In conversation the interlocutors are involved in negotiating meaning. 
When we talk, we usually have some kind of communicative intention, and 
the conversation is felicitous when that intention is recognized by our 
partner(s) in conversation (Grice, 1968; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). This may 
take several turns of mutual clarification. Here is an example from Clark and
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Wilkes-Gibbs (1986), where subjects had to refer to complex tangram figures:
A: Uh, person putting a shoe on.
B: Putting a shoe on?
A: Uh huh. Facing left. Looks like he’s sitting down.
B: Okay.
Here the communicative intention was to establish reference, and that is 
often a constituting component of a larger communicative goal. Such goals 
can be to commit the interlocutor or oneself to some course of action, as in 
requesting and promising, or to inform the interlocutor on some state of 
affairs, as in asserting, for example. The appropriate linguistic acts for 
achieving such goals are called speech acts (Austin, 1962).
Although what is said is the means of making the communicative intention 
recognizable, the relation between the two can be highly indirect. Conversa­
tions involve intricate mechanisms of politeness control (Brown & Levinson, 
1987). What is conveyed is often quite different from what is said. In most 
circumstances, for instance, we don’t request by commanding, like in “Open 
the window” . Rather we do it indirectly by checking whether the interlocutor 
is able or willing to open the window, like in “Can you open the window for 
me?” It would, then, be inappropriate for the interlocutor to answer “Yes” 
without further action. In that case, the response is only to the question 
(whether he or she is able to open the window), but not to the request.
How does the listener know that there is a request in addition to the ques­
tion? There is, of course, an enormous amount of shared situational 
knowledge that will do the work. Grice (1975) has argued that conversations 
are governed by principles of rationality; Sperber and Wilson (1986) call it 
the principle o f  relevance. The interlocutor, for instance, is so obviously able 
to open the window that the speaker’s intention cannot have been to check 
that ability. But Clark (1979) found that linguistic factors play a role as well. 
If the question is phrased idiomatically, involving can and please, subjects 
interpret it as a request. But the less idiomatic it is (like in “Are you able 
t o . .  . ”), the more subjects react to the question instead of to the request.
Another important aspect of conversation is turn-taking. There are rules 
for the allocation of turns in conversation that ensure everybody’s right to 
talk, that prevent the simultaneous talk of different parties, and that regulate 
the proper engaging in and disengaging from conversation (Sacks, Schegloff, 
& Jefferson, 1974). These rules are mostly followed, and sometimes inten­
tionally violated (as in interrupting the speaker). Turn-taking is subtly con­
trolled by linguistic (especially prosodic) and non-verbal (gaze and body 
movement) cues (Beattie, 1983).
THE MENTAL LEXICON
Producing or understanding spoken language always involves the use of
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words. The mental lexicon is our repository of words, their meanings, their 
syntax, and their sound forms. A language’s vocabulary is, in principle, 
unlimited in size. Take, for instance, the numerals in English. They alone 
form an infinite set of words. But it is unlikely that a word such as twenty- 
three-thousand-two-hundred-and-seventy-nine is an entry in our mental 
lexicon. Rather, such a word is constructed by rule when needed. We have 










Figure 1 Fragment of  a lexical network. Each word is represented at the conceptual,
the syntactic and the sound form level 
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How many words are stored? Miller (1991) estimates that the average high 
school graduate knows about 60,000 words (under one definition of “word”).
One way of representing this enormous body of knowledge is by way of 
network models. Figure 1 shows a fragment of such a network. Each word 
is represented by three nodes, one at the conceptual level, one at the syntactic 
(grammatical) or lemma level, and one at the sound form (phonological) or 
lexeme level. The lemma is the syntactic representation and the lexeme is the 
phonological representation. A word’s semantic properties are given by its 
connections to other nodes at the conceptual level (for instance, that a sheep 
is an animal, gives milk, etc.). A word’s syntactic properties are represented 
by its lemma node’s relations to other syntactic nodes (for instance, “sheep” 
is a noun; French “m outon” has male gender, etc.). The sound form proper­
ties, finally, such as a word’s phonological segments, are represented in the 
way a word’s lexeme node relates to other sound form nodes (“sheep” for 
instance contains three ordered phonological segments, /ƒ/, / i/, and /p/,  as 
shown in Figure 1).
Different authors have proposed different network models (e.g., Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; Dell, 1986; Roelofs, 1992), and for different purposes. It is 
unlikely that such networks can adequately represent all complexities of our 
semantic, syntactic, and phonological knowledge about words. But they can 
be useful in predicting speed of word access in comprehension and produc­
tion, as well as in explaining various kinds of errors that we make in speech 
production and various disorders of accessing words in aphasic speech.
Especially important for theories of language use are the ways that verbs 
are represented in the mental lexicon. As a semantic entity, a verb assigns 
semantic roles to its arguments. The verb walk, for instance, requires an an­
imate argument that specifies the role of agent, as in John walked. The verb 
greet governs two arguments, one for the agent and one for the recipient of 
the action, as in Peter greeted the driver. As a syntactic entity, a verb assigns 
syntactic functions to the sentence constituents it governs. In the above sen­
tence, Peter is the subject and the driver the object. A verb’s argument- 
function mapping is not random. Most verbs, for instance, map a recipient 
argument on to a syntactic object function, but not all. The verb receive 
doesn’t. In Mary received the book , Mary is both recipient and sentence sub­
ject. Also, verbs often allow for multiple mappings. In the driver was greeted 
by Peter, the recipient, not the agent appears in subject position.
For each verb, the mental lexicon contains its possible mapping frames. 
These play an important role in the speaker’s syntactic planning and in the 
listener’s syntactic and semantic parsing.
SPEAKING
Speaking is our most complex cognitive-motor skill. It involves the concep­
tion of an intention, the selection of information whose expression will make
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that intention recognizable, the selection of appropriate words, the construc­
tion of a syntactic framework, the retrieval of the words’ sound forms, and 
the computation of an articulatory plan for each word and for the utterance 
as a whole. It also involves the execution of this plan by more than 100 
muscles controlling the flow of air through the vocal tract. Finally, it involves 
a process of self-monitoring by which speech trouble can be prevented or 
repaired. The following is a bird eye’s view over these processes.
Conceptual preparation
The question where communicative intentions come from is a psychodynamic 
question rather than a psycholinguistic one. Speaking is a form of social 
action, and it is in the context of action that intentions, goals, and subgoals 
develop. It is not impossible, though, that the intention what to say occasion­
ally arises from spontaneous activity in the speech formulating system itself. 
It can create rather incoherent “internal speech” , which we can self-perceive. 
This, in turn, may provide us with tatters of notions that we then consider 
for expression (cf. Dennett, 1991).
Conveying an intention may involve several steps or “speech acts” . The 
speaker will have to decide what to express first, what next, and so on. This 
is called the speaker’s linearization problem (Levelt, 1989). It is especially 
apparent in the expression of multidimensional information, as in describing 
one’s apartment (Linde & Labov, 1975). The conceptual preparation of 
speech, and in particular linearization, require the speaker’s continuing 
attention. The principles of linearization are such that attentional load is 
minimized.
Each speech act, be it a request to do X , an assertion that Y, etc., involves 
the expression of some conceptual structure, technically called a “message” 
(Garrett, 1975). That message is to be given linguistic shape; it has to become 
“ formulated” .
Grammatical encoding
A first step in formulating is to retrieve the appropriate words from the 
mental lexicon and to embed them in the developing syntactic structure. In 
normal conversation we produce some two words per second. At this rate we 
manage to access the appropriate words in our huge mental lexicon. Occa­
sional errors of lexical selection (such as “ D on’t burn your toes” where 
fingers was intended) show that the lexicon has a semantic organization.
The standard explanation for such errors is that activation spreads through 
a semantically organized network, as in Figure 1. In such a network, each 
node has an activation level between 0 and 1. When the lexical concept node 
SHEEP is active, then activation spreads to semantically related concept 
nodes, such as GOAT. Both nodes spread activation “down” to their lemma
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nodes. Which one of the lemmas will then be selected for further processing? 
Normally it will be the most activated one, in this case the lemma for 
“sheep” . But the occurrence of an occasional error shows that there is a small 
probability that a less activated lemma gets selected. According to one theory 
(Roelofs, 1992) the probability that a particular lemma becomes selected 
within a time interval t is the ratio of its activation to the sum of the activa­
tion of all other lemma nodes. For instance, if “sheep” and “goat” are the 
only two active lemmas during interval t after presentation of the picture, and 
they have activation levels of 0.7 and 0.1 respectively, the probability that the 
target word “sheep” will be selected during that interval is 7/8, whereas the 
erroneous word “goat” will be selected with the probability 1/8. Hence, if 
there is more than one lemma active in the system, there is always a small 
probability that a non-intended word becomes selected (and it is likely to be 
semantically related to the target).
Spreading activation theories of lexical selection are typically tested in 
picture-naming experiments, where naming latencies are measured. For a 
review of issues in lexical selection, see Levelt (1992a).
As soon as a lemma is retrieved, its syntactic properties become available. 
Among them are the lemma’s grammatical class (preposition, noun, verb, 
etc.). Each lemma requires its own specific syntactic environment or 
“ frame” . Syntactic planning is like solving a set of simultaneous equations. 
Each lemma’s frame has to fit its neighbour’s frames, and since Garrett
(1975) there are theories about how this is realized (see Levelt, 1989, for a 
review). Actually, the equations are not quite “simultaneous” ; the lemmas 
for an utterance are typically not concurrently retrieved. Lemmas for salient 
concepts, such as animate objects, tend to be retrieved faster than for non­
salient concepts (Bock & Warren, 1985), and that affects their position in the 
developing syntactic structure. For a review of grammatical encoding, see 
Bock and Levelt (1994).
Phonological encoding
A selected lemma (but only a selected one: see Levelt et al., 1991) spreads its 
activation to its lexeme node (cf. Figure 1). At this level two kinds of phono­
logical information become available. The first one is the word’s segments, 
which are “spelled ou t” one after another. The second one is the word’s 
metrical structure. For “sheep” it is the information that it is a one-syllable 
word. For “ father” it is the information that it is a two-syllabic trochaic 
word. The metrical frames of successive words are often combined, creating 
so-called phonological word frames. In Peter gave him it, the last three 
words form one phonological word gavimit. In a process of segment-to- 
frame association spelled-out segments are inserted one by one into the corre­
sponding phonological word frames. It is during this ordered insertion that 
phonological syllables are created, one after another (such as ga-vi-mit; see
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Levelt, 1992b). How this string of phonological syllables determines the 
precise articulatory gestures to be made by the speech organs is still a matter 
of much debate (see especially Browman & Goldstein, 1991).
The notion that segments and frames are independently retrieved arose in 
the analysis of phonological speech errors (Dell, 1986; Shattuck-Hufnagel, 
1979). Spoonerisms such as with this wing I thee red , or foo l the pill (instead 
of fill the p o o l) show that segments can become associated to the right place 
in the wrong frame.
Phonological encoding also involves the planning of larger units than 
phonological words. There is, in particular, the planning of intonational 
phrases. These are units that carry a particular intonational contour. Such 
contours can be rising, falling or combinations thereof. They often express 
a speaker’s attitude towards what is said: doubt, certainty, or towards the 
interlocutor: reassuringness, inviting reaction. See Levelt (1989) for a review 
of phonological encoding.
The output of phonological encoding is an articulatory programme. 
Phenomenologically, it appears to the speaker as internal speech. This 
internal speech need not be articulated. It can be kept in an articulatory 
buffer, ready to be retrieved for articulatory execution (Sternberg, Wright, 
Knoll, & Monsell, 1980).
Articulation
The articulatory apparatus consists of three major structures. The respiratory 
system controls the steady outflow of air from the lungs. The breathing cycle 
during speech is quite different from normal breathing, with very rapid inha­
lation and very slow exhalation. The laryngeal system has the vocal cords as 
its central part. It is the main source of acoustic energy. The vocal tract, 
finally, contains the cavities of pharynx, mouth, and nose. They are the reso­
nators that filter the acoustic energy in frequency bands or formants. Vowels 
are characterized by their formant structure. The vocal tract can be con­
stricted at different places, and these constrictions can be made or released 
in different manners. In this way a wide range of consonantal and other 
speech sounds can be made.
The control of this utterly complex motor system has been the subject of 
much research. Present theories converge on the notion of model-referenced 
control (Arbib, 1981; see also Figure 2). The motor system is given an 
“articulatory task” (as part of the articulatory programme), such as “close 
the lips” . There are usually many degrees of freedom in executing such a 
task. For instance, lip closing can be realized by moving the lips, by moving 
the jaw, or by doing both to various degrees. The internal model computes 
the least energy-consuming way of reaching the goal, given the actual state 
of the articulators (there is continuous proprioceptive feedback to the 
internal model). The output is a set of efferent control signals to the relevant
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Figure 2 Model-referenced control in articulation
Source: Levelt, 1989
muscles. Saltzman and Kelso (1987) gave a precise mathematical rendering 
of this theory. See Levelt (1989) for a review of theories of articulation. The 
output of articulation is overt speech.
Self-monitoring
We can listen to our own overt speech and detect trouble, just as we can listen 
to the speech of others and detect errors or infelicitous delivery. This involves 
our normal speech understanding system. We can also detect trouble in our 
internal speech. When the trouble is disruptive enough for the ongoing con­
versation, a speaker may decide to interrupt the flow of speech and to make 
a self-repair.
Not all self-produced trouble (such as errors of selection) is detected by the 
speaker. Self-monitoring requires attention; we mostly attend to what we say, 
far less to how  we do it. Detection of trouble is better towards the end of 
clauses, where less attention for content is required (Levelt, 1989). There are 
two main classes of trouble that induce repairing. The first one is an all-out 
error (as in and above that a horizon-, no a vertical line)] the error can be 
lexical, syntactic, or phonological. The second one is that something is not 
really appropriate (as in to the right is blue -  is a blue point). The speaker 
then repairs in order to make the utterance more precise, less ambiguous. 
Upon detecting either kind of trouble, the speaker can self-interrupt. And 
this ignores linguistic structure; a speaker can stop in the midst of a phrase, 
a word, or a syllable. But then, the speaker often marks the kind of trouble
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by some editing expression: “no” , “sorry” , “ I mean” , for errors; “ rather” , 
“that is” , for something inappropriate.
Restarting, that is, making the repair proper, is linguistically quite prin­
cipled. The speaker grafts the repair on to the syntax of the interrupted utter­
ance, which has been kept in abeyance. As a consequence, repairing is like 
linguistic coordination. One seldom finds a repair such as is she driving -  she 
walking downtown? And indeed, the corresponding coordination is she 
driving or she walking downtown? is ill-formed. But is he — she walking 
downtown? is a very common repair type, and it corresponds to a well- 
formed coordination: is he or she walking downtown? (Levelt, 1989).
SPEECH UNDERSTANDING
The canonical objective in speech understanding is to recognize the speaker’s 
communicative intention. How does the listener induce that intention from 
the speaker’s overt speech, a continuous flow of acoustic events?
Several component processes are involved here. First, there is the hearer’s 
acoustic-phonetic analysis of the speech signal, that is, representing it as a 
phonetic not just an acoustic event. Second, there is phonological decoding, 
in particular finding the words that correspond to the phonetic events, and 
analysing the overall prosodic structure of the utterance. Third, there is 
grammatical decoding, parsing the utterance as a meaningful syntactic struc­
ture. Finally, there is discourse processing, interpreting the utterance in the 
context of the ongoing discourse, and in particular inferring the speaker’s 
intentions. Let us review these processes in turn.
Acoustic-phonetic analysis
It is very hard, if not impossible, to listen to speech as if it were just a string 
of chirps, buzzes, hums, and claps. We just cannot help perceiving it as 
speech. In this so-called “ speech mode” (Liberman & Mattingly, 1985) we 
interpret the acoustic event as resulting from a speaker’s articulatory gestures 
as a phonetic event. There is no unanimity in the literature, though, about 
what kind of representation the listener derives. According to Liberman and 
Mattingly, the listener derives the speaker’s intended articulatory gestures 
(even if they were sloppy). Others argue that listeners have special detectors 
for distinctive events in the speech signal, such as for onsets, for spectral 
peaks, for the frequencies and motions of formants. The detection of such 
acoustic events may suffice to derive the presence or absence of phonetic fea­
tures, such as voicing, nasality, vowel height, stridency, and so on (Stevens 
& Blumstein, 1981).
Speech segments, clusters, and syllables have characteristic distributions of 
phonetic features. Hence, if such feature detectors are reliable, they may pro­
vide sufficient information for effective phonological decoding. Opinions
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differ, however, about their reliability. The speech signal is highly variable, 
dependent as it is on speech rate, sex of the speaker, sloppiness of speech 
delivery, reverberation or noise in the room, for example. Even if the listener 
can partial out such effects of the speech context, acoustic-phonetic analysis 
will often be indeterminate. Still, it may well be sufficient for the purpose. 
Not every word has to be recognized in order to derive the speaker’s inten­
tions. And where a really critical word is missed, the interlocutor will say 
“what?” or signal difficulty of understanding in other ways.
For an excellent review of acoustic-phonetic processing, see Pisoni and 
Luce (1987).
Phonological decoding
Whatever the precise character of the phonetic representations, they are the 
listener’s access codes to the mental lexicon. How does a listener recognize 
words in connected speech? A major problem here is to segment the speech, 
to find out where words begin and end in the continuous flow of speech. 
There are, basically, two routes here.
The first one is the bottom-up approach, that is, to build on cues in the 
phonetic representation. Cutler (1990) has argued that English listeners will, 
by default, segment speech such that there are word boundaries right before 
stressed syllables. It is a statistical fact of English that 85 per cent of the 
meaningful words that one encounters while listening begin with a stressed 
syllable. The segmentation strategy will, therefore, be quite successful. 
Cutler’s theory has meanwhile found substantial experimental support. Also, 
there are speech sounds that tend to occur at the ends of words, such as [-ng] 
and [-nd] for English. Speakers may use such phonotactic properties of their 
language to predict word boundaries.
The second route is top-down. We often recognize a word before it ends. 
But that means that we can predict the word’s end, and hence the upcoming 
word boundary. That gives us a handle on where to start recognizing the sub­
sequent word.
Given that we know a word’s beginning, how do we recognize it? 
According to the cohort theory (Marslen-Wilson, 1989), a small word-initial 
feature pattern (corresponding to about two segments of the input word) ac­
tivates all words in the mental lexicon that match it phonologically. Assume 
the input word is trespass, and the cluster [tr] has become available. This will 
activate all words beginning with [tr], such as tremble, trespass, trestle, trom­
bone , etc. This is called the “word-initial cohort” . As more phonetic inform­
ation becomes available, the cohort is successively reduced. When the vowel 
[e] is perceived, all items not sharing that vowel, such as trombone , are deac­
tivated. This process continues until a single candidate remains. For trespass 
this happens when [p] is reached. The segment [p] is, therefore, called the 
uniqueness point of trespass. A word’s uniqueness point depends
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on its word-initial lexical alternatives. For most words the uniqueness point 
precedes the word’s end.
For an optimally efficient system, the word’s uniqueness point would also 
be its recognition point. There is good experimental evidence in support of 
this hypothesis (e.g., Frauenfelder, Segui, & Dijkstra, 1990), though the 
recognition point may slightly anticipate the uniqueness point in case syn­
tactic or semantic information disambiguates the item from its remaining 
alternatives (Zwitserlood, 1989). Hence, it will often be possible for a listener 
to anticipate the upcoming word boundary.
Phonological decoding serves not only the recognition of words, but also 
their groupings into prosodic constituents, such as phonological and intona- 
tional phrases. These constituents carry important information about the 
syntax of the utterance, and about the communicative intentions of the 
speaker (cf. Levelt, 1989).
Grammatical decoding
As words are successively recognized and prosodically grouped, the listener 
will as much as possible interpret these materials “on-line” (Marslen-Wilson 
& Tyler, 1980). Each recognized word makes available its syntactic and 
semantic properties. There is, then, concurrent syntactic parsing and 
semantic interpretation, each following its own principles, but interacting 
where necessary.
In this connection, one should distinguish between local and global syn­
tactic parsing. Local parsing involves the creation of local phrase structure, 
combining words into noun phrases, verb phrases, etc. There is increasing 
evidence that local parsing can run on word category information alone 
(Frazier, 1989; Tyler & Warren, 1987). We have little trouble parsing “jab- 
berwocky” or semantically anomalous prose such as the beer slept the slow  
guitar. Here we construct phrase structure exclusively by recognizing the 
words’ syntactic categories (Art, Adj, N, V). However, successful local 
parsing is highly dependent on the intactness of phonological phrases, as 
Tyler and Warren (1987) could show. For instance, in the above anomalous 
prose, one should not create a prosodic break between the and slow , or 
between slow  and guitar.
Global syntactic parsing, however, interacts with semantic interpretation. 
In global parsing, semantic roles are assigned to syntactic constituents, and 
this is to a large extent governed by the verb’s argument/function mapping. 
When the meaning of words or phrases contradicts the semantic roles they 
should carry, global parsing is hampered (Tyler & Warren, 1987).
One important aspect of global parsing is the resolution of anaphora. In 
the sentence the boxer told the skier that the doctor fo r  the team would blame 
him fo r  the recent injury, the anaphor him can refer back to the boxer and 
to the skier, but global syntax prohibits its referring to the doctor. Indeed,
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experimental evidence shows reactivation of both boxer and skier, but not 
of doctor when the pronoun him is perceived. Such reactivation can also be 
measured for so-called null-anaphors as in the policeman saw the boy that 
the crowd at the party accused t o f  the crime. Here there is measurable react­
ivation of boy at position t (the syntactic “trace” of the boy ; see Nicol & 
Swinney, 1989). But also in this respect global parsing is semantically facil­
itated, for instance if the anaphor’s referent is a concrete noun (Cloitre & 
Bever, 1988).
Grammatical decoding doesn’t remove all ambiguity (for instance, the 
pronoun him above is not fully resolved). Here, further discourse processing 
is needed.
Discourse processing
Partners in conversation construct mental models of the state of affairs they 
are talking about (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Seuren, 1985). Indefinite expressions 
(such as in there is a dog in the room) make them introduce a new entity (a 
dog) in the model. Definite expressions (such as the room in the same sen­
tence) make them look up an already existing entity. The new information 
in the utterance is then attached to whichever entity it concerns.
Identifying referents is a major accomplishment of human language 
processing, still unmatched by any computer program. The problem is that 
referring expressions can be highly indirect. How can a waitress in a res­
taurant interpret the referent when her colleague says the hamburger wants 
the bilP. Nunberg (1979) argued that there are “ referring functions” that map 
a demonstratum (like the hamburger) on to the intended referent (the person 
who ordered it). But the range of possible referring functions is almost 
unlimited. Clark, Schreuder, and Buttrick (1983) and Morrow (1986) have 
argued (and experimentally shown) that such demonstratum-to-referent map­
ping depends on the mutual knowledge of the interlocutors and on the 
saliency of entities in their discourse models.
Indirectness is the hallmark of discourse interpretation. As mentioned 
above, what is said often relates quite indirectly to what the speaker intends 
to convey. It is not only politeness that governs such indirectness. All figures 
of speech, whether polite or not, require the listener to build a bridge from 
the literal to the intended. This holds equally for metaphor (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1986), irony (Clark & Gerrig, 1984), and hyperbole (Grice, 1975).
Finally, whereas acoustic-phonetic, phonological, and grammatical 
decoding are largely automatic processes, discourse processing requires the 
listener’s full attention. In that respect, it is on a par with the speaker’s con­
ceptual preparation. As interlocutors we are concerned with content. The 
processing of form largely takes care of itself.
331
C O G N I T I O N
READING
The invention of writing systems, whether logographic, syllabic, or alpha­
betic, is probably the most revolutionary step in human cultural evolution. 
It added a powerful means of storing and transmitting information. With the 
invention of printing, it became a major mechanism for large-scale dissem­
ination of knowledge in a culture.
But equally surprising as this ability to map spoken language on to a visual 
code is our capacity to efficiently process such a code. When skilled, we 
silently read five or six printed words per second; this is about twice the rate 
of conversational speech. This ability has not given us any selective advan­
tage in biological evolution; the invention of writing systems is as recent as 
about 5,000 years ago. Rather, the ability to read must be due to a happy 
coincidence of other pre-existing faculties of mind.
One of these is, of course, language. As readers we largely use our parsing 
potential for spoken language. Visual word recognition feeds into the lemma 
level of Figure 1. As lemmas are successively activated by the printed words, 
further syntactic, semantic, and discourse processing operates roughly as for 
spoken language. There are, admittedly, differences too. There is, for 
instance, no prosody to help syntactic parsing; instead there is punctuation. 
Also, there is no external enforcement of rate as there is in speech perception.
Another pre-existing faculty on which reading is parasitic is our enormous 
ability to scan for small meaningful visual patterns. In a hunter’s society 
these were probably animal silhouettes, footprints, and so on. Words (if not 
too long or too infrequent) are recognized as wholes; a skilled reader 
processes a word’s letters in parallel. Much ink has been spilled on the ques­
tion whether the letters individually or the word as a whole activate a phono­
logical code in silent reading, that is, the word’s lexeme (see Figure 1). Such 
phonological recoding indeed exists. But it is only for low-frequent words 
that this “phonological route” is of any help in lemma access (Jared & 
Seidenberg, 1991). However, this silent “ internal speech” probably does play 
a role in further syntactic and semantic parsing; it is a way of buffering 
successive words for further processing.
The ability to scan is optimally used in reading. The basic cycle is this: the 
reader fixates a word for, on average, one-fifth of a second. The fixation is 
roughly between the beginning and the middle of the word. During this 
period lexical access is achieved. In addition, there is some perception of the 
next word in the periphery of vision. Sometimes this suffices to recognize that 
next word as well on the same fixation (but the fixation will then last some­
what longer). Usually, however, the information from the periphery of vision 
is used only to plan a saccadic eye movement (a jump of the eye) to that next 
word. The size of the saccade depends on the length of the next word; the 
average saccade is about eight characters in size. The new word is fixated, and 
the cycle starts all over again.
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When a word is quite infrequent, or when the reader has trouble 
integrating it in the developing syntax or semantics, the fixation duration can 
be substantially longer. Also, the reader may backtrack and refixate an 
earlier word when there is serious trouble in comprehension.
For a major review of the reading process and its disorders, see Rayner and 
Pollatsek (1989).
SIGN LANGUAGE
Contrary to written language, the sign languages of deaf people are not para­
sitic on spoken language. They are autonomous languages in the visual mode. 
Their mere existence shows that our faculty of language is not crucially
SUMMER UGLY DRY
Illustration, copyright Ursula Bellugi, Salk Institute for Biological Studies, La Jolla,
CA, 92037
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Figure 3 Minimal contrasts between signs in American Sign Language: (a) hand
configuration, (b) place of articulation, (c) movement
Source: F rom  Klima and Bellugi, 1979
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dependent on our ability to speak. Deaf children who grow up in a signing 
deaf community acquire their language at the same age and in roughly the 
same stages as hearing children do.
Just as words, signs have form and meaning. The articulators of sign 
language are the hands, the face, and the body. Where words contrast pho- 
nemically (for instance in voicing: bath vs path), signs contrast in hand con­
figuration, in place of articulation and in hand movement (see Figure 3). 
Also, facial features may distinguish between signs.
Although the first coining of a sign is often iconic, its meaning is eventually 
independent of its form, as it is for words in spoken languages. As a conse­
quence, sign languages are mutually unintelligible, just as spoken languages 
are (contrary to what Wundt suggested in Die Sprache -  see above).
Sign languages are rich in morphology (for inflection and for derivation of 
new signs) and have full-fledged recursive syntax. Many syntactic devices are 
spatial in character. Anaphora, that is, referring back to an earlier 
introduced entity, is done by pointing to the locus in the signing space (in 
front of the body) where the original referent was first “established” . In 
American Sign Language the sign for transitive verbs either moves from sub­
ject to object locus, or from object to subject locus. Each verb has its own 
“mapping function” (like in spoken language, see above). For the structure 
and use of British Sign Language, see Kyle and Woll (1985).
There is increasing evidence that a sign language is subserved by the same 
areas of the brain that sustain spoken language. Poizner, Klima, and Bellugi, 
(1987) showed that damage to anterior areas of the left hemisphere in native 
signers resulted in a style of signing highly comparable to the agrammatism 
of so-called Broca’s patients. Similarly, a form of fluent aphasia resulted 
when the damage was in a more posterior area of the left hemisphere, com­
parable to the fluent aphasia of so-called Wernicke’s patients. Damage in the 
right hemisphere left the signing intact, but patients lost the ability to sign 
coherently about spatial relations, such as the layout of their apartment. 
Their spatial representations were damaged, but not their spatial language.
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The nature of human thought and the capacity for rational reasoning have 
been issues of great interest to philosophers and psychologists since the time 
of Aristotle. Humans have excelled among species in their ability to solve 
problems and to adapt their environment for their own purposes. We are 
unique in our possession of a highly sophisticated system of language 
allowing both representation of complex and abstract concepts and the com­
munication of very precise meaning with one another. We have also de­
veloped a new form of evolution -  much faster than natural selection -  
whereby the accumulated knowledge and wisdom of our culture is recorded 
and passed on through education so that each new generation starts with an 
advantage on the one before. Despite this impressive record, we also are sub­
ject to many systematic errors and biases in our thinking, some of which are 
discussed in this chapter.
The study of thinking and reasoning in humans can accurately be described 
as the study of the nature of intelligence. The work described here falls, 
however, into a quite different tradition from the psychometric study of indi­
vidual differences in intelligent performance that is usually referred to as the 
psychology of intelligence. Psychometrics is concerned with the measurement 
of intelligent performance, whereas the study of thinking and reasoning is
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focused on understanding the nature of intelligent processes. Strangely 
enough, these turn out to be two quite different kinds of undertaking.
THE NATURE OF THINKING: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historically, we can trace three different conceptions of the nature of 
thinking. The first of these corresponds to what the non-psychologist might 
respond if asked to define thought. I shall describe this notion as the contents 
o f  consciousness. Common sense (or fo lk  psychology) supposes that we are 
consciously in control of our actions: we think, therefore we do. When we 
make a decision or solve a problem it is on the basis of a train of thought 
of which we are conscious and which we can, if required, describe to another. 
Such reports of thought are known as introspections. The validity of 
introspection is clearly assumed in our everyday folk psychology, as we all 
feel able to ask and answer questions about how and why we have taken par­
ticular actions. Indeed, a major industry -  opinion polling -  is based upon 
introspectionism. Politicians and political commentators alike are absorbed 
by the results of polls that ask people not only how they intend to vote, but 
also to identify the issues which will influence their decisions.
Aristotle and other early philosophers were in no doubt that the mind 
could and should study itself through introspection. This led to a theory of 
thinking known as associationism in which thinking was supposed to consist 
of a sequence of images linked by one of several principles (see Mandler & 
Mandler, 1964). Associationism and the equation of thought with conscious­
ness remained more or less unchallenged until the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries when several separate developments conspired to 
challenge this idea.
First, there were the systematic experimental studies of introspection car­
ried out at the Wurzburg School around the beginning of the twentieth cen­
tury (see Humphrey, 1951). In these experiments, subjects were asked to 
perform simple cognitive acts such as giving word associations or judging the 
comparative weight of two objects and then asked to report on what went 
through their minds at the time. Much to the initial surprise of the 
researchers, many of these acts did not appear to be mediated by conscious 
thoughts. Subjects often reported either no conscious experience at all, or 
else one of indescribable or “imageless” thought.
A second influential development was that of the Freudian school of 
psychoanalysis which introduced the notion of unconscious thought and 
motivation. An introspective report of the reason for an action would cer­
tainly be suspect to a Freudian since it might well constitute a rationalization 
of behaviour determined by deep-seated and repressed emotions in the 
unconscious mind.
The other major influence was the introduction of the school of beha­
viourism by J. B. Watson (e.g., 1920) whose influence was very strong in
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psychology up until the 1950s and which lingers on even in the present day. 
Watson attacked all study of conscious thought as mentalistic and unscien­
tific. Science, he maintained, could concern itself only with the study of 
phenomena that were subject to objective observation and independent 
verification -  criteria that introspective reports clearly could not meet. 
Watson and other behaviourists effectively redefined thought as simply com­
plex forms of behaviour which were the result of stimulus-response learning. 
Study of stimulus-response pairings and reinforcement history were suffi­
cient to explain all phenomena attributed -  by the mentalistically inclined -  
to thinking.
From the viewpoint of a modern cognitive psychologist both introspec- 
tionists and behaviourists might be seen as half right. The behaviourists were 
probably right in their contention that thought cannot be studied effectively 
via introspection. The mentalists, on the other hand, were correct in asserting 
that complex behaviour could not be explained without reference to internal 
mental processes. Their mistake -  with the benefit of hindsight -  was to 
assume that such processes were necessarily conscious and reportable. This 
leads us to the third conception of human thought — that of information 
processing.
Psychologists’ own thinking — like that of their subjects -  is constrained 
by the availability of models and analogies. Watson used the analogy of a 
telephone exchange to explain his notion of learning by stimulus-response 
connections. Although its origin can be traced to earlier, highly creative 
thinkers (especially Craik, 1943) the emergence of cognitive psychology in the 
1950s and 1960s was largely due to the development of cybernetic systems 
and then the digital computer. Computers are general-purpose information 
processing systems. They compute by manipulating symbols which can 
represent almost anything -  numbers and arithmetical operators, permitting 
arithmetic; letters and words as in word and text processing; collections of 
facts stored in a database; and so on.
When people perform mental arithmetic, we would describe this as an act 
of thought. So is a computer also thinking when it performs computations 
to solve problems? It appears that it is, although some philosophers (e.g., 
Searle, 1980) maintain that computer intelligence is intrinsically different 
from that of the human mind. The point of the analogy, however, is that we 
can see that computers can perform complex acts of information processing
-  depending upon their programming -  but without any need to assume that 
they are conscious. Once you equate thinking with information processing, 
then the task of the modern cognitive psychologist is clear: understanding 
thought is the problem of discovering the software of the human brain. Many 
psychological theories in fact are formulated as working computer programs 
which attempt to simulate the behaviour of a human being who is solving a 
problem or engaged in some other cognitive activity.
In spite of this advance, arguments persist among cognitive and social
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psychologists as to the value of introspective reports. Some cognitive 
psychologists disregard them entirely on the basis of much evidence that such 
reports can be both incomplete and misleading (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). One 
interesting line of argument is that verbal reports are useful indicators of 
thought processes but not as used in the tradition of introspective reporting 
(Ericsson & Simon, 1980). According to this view, verbalizations are the 
products of cognitive processes and can be fruitfully interpreted by the psy­
chologist when subjects are asked to “think aloud” while performing a task 
or solving a problem. Introspective reports fail because first, they are 
retrospective rather than concurrent, and second, they invite subjects to 
describe their thinking or to theorize about the causes of their behaviour.
The psychology of thinking can be broadly defined to cover a wide range 
of topics. For example, Gilhooly (1982) distinguishes between directed 
thinking -  as found in problem solving and reasoning -  undirected thinking
-  as in day-dreaming -  and creative thinking. In this chapter we shall focus 
on directed thinking: thought aimed at achieving specific goals. This is an 
area in which reasonable theoretical progress has been made, and for which 
there are clear practical applications in everyday life.
Studies of directed thinking fall broadly into three main areas which are 
described as problem solving, reasoning, and decision-making. We shall 
consider each in turn.
PROBLEM SOLVING
A person has a problem whenever he or she wishes to achieve a goal and is 
unable to proceed immediately to do so. Problem solving consists of finding 
a method of getting from where you are to where you want to be, using such 
resources and knowledge as you have available. This definition obviously 
covers a vast range of human activity; problem solving is clearly involved in 
solving crossword puzzles and choosing chess moves, but it is equally 
involved in finding your way to a new destination, obtaining a ticket for a 
sold-out sporting contest, or working out how to persuade your boss to give 
you a pay rise.
One distinction which has helped psychologists think about the vast range 
of behaviours involved in problem solving is that between well-defined and 
ill-defined problems. In a well-defined problem, all the information needed 
and the means of solution are available at the outset. This is typical of things 
that are set as “problems” in newspapers, and so on, and also typical of much 
research in the psychological laboratory. An anagram is an example of a well- 
defined problem. You know the letters that constitute the solution word and 
also the means of solving the problem — rearrangement of the order of letters
-  at the outset. Well-defined problem solving thus consists of applying 
known rules to known information in order to transform the situation and 
achieve the goal.
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Some of the most famous studies of well-defined problem solving were 
conducted by Newell and Simon (1972). An example of one of their problems 




Subjects are also told that D = 5 and that each letter represents a single digit 
number between 0 and 9. Given this information and the assumption that the 
normal rules of arithmetic apply, it is possible -  though complicated -  to 
work out what all the letter-number pairings must be. If the reader wishes 
to attempt this problem, then it is suggested that a good record (on paper) 
of the sequence of attempts — including errors and correction -  be kept.
Newell and Simon (1972) made an important theoretical contribution with 
the idea of problem solving as a search through a problem space. A problem 
space consists of a number of linked states including an initial or starting 
state and one or more goal states. All problems include permissible operators 
which allows one state to be transformed to another. Thus, solving problem 
consists in applying operators repeatedly to transform the initial state into a 
goal state.
As an example consider the game of chess (also studied by Newell & 
Simon, 1972). The states of the game can be described as the position of the 
pieces on the board plus some additional information (whose turn is it to 
move, do players have the right to castle, may a pawn be captured en 
passant, and so on). The initial state is thus the board with the pieces in 
starting position with White having the right to move. A goal state is any 
position in which the player has won the game either by checkmating the 
opponent or making such a mate inevitable. The permissible operators are 
the laws of chess, which determine the moves that can legally be made in a 
given situation.
Note that these definitions tell us nothing about the strategy of chess. The 
problem space consists of all states that can be reached by legal moves -  a 
vast number of possibilities in the case of chess. The strategy of the game 
obviously consists in choosing between alternative legal moves in such a way 
as to move towards the goal state of a winning position. In chess, as in many 
other problems, the problem space is too large for an exhaustive search to 
be feasible. You cannot consider all moves and all possible replies to more 
than a very few moves ahead without the number of possible positions 
becoming enormous. Thus Newell and Simon (1972) emphasize the import­
ance of heuristic strategies. An heuristic is a short-cut, rule of thumb method 
which may lead to a quick solution, but which may also fail. What heuristics 
do is to drastically reduce the size of the problem space to be searched in the 
hope that the goal state is not excluded in the process.
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Consider the following anagram: GBANRIEK. Since it has eight letters the 
total problem space includes the 8! = 40,320 possible rearrangements of the 
letters. A guaranteed, algorithmic (i.e., exhaustive search) method of solving 
this involves constructing all 40,320 letter strings and checking whether each 
is a word. A typical heuristic method, on the other hand, might involve 
looking for familiar letter patterns to decompose the problem. For example, 
we note that the anagram includes the letters I, N, and G and speculate that
the word might be of the f o r m ____ING. Thus we have now reduced the
problem to solving the five-letter anagram BAREK which has only 5! (120) 
possible solutions and is thus much easier. We may now spot the solution 
word BREAKING. Like all heuristics, however, this was not guaranteed to 
work. Many words contain the letters ING in other configurations, e.g., 
GELATIN.
Problem space analysis is extremely useful as it provides a common frame­
work in which to describe a very wide range of different problems. Newell 
and Simon (1972) studied subjects using think-aloud protocols while solving 
problems such as the cryptarithmetic example given above. They concluded 
that people have sets of general-purpose problem solving strategies that are 
used in similar ways to search problem spaces, no matter what particular 
domain is involved. They implemented their theory in a working computer 
program called General Problem Solver that was claimed to solve the same 
problems as the human subjects and in a similar way.
Important though this work has been, the conclusions are somewhat ques­
tionable. The first difficulty is that most real-life problems are ill defined. 
Some aspect of the problem -  the information assumed, the means of solu­
tion, sometimes even the goal -  is incomplete or missing at the outset. Take 
the case of engineering design which was subjected to detailed psychological 
study by Ball, Evans and Dennis (in press). An engineer is given a general 
specification for a device which includes its functionality — what it must 
do -  and a number of constraints, including costs. The engineer must then 
come up with a technical specification for a device which can be constructed 
and can be demonstrated to work.
As Ball discovered, such problems are not at all well defined. Nearly all the 
information required to solve the problem is implicit and must be retrieved 
either from the existing knowledge and experience of the engineer or by 
researching technical manuals, and so on. In the process of design, con­
straints emerge that were not apparent at the outset. The goal initially set may 
also be modified and rethought as the work progresses. Now such activity can 
still be usefully described within the problem space framework -  a space that 
is being continually augmented and redefined by the knowledge and experi­
ence of the engineer. However, the point is that simply applying the problem 
space description provides no explanation for some of the most important 
aspects of the process, particularly the means by which prior knowledge and 
experience are retrieved and applied.
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A number of more recent studies of human problem solving have focused 
on ill-defined problems and the use of prior knowledge. Of particular interest 
has been the role of analogy in solving problems (see Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 
1983; Keane, 1988). Most real-life problem solving -  including “expert” 
problem solving -  occurs within contexts where the solver has previous 
experience. Clearly, people do not solve all such problems as if seen for the 
first time; they must extrapolate from past experience. The theoretical and 
practical interest lies in how they actually bring their prior knowledge to bear.
A problem that has featured in many of these studies is the tumour 
problem  first introduced by the Gestalt psychologist Duncker (1945). The 
problem is that of a patient who has a malignant but inoperable tumour that 
can be destroyed only by radiation. However, the radiation destroys healthy 
tissue at the same rate as diseased tissue. The solution that subjects must find 
is to use a lens to converge the rays at the point of the tumour. Hence, the 
rays accumulate only to sufficient intensity to destroy the tumour and not the 
healthy tissue they pass through on the way (see Figure 1).
The problem is incompletely defined in that while the goal and constraints 
are generally indicated, subjects must search their knowledge and imagin­
ation for possible means of solution. General knowledge of medical proce­
dures is unhelpful; surgery is out by definition; drug treatments are of no 
relevance. The problem can, however, be facilitated by provision of a struc­
tural analogue such as the General story. The General is trying to attack a 
fortress which is well defended and which may be reached by a number of 
different roads. Each road is mined and may be safely crossed only by a small 
band of men. The General splits his force into small groups which approach
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simultaneously from different directions, and converge at the fortress with 
sufficient force to win the battle.
Gick and Holyoak (1980) showed that presentation of the General story 
could facilitate convergence solutions to the tumour problem provided that 
subjects were given a cue as to its relevance. There is a theoretical argument 
as to whether analogies can work by direct mapping of the elements of the 
analogy on to the problem, or whether the solution is mediated by an abstract 
schema. Gick and Holyoak suggest that subjects may construct and apply a 
convergence schema which is defined in terms of variables. For example, in 
the schema the goal is to destroy an obstacle, the means is a sufficient force, 
the constraint is that direct application is blocked, and so on. The General 
story could lead to development of a schema which is applied to the tumour 
problem.
The notion of schema is a useful one, in that it helps us to understand how 
knowledge may be abstracted, generalized, and applied in new situations. 
The notion will recur in the discussion of reasoning to which we now turn.
REASONING
Reasoning is the process of drawing conclusions or inferences from given 
information. An important distinction is that between deductive and induc­
tive inference. Deductive reasoning involves drawing conclusions that are 
logically valid, that is, they necessarily follow from the premises on which 
they are based. Thus such inferences do not increase the amount of inform­
ation contained in the premises; they merely render explicit what was pre­
viously latent information. The following are examples of valid deductive 
inferences:
The television will work only if it is plugged into the mains;
The television is not plugged into the mains,
Therefore, the television will not work.
John is taller than Jim;
Paul is shorter than Jim,
Therefore, John is taller than Paul.
The validity of the first example does not depend in any way on our 
knowledge of television sets, but only on our understanding of the connective 
“only if” . Any argument of the form p  only if  q; not-q, therefore not-p 
would be logically valid no matter what propositions we substitute for p  and 
q. Hence, validity depends on the form of the argument, not its actual con­
tent. In logic, the statement p  only if  q cannot be true in a world where p  
is the case and q is not the case. Hence, once we know that q is false we can 
infer that p  must be false as well.
The second example requires us to know that the relation taller—shorter is 
transitive. A transitive relation is one where the objects are ordered in a single
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line so that whenever A is higher than B on the scale, and B is above C  then 
A is also above C. Examples of other transitive relations are better-worse, 
warmer-colder, and darker-lighter. Many relations, of course, are not tran­
sitive. If A is next to B and B is next to C it does not follow that A is next 
to C.
Deductive inferences are very important in intelligent thinking as they 
allow knowledge to be stored in generalities and then applied to particular 
situations. Thus if we want to watch television and discover one that is 
unplugged, we immediately plug it in. This is a simple example of reasoning 
in order to solve a problem. The limitation of deductive reasoning, however, 
is that it adds no new knowledge; thus we cannot learn by deduction. Induc­
tion is involved whenever our conclusion has more information than the 
premises. A typical example is an inductive generalization such as
The Australian soap operas I have seen were boring, hence all Australian soap
operas are boring.
Such an inference is clearly not logically valid, though it could well influence 
what you watch when you get the TV plugged in.
The British psychologist, Peter Wason, invented two famous problems 
that have been used extensively to study both inductive and deductive 
reasoning. The inductive problem was first published by Wason (1960) and 
is known as the “2 4 6” task. The subjects are told that the experimenter has 
a rule in mind which applies to “ triples” of three whole numbers. An example 
which conforms to the rule is “2 4 6” . The subjects are then asked to discover 
the rule by generating triples of their own. In each case the experimenter says 
whether the triple conforms or not. Subjects are told to announce the rule 
only when they are very sure that they know it.
The actual rule is “any ascending sequence” but the subject is induced by 
the example to form a more specific hypothesis, such as “ascending with 
equal intervals” . Most subjects have great difficulty in solving the problem 
initially because all the examples they test appear to conform to the rule. The 
reason is that subjects test positive examples of their hypothesis which invari­
ably turn out to be positive examples of the experimenter’s rule as well. Their 
hypothesis can be refuted only by testing a negative example of the 
hypothesis such as “ 1 2 4” which is revealed as a positive instance of the 
actual rule. The set relationships involved are shown in Figure 2.
The protocols discussed by Wason (1960) were very interesting, suggesting 
that some subjects became so convinced of the correctness of their 
hypotheses that they were led to reformulate the proposed rule in different 
terms when told it was wrong. A striking example of this is shown in Table 1.
W ason’s interpretation of his findings was that subjects have a confirma­
tion bias, meaning that they systematically seek out evidence that confirms 
rather than refutes their current hypothesis. He suggested that such a 
confirmation bias is a very general tendency in human thought which may
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U Universal set of all triples 
E Experimenter’s rule -  all 
triples in ascending sequence 
S Subjects’ hypothesis, e.g., 
ascending with equal intervals
Figure 2 Set relationships in W ason’s 2 4 6 task
Table 1 Example protocol from Wason (1960)
8 10 12: two added each time; 14 16 18: even numbers in order or magnitude;
20 22 24: same reason; 1 3 5: two added to preceding number.
The rule is that by starting with any number two is added each time to form  the 
next number.
2 6 10: middle number is arithmetic mean of other two; 1 50 99: same reason 
The rule is that the middle number is the arithmetic mean o f  the outer two.
3 10 17: same number, seven, added each time; 0 3 6: three added each time.
The rule is that the difference between two numbers next to each other is the 
same.
12 8 4: the same number subtracted each time to form the next number.
The rule is adding a number, always the same one, to form  the next number.
1 4 9: any three numbers in order o f  magnitude.
The rule is any three numbers in order o f  magnitude.
(17 minutes)
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account for the maintenance of prejudice and false belief. While a number 
of authors have accepted this interpretation, it has also been subject to 
serious challenge (see Evans, 1989; Klayman & Ha, 1987).
The problem is that the subjects in the “2 4 6” experiment have no way 
of knowing that a positive test cannot lead to refutation of their hypothesis, 
and in many real-world situations it would do so. For example, in science it 
is customary to formulate general hypotheses and test if they apply to specific 
cases. Hence, given the hypothesis “All metals expand when heated” you 
would test any untried metal to see if the prediction holds -  and if it did not 
you would indeed refute the hypothesis. You would not be likely to try 
heating non-metal things, and even if you did and they expanded, it would 
mean only that your rule was insufficiently general.
Arguments such as these have led some authors to suggest that subjects’ 
behaviour on the “2 4 6” is more rational than it at first appears and that if 
there is a bias, it is towards positive testing rather than to confirmation as 
such. A particularly interesting experiment reported by Tweney, Doherty, 
and Mynatt (1980) provides evidence for this. In one study, instead of 
defining instances in positive and negative terms (right/wrong, belonging/ 
not-belonging) they told subjects that all triples were either MEDs or DAXes 
and that “2 4 6” was an example of a MED. What happened was that subjects 
continued to test their hypotheses positively but alternated between testing 
MED and DAX hypotheses. For example, if the hypothesis was that “ triples 
ascending in equal intervals are MEDs and others are DAXes” , then they 
might test “ 1 2 5” predicting it to be a DAX. This meant that they effectively 
tested negative examples of the usual hypothesis and hence solved the 
problem much more easily. The psychological difference is that the negative 
test of MED was construed as a positive test of DAX.
A close parallel to these findings occurs with the second and most famous 
of W ason’s problems -  the four-card selection task (see Evans, Newstead 
and Byrne 1993 for detailed review and discussion). This problem requires 
subjects to test hypotheses via deductive reasoning. In the classic “abstract” 
version of the task, subjects are told that a set of cards always has a capital 
letter on one side and a single-figure number on the the other side. They are 
then shown four such cards lying on a table with the exposed values as shown 
in Figure 3. The subjects are told that the following rule may be true or false:
I f  there is an A on one side o f  the card then there is a 3 on the other side o f  the card.
The subjects’ task is to turn over those cards -  and only those cards -  that 
are needed to decide whether the rule is true or false. The task is deceptively 
simple, since most subjects fail to solve it. The common answers given are 
A alone, or A and 3. The correct answer is the A and the 7. The reason is 
that the rule can be shown to be false only if there is an A on one side of 
a card and number other than a 3 on the other. Only by turning the A and 
the 7 (not a 3) is it possible to discover such a card. There is also no point
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Figure 3 The four cards displayed in a version of W ason’s selection task
in turning the 3 since the rule makes no claim that an A must be on the back 
of a 3.
W ason’s original claim was again that card selections reflected a confirma­
tion bias: subjects were trying to prove the rule true rather than false, that 
is, looking for the combination A and 3, rather than A and not-3. This view 
was, however, refuted to the satisfaction of Wason as well as other authors 
by the finding of “matching bias” reported by Evans and Lynch (1973). They 
pointed out that the preferred selections, A and 3, were not only the verifying 
choices, but also the positive choices matching the items named in the actual 
rule. Verification and matching could, however, be separated by introducing 
negative components into the rule. Consider for example, the rule
I f  there is an A on one side o f  the card then there is N O T a 3 on the other side
o f  the card
If subjects have a confirmation bias, then they should now choose the A and 
the 7 which confirm the two parts of the rule. If, however, they have a 
matching bias then they should continue to choose A and 3 which are the cor­
rect and falsifying combination on this rule. Subjects do, in fact, continue 
to choose predominantly matching values on this and other variants of the 
rule, thus confirming the predictions of Evans and Lynch. Evans (1989) 
regards matching as an example of a generalized positivity bias, that is, bias 
to think about positively defined items, which also accounts for subjects’ 
behaviour on the “2 4 6” task.
Dozens of experiments have been published -  and continue to be published
— in which subjects are asked to solve versions of the Wason selection task. 
Most of these have been concerned with the so-called thematic materials 
facilitation effect. This has its origin in two early studies discussed in Wason 
and Johnson-Laird’s (1972) famous textbook on reasoning. In one of these 
(Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Legrenzi, 1972) subjects were shown envelopes 
in place of cards, together with the following Postal Rule:
I f  the letter is sealed then it has a 50 lire stamp on it.
Subjects were then shown four envelopes which were either front side up and 
showing a 50 or 40 lire stamp, or rear side up showing that they were sealed 
or unsealed (see Figure 4). The subjects had to decide which envelopes to turn
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Figure 4 The four envelopes shown to subjects in the Postal Rule version of  the
selection task
over in order to decide if the rule was true or false. The usual matching 
response on the abstract task would lead to choice of the sealed envelope and 
the 50 lire stamp. However, almost all subjects made the logically correct 
choice of the sealed envelope and the one showing a 40 lire stamp.
The original interpretation offered of this and other similar experiments 
was that use of thematic materials facilitated logical reasoning on the task. 
This view has been considerably refined by subsequent research, however. 
The problem with the Postal Rule is that a very similar rule (involving pence 
rather than lire) was in force in the UK at the time of the study. Thus it was 
argued that subjects knew from experience that envelopes with a lower value 
stamp must not be sealed and that hence no “ reasoning” as such was required 
to solve the problem. This argument was supported by the findings of several 
later studies which showed that first, the Postal Rule produces no facilitation 
of performance in American subjects unfamiliar with such a rule, and 
second, British subjects too young to remember the rule (it was dropped in 
the 1970s) show no facilitation on the problem whereas older subjects per­
form much better.
It is not the case, however, that subjects must have direct experience of the 
context in order for a problem content to facilitate on the selection task. A 
very effective version, for example, is the Sears Problem in which subjects
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are asked to play the role of a store manager checking that a company rule 
has been followed. The rule is
I f  a purchase exceeds $30, then the receipt must be approved by the departmental
manager.
Subjects are shown four receipts, two of which are front side up showing 
totals of above and below $30 and two of which are front side down and 
either have or do not have the signature of the departmental manager on 
them. Few subjects have any difficulty in correctly deciding to turn over the 
receipt for more than $30, and the one that has not been signed by the 
manager. This is despite the fact that subjects have not worked as managers 
in department stores.
While arguments exist about the precise reason for facilitation of perform­
ance by these kinds of thematic content, the general idea is that where sub­
jects have either direct or analogous experience that can be linked to the 
problem, then they can solve it. Another line of argument is that it is the 
introduction of deontic terms such as may and must which carry with them 
notions of permission and obligation that causes the facilitation. The idea is 
that we have generalized reasoning schemas that enable us to understand the 
logic of any situation in which, for example, a precondition is set for an 
action. Thus, once we have identified the action (e.g., sealing an envelope, 
spending over $30) and the precondition (sufficient value stamp, permission 
of departmental manager) we know what to do: we are applying a generalized 
permission schema to the problem at hand.
The two problems of Peter Wason discussed in this section have stimulated 
much interesting psychological work on the nature of human reasoning. The 
specific findings discussed here invite two general conclusions: first, that 
reasoning with “abstract” problem material is heavily biased by a tendency 
to think about positively rather than negatively defined information, and 
second, that the introduction of thematic problem content, and hence 
associated prior knowledge, can have a dramatic effect on the reasoning 
observed, and sometimes produces much better logical performance. The 
“sometimes” in the latter conclusion is needed. Other research, which there 
is no space to discuss here, has also indicated that prior knowledge can be 
a source of bias and error in reasoning. This is especially the case when sub­
jects are asked to evaluate the logic of an argument but have strong prior 
beliefs about the truth of a conclusion (see Evans, 1989, chap. 4).
DECISION MAKING AN D  STATISTICAL JUDGEMENT
In a problem solving task, it is normally possible to work out and demon­
strate a solution to the problem set. Once you have the solution, you know 
it and can prove it. In a decision-making task, however, subjects are required 
to exercise judgement about a choice that will only later prove to work out
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well or badly. Decision-making means committing yourself to choices 
between actions by anticipation of what the outcomes will -  or may -  be. 
Thus when we make any decision -  to accept one job rather than another, 
to marry someone or not, go to a football match rather than stay at home
-  we do so in the hope that the future we chose was to be preferred to the 
one we avoided.
Decision-making is obviously of great importance in the real world, but it 
is a subject of considerable psychological interest too. Most real-world 
decision-making is done under conditions of uncertainty: we do not know for 
sure what will happen as a result of each choice and at best can try to estimate 
the probabilities of different outcomes. If we are to choose rationally then 
we need to evaluate the desirability of these outcomes as well. In the parlance 
of decision theory, we should try to maximize expected utility where utility 
is the subjective value of the outcome and where the term “expectation” 
means that we weight the various possible outcomes by their likelihood of 
occurring. Hence, a small chance of a highly desirable outcome might be 
equally attractive to a much better prospect of a less desirable outcome.
There has been much debate in the psychological literature about whether 
people choose rationally or not. The notion of rational choice has several 
components. First, it implies that people will consciously consider the various 
actions available to them and try to project ahead the possible outcomes and 
further choices to which they lead in what is termed a decision tree. Second, 
it is assumed that they assign probabilities and utilities to each of these out­
comes as accurately as possible in the light of their current beliefs. Finally, 
rational decision-makers are assumed to apply systematic principles, such as 
the maximization of expected utility, in order to decide their final choices.
There are many demonstrations of human choice behaviour that appear to 
depart from this idealized notion. Within the space restriction here I shall 
discuss just one aspect -  the ability of people to judge probabilities or to 
reason statistically. A famous set of papers by the psychologists Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman dating from the early 1970s have apparently 
demonstrated the frailty of human probability judgement. This research is 
often cited as evidence of irrationality, although Tversky and Kahneman 
themselves follow the tradition of work on “bounded rationality” espoused 
by Newell and Simon (1972). The idea is that people cannot base their prob­
ability judgements on probability theory due its computational complexity 
and instead employ short-cut rules of thumb known as heuristics. While 
often useful, such heuristics can also lead to systematic errors and biases.
Of the heuristics discussed by Kahneman and Tversky, the two most 
famous are those of representativeness and availability (see Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982 for a collection of relevant papers, including the 
seminal ones). Probability or frequency of an event is estimated by the avail­
ability heuristic when people base their judgement on the ease with which 
examples can be brought to mind. Such a heuristic would often be effective.
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For example, an experienced doctor might base a provisional diagnosis on 
her recollection of the numbers of previous cases or patients with similar 
symptoms who turned out to suffer from a particular condition. Assuming 
that memory was accurate and that experience was representative then this 
is a good, if rough basis for a judgement.
As Tversky and Kahneman have demonstrated, however, relying on avail­
ability of recalled examples can lead to biases. For example, some types of 
information are easier to retrieve than others, due to the way in which 
memory is organized. For example, most people will say, if asked, that there 
are more words in English that start with the letter k than those that have 
k as the third letter, although the reverse is true. The problem is that it is hard 
to generate examples of the latter category: they cannot easily be “brought 
to mind” .
Availability is also implicated in biases which preserve false beliefs and 
theories. An interesting example is the phenomenon of illusory correlation. 
It has been demonstrated in a number of studies that human judges -  
including experts — hold theories that are not supported by the evidence they 
encounter. For example, some clinicians maintain that projective personality 
tests such as the Rorschach ink blot test is useful in diagnosing mental illness 
despite a lack of any supporting evidence. Research has shown that such 
judges perceive a correlation between test results and diagnoses in a set of 
data in which they are in fact randomly related. A plausible explanation of 
illusory correlation is that the judges selectively remember the cases that 
confirm their expectations or pet theories. Thus confirming cases are more 
available in later recall and bias the judgement of the correlation.
The representativeness heuristic is involved in judgements of conditional 
probability. The likelihood of a sample given a population, or of an event 
given a hypothesis is dependent upon the perceived similarity of the two. Sim­
ilarity judgements may, however, cause the subject to overlook the relevance 
of a critical statistical feature such as the size of the sample, or the base rate 
occurrence of the event. A simple example is provided by the conjunction 
fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Subjects are given a description of Bill 
as follows:
Bill i s . . .
They are then asked to rank the likelihood of several statements including the 
following:
a Bill is an accountant 
b Bill plays jazz for a hobby
c Bill is an accountant who plays jazz for a hobby.
What happens is that most subjects rate the order of likelihood of these state­
ments as a >  c >  b. However, there is a statistical impossibility here in that 
statement c cannot be more likely than statement b. Given two events A  and
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B the probability of them both occurring -  P{A  0 5 )  -  must be less than or 
equal to the probability of either P ( A)  or P(B).  Whenever c is true then b 
is true as well, because Bill plays jazz for a hobby. If all jazz players were 
accountants then the two statements would be equally likely, otherwise b has 
to be more probable.
The explanation offered for the fallacy is that the description of Bill con­
forms to our stereotype for accountants but not for jazz players. Thus the 
statement c is more representative of the description than is statement b and 
hence judged more probable.
One of the most famous of Kahneman and Tversky’s problems is the Cabs 
Problem. You are given the following information: in a certain city there are 
two cab companies: the Blue cab company, which has 85 per cent of the city’s 
cabs, and the Green cab company, which has 15 per cent of the city’s cabs. 
A cab is involved in a hit-and-run accident and a witness later identified the 
cab as a Green one. Under tests the witness was shown to be able to identify 
the colour of a cab correctly about 80 per cent of the time under comparable 
viewing conditions. The subjects are asked if the cab involved in the accident 
is more likely to have been Green or Blue. Most say Green, although the cor­
rect answer is Blue.
The problem is that subjects disregard the base rate or prior probability of 
the cab colour -  85 : 15 in favour of Blue. In fact, when asked to give a 
numerical estimate, most subjects say 80 per cent Green -  the chance of the 
witness correctly identifying a cab. If there were no witnesses, it would be 
obvious that the chance of the cab being Blue was 85 per cent -  the base rate. 
As Figure 5 shows, however, the chance of a Blue cab being identified as 
Green is 17 per cent which is still higher than the chance (12 per cent) of a 
Green cab being identified as Green.
Blue Cabs (85%) Green Cabs (15%)
A Probability o f  Blue identified as Blue = 80% x 85% = 68%
B Probability of  Blue identified as Green = 20% x 85% = 17%
C Probability o f  Green identified as Green = 80% x 15% = 12%
D Probability of  Green identified as Blue = 20% x  15% = 3%
Figure 5 Probabilities in the Cabs Problem
354
T H I N K I N G  A N D  R E A S O N I N G
Originally, the base rate fallacy was interpreted as the base rate lacking 
representativeness, although the explanation is probably more fundamental. 
We find it very difficult to apply abstract statistics to individual cases. Hence, 
many cigarette smokers are aware of the statistical risks for smokers as a 
whole, but do not feel that this affects them as individuals. However, we can 
apply statistics when we see a causal connection. If the cabs problem is 
slightly reworded, most subjects give the right answer. In this version the 
number of Green and Blue cabs in the city is the same, but 85 per cent of 
the cabs involved in accidents are Blue. The image of reckless Blue cab 
drivers conjured up induces subjects to take account of the base rate, 
although from a statistical point of view the problem is unchanged.
CONCLUSIONS
Psychological research on thinking and reasoning has produced some useful
-  and sometimes surprising — conclusions. The common-sense view, that 
intelligent actions are based on conscious and rational acts of thinking, does 
not fit the evidence at all well. If thought is to be defined as the information 
processing that underlies problem solving, reasoning, and decision-making, 
then surprisingly little of this appears to be accessible through introspection.
If human thinking is rational -  and the success of the species suggests that 
it should be -  then that rationality is highly constrained by our capacity to 
process information. In particular, we seem to solve problems and make de­
cisions largely on the basis of heuristic processes which serve us well in some 
circumstances, but lead us into error and bias in others. We seem to have 
particular difficulty in understanding probability and uncertainty despite the 
crucial role that this plays in rational decision-making.
Studies of reasoning also show that we are prone to biases, for example 
in a strong preference for thinking about positively defined information. 
Perhaps the most important finding in this area, however, is the discovery 
that we do not -  as was once thought -  appear to reason by the use of an 
abstract mental logic, but instead seem to be highly influenced by the content 
and context of the problems with which we are faced. The processes of 
human thought appear to be quite specific to the areas of knowledge which 
we are involved in applying.
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Artificial intelligence, cognitive 
psychology, and the future 
Further reading 
References
Artificial intelligence, almost always known as AI, attempts to understand 
intelligent behaviour, in the broadest sense of that term, by getting computers 
to reproduce it. “ Intelligent behaviour” is taken to include thinking, 
reasoning, and learning, and their prerequisites (perception, the mental 
representation of information, and the ability to use language). Indeed, much 
current work in AI is concerned with modelling aspects of behaviour that 
would not normally be thought of as requiring any special intelligence. As 
part of computer science, AI is separate from cognitive psychology, although 
there is a large overlap in subject area. The two come together (with, most 
importantly, linguistics and philosophy) in the multidisciplinary approach of 
cognitive science.
Although AI aims to understand human intelligence, it also aims to 
produce machines that behave intelligently, no matter what their underlying 
mechanism. However, although these machines may not model human 
behaviour, their construction may reflect principles that are useful in 
studying it.
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HISTORY
Since AI depends on computers, it is a relatively new discipline: the name was 
first used in the mid-1950s, though a few years earlier, pioneers such as Alan 
Turing in Britain and Claude Shannon in the United States had worked out 
how to write chess-playing computer programs. The dream of mechanized 
thought has, of course, a much longer history. The philosophers Blaise 
Pascal (1623-1662) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646—1716) built small cal­
culating machines, and conceived grander schemes for formalizing thought 
processes. Charles Babbage (1792-1871) came nearer to building a universal 
computing machine, but was foiled by the limitations of having to use mech­
anical parts. Real computers had to wait for electronic components -  first 
vacuum tubes, then semiconductors.
A conference at Dartford College, New Hampshire, in 1956 effectively 
launched AI research, even though its organizers felt disappointed at the 
time. In retrospect, the most important line of research discussed at the con­
ference was that of Allen Newell and Herbert Simon (see e.g., Newell, Shaw, 
& Simon, 1957) on human problem solving. They proposed the idea of a heu­
ristic (“ rule-of-thumb”) procedure for solving problems, and they shunned 
a line of research based on modelling the properties of networks of brain 
cells, which only assumed major importance again 25 years later, in the guise 
of connectionism. Newell and Simon’s information processing approach was 
the dominant one in the early days of AI, and it remained influential 
throughout the 1960s -  the so-called semantic information processing era. 
There was, however, a subtle shift of emphasis from a formal analysis of 
tasks to one based on the meaning of the information being processed. Fur­
thermore, in attempting to tackle broader problems, such as natural language 
understanding, AI researchers quickly discovered that everyday tasks depend 
on huge amounts of background knowledge. To keep programs manageable, 
they were made to work in limited domains, in particular BLOCKSWORLD
-  a tabletop with prismatic blocks on it. It was hoped that programs that 
worked in these limited domains would scale up to real situations. In practice 
they did not, and in retrospect it is often obvious why they could not.
The 1970s was a somewhat disappointing period in “traditional” areas of 
AI research. Indeed, in the UK the Lighthill report (Lighthill, 1972) con­
cluded that AI should not be a priority area for research. The late 1970s saw 
four important developments. The first was a shift in interest from specific 
computer programs to general principles. To some extent this development 
was linked to the second, the emergence of cognitive science, in which AI 
techniques are used with the primary goal of developing general theories of 
cognition, rather than with the more applied (“engineering”) goal of building 
intelligent machines. The third development was a shift in the research topics 
seen as central to AI. In particular, fifteen years of research on the first 
expert systems was beginning to have spectacular payoffs (in the domains of
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mathematics, medical diagnosis, and determining the structure of complex 
organic molecules) and suddenly everyone wanted to write an expert system. 
In the short term, this enthusiasm generated additional funding and research, 
but it soon became apparent that an expert system in one domain could not 
necessarily be used as a model for one in another domain. If expert systems 
showed that real applications had to come to grips with formalizing real 
knowledge (as opposed to knowledge about toy domains), they also showed 
that this task was a formidable one. The fourth development was the re- 
emergence of neural network modelling, of the kind that had been largely set 
aside by those who espoused the Newell and Simon information processing 
approach. Theoretical developments together with the availability of larger, 
faster computers suddenly saw this approach producing important and 
enticing results.
The 1980s saw the working out of these developments. Although all remain 
important, all have faced disappointments. It is very hard to make an expert 
system that replaces an expert, though much easier to write a program that 
helps one. And it is hard to generalize the lessons learned in one domain of 
expertise. Cognitive science has not integrated its subdisciplines as closely as 
was hoped, and neural network modelling has still to show that it can make 
significant contributions to modelling abilities that call for complex inform­
ation processing, in particular high-level processes in language understanding 
and thinking and reasoning.
KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION
Intelligent behaviour requires information to be stored, either in a short-term 
store or a long-term store or, more usually, both. One of the primary tasks 
of AI is therefore to produce an account of how information is represented 
in an intelligent system.
We know that the human nervous system has many parts, and that those 
parts probably operate in different ways. Nevertheless, there are many attrac­
tions in proposing that all information is stored in the same format. It may 
not be the form of information storage that differentiates information 
processing systems, but the nature of the information and the purpose for 
which it is used. Partly for this reason, many AI researchers have been 
attracted to the idea that information should be stored using the logical lan­
guage known as first order predicate calculus (FOPC), and extensions of it 
that incorporate reasoning about time and modality. An additional attraction 
of this proposal is that, at least in principle, FOPC is computationally tract­
able: given a FOPC database, other facts implied by that database can be 
generated automatically. Other systems of representation are either not 
known to have or known not to have this property.
Unfortunately, although FOPC appears to have desirable properties, in 
practice it is extremely cumbersome to use. Partly because of the uniformity
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of the representation, facts in a large FOPC database can be difficult to find. 
Similarly, although there is a well-established procedure for drawing infer­
ences from facts in a FOPC database (the resolution method, Robinson, 
1965), it very quickly gets bogged down in making all but the simplest infer­
ences. Furthermore, inferences made from a FOPC database cannot be over­
ridden by new information. Everyday inferences can -  they are said to be 
non-monotonic. For example, if I know that John is 25 years old and lives 
in Los Angeles, I infer that he can drive. If I subsequently learn that he 
suffers from epilepsy, I would probably withdraw my previous conclusion. 
Since the late 1970s there have been several attempts to construct non­
monotonic logics, similar to FOPC but with additional rules of inference that 
violate monotonicity. There have also been attempts to formalize non­
monotonic reasoning in other ways. The idea of a truth maintenance system 
(TMS) (Doyle, 1979) has been important in many of these. A TMS stores 
information about the justification for beliefs held, and allows dependency- 
dependent backtracking, so that when a belief turns out to be false, the 
reasons why it was held can be accessed directly and reassessed. None of these 
attempts to handle non-monotonic reasoning has been entirely successful.
Partly as a result of problems with uniform representation systems, such 
as FOPC, many AI researchers have proposed non-uniform representations, 
which allow special procedures for manipulating certain types of inform­
ation. One of the earliest, and best-known, non-uniform representations is 
semantic networks (Quillian, 1968). Semantic networks give a special place 
to the information represented in their links and, in particular, they allow 
efficient processing of taxonomic information. Quillian’s original, and rather 
simple, networks have been extended and elaborated in various ways, and 
representation of information in network form has proved a recurrent theme 
in AI. More complex non-uniform representation schemes that are related to 
semantic networks include frames and scripts. Scripts represent stereotyped 
sequences of events, frames have several uses. In one, frames represent par­
ticular objects and types of object, and a more recent development is that of 
object-oriented programming languages. The first widely used object- 
oriented language was the AI language SMALLTALK. More recently object- 
oriented versions of the most important AI language, LISP, have appeared, 
and languages such as C now have object-oriented versions (C++). Indeed, 
one of the major applications of object-oriented programming is not in AI, 
but in the development of windows-based interfaces for personal computers 
and workstations, where windows are treated as objects.
In the framework of semantic networks, the spread of activation through 
a network is the principal method of extracting information from it. This 
process has usually been simulated on a serial computer, but it ought to be 
achieved more efficiently on parallel hardware. Indeed, one of the most 
important parallel processing computers, the Connection Machine (not to be 
confused with connectionist neural nets), was inspired by Scott Fahlm an’s
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(1979) suggestion for implementing semantic networks on special hardware. 
The idea of distributed processing is also found in neural network models of 
cognitive processing. Neural networks also allow, though they do not 
demand, distributed representations of the knowledge embodied in them. In 
particular, those neural networks that learn to perform tasks, rather than 
having information encoded into them by the programmer, are likely to 
develop distributed representations. Such networks show rule-governed 
behaviour as an emergent property, and the only way to determine exactly 
what rules such a network is following is to examine the relation between its 
inputs and its outputs.
There are many things we cannot be sure of, so a further issue in 
knowledge representation is the encoding and use of uncertain information. 
Inferences from uncertain information are modelled mathematically using 
probability theory and, in particular, Bayes’ theorem, which is familiar to 
psychologists from statistical courses. Complex sets of probabilistic interrela­
tions can be modelled in so-called Bayesian networks. Unfortunately 
Bayesian inference is neither computationally simple nor always the correct 
model of real world uncertain inference. The early expert system MYCIN (see 
below) introduced the simplifying idea of certainty factors  associated with 
each of its diagnostic rules of inference. In recent years attention has focused 
on a more sophisticated mathematical approach known as Dempster-Shafer 
theory and there has also been renewed interest in fuzzy set theory, which 
enjoyed brief popularity in cognitive psychology in the mid-1970s.
VISION
Traditional AI research on vision was concerned, broadly speaking, with 
recognition of the objects -  the prismatic solids -  in the BLOCKSWORLD. 
For computer vision programs, the objects were matt white, uniformly lit (no 
shadows), and placed against a black background. In fact, the general 
problem of object recognition in the BLOCKSWORLD was set aside in 
favour of two of its component problems: finding lines in an image of a 
BLOCKSWORLD scene, and segmenting the image into sets of regions -  
each region corresponding to a surface -  that belong to the same object. 
Indeed, this research came to be dominated by attempts to solve the seg­
mentation problem: many programs required line drawings (rather than 
images) as their inputs.
The most important method of attempting to solve the segmentation 
problem, originally suggested by Alfonso Guzman (1968), was to use inform­
ation about the types of vertex in the scene. G uzm an’s taxonomy was intu­
itive, but it was systematized independently by Max Clowes (1971) and David 
Huffman (1971), who stressed the importance of maintaining different 
descriptions of the image (in terms of lines, line junctions, and regions) and 
the scene (in terms of edges, vertices, and surfaces), and of making systematic
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inferences about the scene on the basis of the image. The Clowes-Huffman 
scheme is limited to scenes with no shadows and in which no more than three 
lines meet at any point. It has three types of line (corresponding to bound­
aries, inside edges, and outside edges) and four basic types of line junction 
(Ts, Ys, Ls, and arrows). From these line types and junction types, 16 
derived junction types can be constructed, which correspond to possible
Figure 1 The 16 derived junction types in the Clowes-Huffman scheme -  4 Ts, 3 Ys, 
6 Ls, and 3 arrows. An arrow on a line signifies that it represents an occluding edge 
(boundary between objects), a plus (+) sign signifies a convex (or outside) edge of a 
single object, and a minus (—) sign a concave (or inside) edge. The direction of the 
arrow indicates the side of the line on which the occluding object lies (to the right
when facing in the direction of the arrow)
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configurations in a BLOCKSWORLD scene (see Figure 1). Identification of 
the basic junction types in the image, plus the application of the constraint 
that any line should be of the same type along its whole length, allows most 
images of permissible scenes to be interpreted.
David Waltz (1975) extended the Clowes-Huffman scheme to scenes with 
shadows and to images in which more than three lines meet at a point. These 
apparently simple changes increased the number of permissible derived junc­
tion types from 16 to about 2,500. Nevertheless, Waltz’s program was more 
successful than those devised by Clowes and Huffman, since he exploited the 
need for consistent labelling of neighbouring junctions. An iterative tech­
nique known as Waltz filtering or, more generally, as relaxation eliminates 
possible labellings of junctions, using this consistency constraint. In most 
cases it rapidly converges on a solution to the segmentation problem for the 
image it is processing.
Steve Draper (1981) and others have identified a number of problems with 
the junction-labelling technique and with an alternative to it known as the 
gradient-space method. Draper invented a technique called sidedness 
reasoning. Sidedness reasoning is about whether two points or surfaces are 
on the same side of a third surface. Draper showed that this technique was 
able to segment all BLOCKSWORLD images but in doing so he virtually put 
a stop to work on object recognition in the BLOCKSWORLD. The reason 
was that his technique wore on its sleeve the fact that it was specific to 
BLOCKSWORLD: it works only when all surfaces are flat. Thus, the idea 
of solving the problem of object recognition in a miniature domain and 
scaling up the solution to the real world would not work.
A quite different approach to the problems of vision is found in the work 
of David Marr (1982) and his associates. M arr’s work integrates ideas from 
AI, psychology, and neurophysiology in what is usually taken to be the 
paradigmatically successful piece of research in cognitive science. The work is 
guided by an underlying philosophy about the study of natural information- 
processing systems. Marr identified three levels at which such systems should 
be studied. First, a task analysis answers the questions of what the system 
does and why it does it. This analysis leads to a computational theory of  the 
system -  an account of the function (in the mathematical sense) it computes. 
The second level of analysis is that of representation and algorithm. The third 
level is that of implementation. In the case of natural information processing 
systems, this level of analysis requires the study of the neural mechanisms 
that support the system. Marr is critical of previous AI work on vision, 
largely because of  its focus on the second level of analysis at the expense of 
the first, to which Marr attached great importance. He is also critical of 
neurophysiological work, such as that o f  Hubei and Wiesel (1962), in which 
the purpose of certain types of cell is inferred from their properties. 
According to Marr, the purpose of a system (and of its parts) can be deter­
mined only by constructing a computational theory.
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In his own work, Marr recognized three main stages of visual processing. 
In the first of these stages, the array of light falling on the retina is trans­
formed into a representation called the primal sketch. The primal sketch is 
a symbolic representation, but it is a representation of the image, not of the 
scene. It contains information about lines, boundaries, and regions in the 
image. The construction of the primal sketch takes place very early in the 
visual system and proceeds on the basis of local interactions between 
processing units (cells) that represent adjacent parts of the image. Although 
these interactions reflect what is known about the early visual system, Marr 
eschewed theories what were motivated solely by neurophysiological evid­
ence. Hence, his demand for independent support -  from task analysis and 
psychological evidence -  for the algorithm and representation he proposed.
In the second stage of visual processing, the 2iD sketch is derived from 
the primal sketch. This sketch is a very short-term memory store into which 
a set of processes writes information about the surfaces (in the scene) 
represented in the image, their orientation, and their approximate distance 
from the viewer: the third dimension is not properly represented, hence 
2iD sketch. The most important of these processes are stereopsis, structure 
from motion, and shape from shading.
Since objects have not yet been recognized, surfaces cannot be identified 
by reference to information about the objects of which they are part. This 
aspect of the construction of the 2iD sketch reflects M arr’s preference for 
bottom-up  (data-driven) theories of visual processing. The only world 
knowledge that such theories can claim the visual system uses is a set of 
general principles, such as what very few points in an image correspond to 
abrupt changes in the surface represented. Specific information about the 
scene being viewed is not yet available.
In the final stage of visual processing, a 3D model description is con­
structed from the 2iD sketch. This representation contains information 
about the identity and three-dimensional structure of the objects in the scene. 
M arr’s account of this final stage is highly speculative, and less closely linked 
with the psychological and neurophysiological evidence. M arr’s basic idea is 
that objects can be represented, in a catalogue stored in long-term memory, 
as jointed generalized cylinders (cylinders whose cross-section changes along 
their length). The principal axes of these cylinders make up stick figures of 
the objects represented. He showed that, subject to certain constraints, 
generalized cylinder representations could be derived from the 2 iD  sketch, 
and then compared with entries in the catalogue, with any necessary rotation 
and bending at the joints. In practice this matching is difficult, and Marr sug­
gested a process of gradual refinement in the match between the image and 
the stored representations in the catalogue. This kind of process can be (rela­
tively) time-consuming, and was rejected by Marr in his analyses of the lower 
levels of visual processing.
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M arr’s work incorporates, in addition to traditional Al-style program­
ming, much straightforward mathematics. Subsequent work on vision, both 
theoretical and applied, has become increasingly mathematical and, hence, 
increasingly inaccessible to psychologists. On the theoretical side, many of 
the problems of visual analysis have been identified as special cases of what 
are known as ill-posed problems. They are ill posed because, as they stand, 
they do not have a unique solution. They can be analysed by a technique 
known as regularization, which requires the addition to the problem of the 
kind of general constraints identified by Marr. On the applied side, special­
ized hardware in the form of very large-scale integration (VLSI) chips has 
allowed, for example, stereo algorithms to be used in real-world applications.
THINKING, REASONING, PROBLEM SOLVING
Historically, problem solving was one of the earliest topics of AI research. 
Furthermore, it has often been argued that it is the central topic, since AI 
techniques in other domains can be seen as special cases of searching through 
a “space” of possibilities for a solution to a problem. For example, parsing 
a sentence can be seen as a search through the (infinite) set of possible 
syntactic structures defined by the grammar of a language.
Occasionally it is possible to examine all possible solutions to a problem 
to find the right one. However, for most interesting problems there are too 
many possibilities to make this approach viable. Usually there are several 
steps in the solution to a problem, so the number of possible moves multiplies 
up at each step, producing what is called a combinatorial explosion in the 
number of potential solutions. A control strategy for searching through 
the space of possible solutions is, therefore, required.
Traditionally, there are two ways of representing problems so that a search 
can be made for their solution. In a state-space representation, problems are 
represented in terms of states of the relevant part of the world, and actions 
(usually referred to as operators) that transform one state into another. 
In this representation, a single path through the tree of possibilities 
( = a sequence of operators) represents the solution to the problem. In a 
problem-reduction representation a large problem is broken up into a 
number of sub-problems, all of which must be solved if the main problem 
is to be solved. State-space representations are easier to construct. Sensible 
reductions of problems can be hard to find, but they are very useful when 
they have been found. In serious AI work on problem solving the two types 
of representation are combined into AND/OR trees. AND branchings rep­
resent problem reductions, where all the sub-goals have to be fulfilled. OR 
branchings represent alternative possibilities in a state space, only one of 
which has to be fulfilled.
Various general control strategies for searching problem spaces have been 
proposed. The most fundamental distinction is between breadth-first and
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depth-first search of trees. In breadth-first search all possible one-operator 
solutions are checked, then all possible two-operator solutions, and so on. 
In depth-first search one possible solution is followed up until it succeeds or 
fails, or until a pre-set depth limit is reached, since a branch in an AND/OR 
tree may never terminate. Simple depth-first and breadth-first search are used 
only in desperation. Usually some method is introduced for following up the 
most promising possibilities. Methods for deciding which possibility is the 
most promising are inevitably heuristic. The most sophisticated method of 
making the choice is the AO* algorithm. However, the algorithm itself does 
not provide the means of measuring which next move is the best. Further­
more, there is no general method for assigning values to moves. A new one 
must be devised for each domain in which the algorithm is used.
Such methods can, nevertheless, be applied to solving puzzle-book 
problems and in game-playing computers (e.g., for chess). In chess-playing 
programs the problem that the computer is trying to solve is not how to win 
the game, but what move to make next. Successful programs run on very fast 
super-computers, so that they can examine vast numbers of possible moves. 
However, they limit the distance ahead (in terms of moves) that they look. 
Since they typically cannot see ahead to a winning position, they have to 
evaluate the positions that they can reach in other ways, and then aim to 
reach the best position that a rational opponent will let them. The play of 
such programs differs in several ways from that of human chess players. The 
standard of the best of them, however, is usually reckoned to be in the 
grandmaster category.
Even if all AI researchers had access to the kind of super-computers that 
chess programmers use, they would not necessarily want to use the same kind 
of brute force problem solving methods, particularly if they were interested 
in modelling human problem solving abilities. Newell, Shaw, and Simon 
(1957) first introduced the idea of heuristic (rule-of-thumb) problem solving 
techniques in their Logic Theory Machine, that proved theorems of logic. An 
alternative way of speeding up problem solving is to use domain-specific tech­
niques, that may be heuristic, but which need not be. An early example of 
an AI program that used a domain-specific technique was Gelernter’s (1963) 
Geometry Machine, which constructed the equivalent of geometrical dia­
grams. It is thought that most human mathematicians, except when they are 
working in completely new areas of mathematics, use domain-specific tech­
niques. More generally, domain-specific techniques are thought to be widely 
used in all types of problem solving.
LANGUAGE
There is a long history of computational research on all aspects of language 
processing. Research on speech, both automatic speech recognition and 
speech synthesis, has been strongly influenced by work on signal processing
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carried out by electronic engineers. More recently, with the advent of larger 
and more powerful computers, the field of speech and language technology 
has emerged, which is primarily directed to producing tools for processing 
large corpora of linguistic data held on computers. Some of the techniques 
developed may be of interest to AI researchers; others are used to derive 
statistical information that is of primary interest to, say, lexicographers.
Work on language processing is divided into three parts, concerned respect­
ively with recognizing or selecting words, computing or generating sentence 
structure, and processing meaning at the level of discourse. Until the 1970s 
AI research on language processing often produced working systems that 
understood a substantial portion of a language such as English. Winograd’s 
(1972) SHRDLU, a program that talks about moving blocks around the 
BLOCKSWORLD, represents the apotheosis of this work. However, it has 
since become obvious that the component parts of language processing are each 
so complex that they must be studied separately, if real progress is to be made.
Recent work on word identification has been largely dominated by neural 
network modelling, in particular the TRACE model of auditory word iden­
tification (McClelland & Elman, 1986) and Seidenberg and McClelland’s 
(1989) model of visual word identification. The TRACE model is “hand- 
coded” . It does not use distributed representations, and hence its mode of 
operation is easy to discern. It has interacting banks of detectors at three 
levels: for the auditory features of sounds, for phonemes (sounds that cor­
respond roughly to letters), and for words. The Seidenberg and McClelland 
model, on the other hand, is a model that learns. One of its most interesting 
features is its eschewal of lexical representations: all its knowledge is encoded 
in links between orthographic and phonological features.
Investigations of the computation of sentence structure (parsing) have 
taken two rather different directions. On the one hand, computational lin­
guists worry about problems such as the linguistic niceties of describing sen­
tence structure and the computational properties of the procedures that 
derive the structure for a particular sentence, given a description of how sen­
tences in its language can be structured (a grammar). One of the most impor­
tant developments in computational models of parsing is the introduction of 
unification-based approaches (e.g., Kay, 1985). Unification is a technique 
that is widely used in other branches of AI, in particular theorem proving. 
Unification-based parsers, like some other parsers, such as chart parsers, 
have the additional advantage of clearly separating information about how 
sentences can be structured (the grammar) from information about how sen­
tence structure is computed (the parsing algorithm). In contrast with 
researchers whose primary interest is in the computational properties of 
parsing systems, those who attempt to model the way that people derive sen­
tence structure have to take account of well-established empirical findings on, 
in particular, what happens when people encounter a syntactic ambiguity. It 
is not yet clear how these two approaches to parsing can be integrated.
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Understanding and generating discourse still remain formidable tasks. AI 
research has often been hampered by a restricted or ad-hoc approach to word 
meanings. One hope is that linguistically more sophisticated approaches to 
word meaning, such as Jackendoff’s (1990) conceptual semantics, will be 
taken up by AI researchers. At the level of sentence meaning, AI researchers, 
at last, agree about the importance of compositional semantics of a broadly 
Montagovian kind (Dowty, Wall, & Peters, 1981). However, the major 
problems in describing discourse level processing, which have been known 
for many years, still resist satisfactory analysis. Some of the most important 
are figurative and indirect uses of language, coherence, ellipsis, and the role 
of the other participants’ beliefs.
LEARNING
For historical reasons, learning has been a comparatively neglected topic in 
AI. The information processing approach to understanding intelligent behav­
iour was seen as a radical alternative to the behaviourism that had dominated 
psychology, and which placed a strong emphasis on learning. Furthermore, 
traditional AI aimed to study intelligence at an abstract level, independent 
of both its genesis (learned or programmed) and its underlying mechanism 
(carbon or silicon). The study of learning has come back into its own with 
the increasing importance of connectionist modelling. Nevertheless, a 
number of important studies of learning have been carried out in the sym­
bolic framework, and the diversity of the learning mechanisms that they 
investigate contrasts sharply with the behaviourist approach.
Learning by being told often involves little more than adding a fact to a 
database. However, more abstract pieces of information, such as advice on 
the best strategy for winning a game, may need to be operationalized.
A more complex kind of learning is learning from mistakes. Gerald Suss- 
m an’s (1975) program HACKER writes its own mini-programs for solving 
problems of stacking and unstacking blocks in BLOCKSWORLD. However, 
it can learn only when it can almost solve a problem, and its performance 
is crucially dependent on its having a “teacher” who presents it with a suit­
ably graded set of problems. Patrick Winston’s (1975) program that learns 
concepts for configurations of blocks (such as arches) in BLOCKSWORLD, 
similarly learns from almost correct information. When told that something 
is not quite an arch, it can use that information to deduce what distinguishes 
arches from non-arches.
As well as recognizing the importance of being almost correct, Winston 
also emphasized that an important aspect of learning is what is sometimes 
called induction -  going beyond the information embodied in the examples 
presented to the program to form general concepts (in his case) or rules. 
Positive instances suggest generalizations of the concept or rule, negative 
instances suggest specializations (or restrictions). Research subsequent to
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Winston’s, particularly that of Ryszard Michalski (e.g., 1983) has systema­
tized the study of induction, and shown that it can be regarded as a special 
case of search, with the search space being the set of possible generalizations 
statable in a particular language. Michalski’s approach is more powerful than 
Winston’s, but less closely related to human learning. It can also be used for 
the related task of discrimination learning. Its disadvantage is that it works 
straightforwardly only if the generalizations are formulated using exactly the 
same predicates that are used to describe the instances.
Winston’s program can learn more complex concepts (such as arch) only 
because it knows simpler concepts (pillar, lintel). This aspect of the program 
relates, very crudely, to the question of how much of what we know about 
language is learned, and how much is innate. In the case of concepts, it has 
been argued (e.g., by Fodor, 1981) that all concepts must be innate. More 
generally, it is widely, though not universally, believed that many general 
principles governing the form of possible languages are innate, and that the 
availability of these principles to the language learning mechanism explains 
how it is able to achieve what appears, on mathematical analysis, to be a 
difficult or impossible task.
Another famous example of learning by generalization is Arthur Samuel’s 
(1963) checkers (draughts) program. This program develops a general 
method for evaluating board positions by comparing computed evaluations 
with the way the game actually turns out, and revising, if necessary, the 
method of evaluation.
A more ambitious, and more controversial, attempt to study a different 
kind of learning -  learning by exploration -  is found in Doug Lenat’s (1982) 
AM (Automated Mathematician) and EURISKO programs. AM starts with 
a collection of set-theoretic concepts and ways of combining them, and 
creates further mathematical concepts from them (e.g., positive whole 
number, prime number, the fundamental theorem of arithmetic -  that every 
number can be expressed as a product of prime factors).
None of the programs described so far provides a convincing model of 
human learning. People can learn things very quickly, though they often 
make mistakes in doing so. This very quick learning depends on particular 
ways of using background knowledge. Two lines of research that attempt to 
model this kind of learning investigate analogy-based learning and 
explanation-based learning. The importance of  analogy in learning and 
problem-solving has long been recognized in cognitive psychology. None the 
less the underlying processes are difficult to model computationally, not least 
because the domain from which an analogy is drawn need not be specified 
in advance. In explanation-based learning (see e.g., de Jong, 1988) a single 
event or episode is explained on the basis o f  a theory about the relevant 
aspects of the world. That explanation is then generalized so that it will be 
useful in other situations.
Traditional AI work on learning has embodied a variety of  ideas. An
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alternative tradition, running from the British Empiricist philosophers of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the behaviourists and neo­
behaviourists of the twentieth century, has seen all learning as the formation 
and strengthening of associations between ideas. In a modified form, this 
notion also underlies recent connectionist accounts of learning. Connec- 











Figure 2 A simple connectionist network showing the three types of unit -  input,
hidden, and output -  and the connections between them
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activation that can be passed from one unit to another. A typical machine 
has three layers of units: input units, hidden units and output units (see 
Figure 2). Such machines can learn in several ways, but the most popular is 
known as a back propagation. It is a supervised learning method in which 
a stimulus is encoded at the input units and produces an output at the output 
units. The supervisor tells the machine what the output should have been, 
and the difference between the actual and expected outputs is propagated 
back through the network of units, and used, in a precisely specified way, to 
adjust the (associative) strengths of the connections between them. Adjust­
ments are small, because the machine must not produce the correct response 
to the last input at the expense of responding grossly incorrectly to other 
inputs. Learning is slow, sometimes very slow, but a stable set of associative 
strengths is usually reached.
Another biological metaphor that has inspired AI work on learning is 
evolution. Genetic algorithms (e.g. Goldberg, 1989) use complex rules to per­
form tasks. The parts of these rules can be recombined by processes that are 
analogous to the genetic operations that take place in the germ cells during 
sexual reproduction. The resulting rules are then allowed to perform their 
task for some time, and their performance is assessed. Those that do best 
re-enter the “ reproductive” process.
APPLICATIONS
Intelligent machines should be of  more than academic interest. However, 
most of the machines that we interact with in everyday life, for example au to ­
matic bank tellers, are not intelligent. More intelligent machines -  often 
referred to as expert systems -  do have applications. However, despite the 
hopes of the early 1980s, it now appears that expert systems will typically be 
used to assist experts, rather than to replace them. Perhaps the most im­
portant area of application for intelligent programs is in medical diagnosis, 
though there are obviously ethical problems in this domain. One area in 
which computers play a crucial role is in modern scanning techniques (CAT, 
PET, NMR, etc.). The basic use of computers in scanning is to generate 
appropriate images. Intelligent programs might also help to produce diag­
noses from images.
One of  the earliest, and best known, medical diagnosis systems is MYCIN 
(Shortliffe, 1976), which diagnoses serious bacterial infections so that life- 
saving antibiotic drugs can be administered before a culture has been de­
veloped. The development of such a system requires the gleaning of  inform­
ation about the diseases in question and their symptoms. Some of  this 
information is elicited from experts, sometimes with difficulty, as the experts 
cannot necessarily verbalize their knowledge. TEIRESIAS (Davis, 1982) is a 
program that attempts to automate this knowledge transfer, and also to use 
the knowledge already in MYCIN to generate user-friendly explanations of
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its diagnoses. Other diagnostic inform ation com es from statistical records. In 
an expert system all the inform ation is usually represented in a uniform way, 
so that new inform ation can readily be added. The rules for making infer­
ences are stored separately, and an attempt is made to keep the inferential 
processes simple. One o f  the major aspects o f  inference in expert systems is 
com bining uncertain bits o f  inform ation to produce a best guess, for example  
at a diagnosis. This com bination is som etim es achieved using standard  
statistical (Bayesian) techniques and som etim es using dom ain specific rules, 
as in M Y C IN  (see above).
M Y C IN  also form ed the basis o f  the first expert system shell, E -M Y C IN , 
which is M Y C IN  stripped o f  its dom ain-specific knowledge. Expert system  
shells were the first o f  several attempts to make the creation o f  new expert 
systems easy. Success has been partial. E -M Y C IN , for exam ple, is most suc­
cessful in other medical diagnosis system s, such as P U F F , which diagnoses  
pulm onary diseases.
A nother well-known expert system is D E N D R A L  (Lindsay, Buchanan, 
Feigenbaum , & Lederberg, 1980), which works out the molecular structure 
o f  large organic m olecules from their mass spectrograms. D E N D R A L  has 
been in regular use by research chemists for som e time. A n additional pro­
gram, m eta -D E N D R A L , attempts to form ulate new rules using the induction  
techniques described above.
A  second area in which AI has sought to find application is in com puter- 
assisted learning (C A L). W ith the expansion o f  higher education in the UK, 
C A L  is likely to becom e increasingly im portant, though it is as yet unclear 
what the contribution o f  AI techniques will be. The current focus o f  attention  
is on m ultim edia, and in particular hyperm edia learning too ls , which provide  
facilities for exploring large databases in various ways, but which rely on  
much o f  the intelligence resting in the instructions and with the student.
The intelligent tutoring systems o f  A I, on the other hand, try to be intelli­
gent them selves. Such system s have three main com ponents: a know ledge  
base which could , in principle, incorporate m ultim edia options, a m odel o f  
the student, and a set o f  teaching strategies. The know ledge base is used to  
impart inform ation  directly to students, but it is also used to generate ex­
planations o f  why students’ answers to questions are wrong. This process, in 
turn, m akes use o f  the m odel o f  the student to decide what kinds o f  m iscon ­
ceptions students will have. Such indirect m ethods o f  teaching meet with 
som e success, but they prove com paratively difficult to im plem ent in a 
tutoring system .
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
AI research, m ore than that in other sciences, has been surrounded by 
philosophical controversy. T w o related issues have provided the m ajor focus
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o f  debate. The first is whether machines can think, and the second is what 
role they should be allowed to play in our lives.
The question o f  whether machines can think, although one that excites the 
popular im agination, is not necessarily a clear one. One crucial aspect o f  it, 
however, is whether there is a difference between com puter programs that 
m odel phenom ena such as the weather, which simulate processes in the 
world, but do not reproduce them , and AI programs. In other words: is a 
com puter running such a program really intelligent, or is it just simulating  
intelligent behaviour? On one view, most programs lack real intelligence  
because they do not interact with the world. The sym bols that they m anipu­
late have meaning only because o f  the way they are interpreted by their 
programmers. On this view a robot that based its interactions with the world  
on its internal com putations could be intelligent. An opposing view is that 
real intelligence can be m anifest only in biological systems (Searle, 1980). To  
support this thesis Searle put forward his fam ous Chinese room  argument. 
If he sat in a room  m anipulating sym bols according to the rules em bodied  
in a com puter program, he might, from the outside, be described as reading 
and answering questions in Chinese. He would not, however, understand  
Chinese. So, understanding Chinese is not just running a program. H ow ever, 
Searle’s view o f  what else it is, basically being a biological intelligence, 
appears to have no foundation , and has been dubbed protoplasm  chauvinism  
(Torrance, 1986).
If m achines, or at least robots, can be intelligent, we might at som e time 
in the future have moral responsibilities towards them , or we might be in 
danger o f  being dom inated by them . To som e extent the moral issues raised 
by such considerations are just those that arise in the application o f  any  
science. The difference is that we might be faced not sim ply with a substance  
or technique that might be m isused, but with som ething that is itself an 
“alien” intelligence. H ow ever, it is difficult to pinpoint, as W eizenbaum
(1976) has tried to do, the sense in which intelligent com puters pose a special 
threat.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, AND  
THE FUTURE
Since the m id-1970s there has been an enorm ous growth in AI research. It 
is no longer possible, as it once was, for an AI researcher, let a lone a p sych o­
logist, to keep up with developm ents in all o f  its subfields. Furtherm ore, 
m uch o f  AI has becom e very technical: m uch m ore so than cognitive psy­
ch o logy . N evertheless, the best science often  is technical; if  cognitive p sychol­
ogists are not to risk being usurped, they should  keep at least one eye on  
developm ents in A I.
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